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This dissertation investigates the immediate effects of securities analysts' 
statements on shareholders. Two of the most important questions posed in research on 
capital markets are when and how analysts matter. A time at which analysts might matter 
is when they make pronouncements regarding a firm or industry; ways in which they 
might matter is through their word choices and the context of their words in these 
pronouncements.  
The question, "Do analysts matter?,” has been explored before and has been 
answered in terms of the securities analysts' quantitative earnings forecasts and their 
effects on the capital markets. I investigated the discourse used in these earnings forecasts 
and other statements regarding the focal firm or industry in analyst reports. Therefore, I 
answered the question, “Do analysts matter, as defined by their words used, and do they 
change investors’ judgments about a firm's future prospects?”  The study employed 
content analysis of analysts' language to determine whether the words they use in their 
statements cause a response in the market. The study also investigated how the analysts’ 
language differs based on their affiliations. 
 vii 
To examine this question, I drew on the efficient markets theory from finance. 
Data sources included the Chicago Centre for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) tapes 
and First Call analyst reports. The research applied quantitative computer text analysis, 
the event study methodology, and regression to test the hypotheses.  
By studying statements from the All-American Team analysts, the present work 
shows that investors do consider the pronouncement of analyst statements significant. 
The results demonstrate support for the idea that analyst statements have an impact on the 
stock market. Moreover, the statement characteristics have an incremental effect on the 
market response. The key findings illustrate that words in the analysts’ report matter. The 
analyst characteristics were instrumental in deciding the words that the analysts use in 
their reports. Finally, analysts use words to signal information to investors when they are 
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When Jack Grubman first encountered estimating firms’ earnings as a fledgling 
telecommunications analyst at PaineWebber, times were simpler than they later became. 
No blast fax messages from firms were sent. No conference calls to discuss quarterly 
numbers with analysts, investors, and journalists were made. E-mail, the Internet, and 
CNBC did not exist. "You had to call up the firm, and then you could spend three days 
regurgitating what was in the press release," recalls Grubman about the earlier period 
(Anonymous, 1999a: 103). He was speaking of conditions in 1982.  
Now, chief executive officers (CEOs) give national television interviews minutes 
after major news items are released. Hard news and bawdy rumors about firms abound on 
the web. Media-trained talking heads and money managers fill the airwaves around the 
clock with their commentary on the most obscure news outlets. The market has 
increasingly come to rely on analysts to wade through and interpret the volumes of 
information available about the market. "There's now a research component in almost 
every aspect of Wall Street's business," says Greg Ostroff, co-chief operating officer of 
investment research at Goldman, Sachs & Co. "It's gone from being 'nice to have' to 
being vitally important".(Anonymous, 1999a: 103).   
 Reshaping the securities analyst's job are forces increasingly familiar to all 
businesses today: technology, globalization, consolidation, and convergence. These 
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forces are completely revamping the firms that analysts cover as well as the ones for 
which they work. Cross-national and cross-industry enterprises are becoming more of a 
norm. Another factor in this melee is the unprecedented demands that analysts face from 
the banking side of the securities business. Record merger, spin-off, and corporate-
finance activities mean more road shows (proposal trips), beauty contests (competitions), 
and pitch books (capabilities material) than ever before. And, deals like the 
DaimlerBenz–Chrysler Corp. or Citicorp–Travelers Group mergers make transaction 
analyses more difficult, because the deals are increasingly global and cross-industrial. 
"There's an incredible demand for information from analysts," says Alfred Jackson, 
managing director and head of global research at Credit Suisse First Boston (Anonymous, 
1999a: 103-104). Analysts must manage these heightened responsibilities under a 
spotlight of extraordinary brightness. The most famous analysts are celebrities, but all 
research professionals play to a much larger audience than ever before. Bad calls are 
harder to hide; good calls, when stocks rise or fall sharply, can become stunning media 
events. In short, analysts’ research and opinions are more important to investors than at 
any previous time.  Analysts’ messages, written and spoken, carry more weight and 
generate more interest than they did even 10 years ago. Given investors’ unprecedented 
interest in analysts’ opinions, I am interested in the effect of analysts—specifically, the 
effect of their words—on shareholder wealth. 
 To research the effect of analysts’ messages on securities, I will make use of the 
theoretical literature in finance that deals with efficient markets. My hypothesis is that 
securities analysts' discourse—their words both written and oral—is correlated with 
investors' revision of their judgments about a firm's future prospects. This hypothesis 
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holds that the effect of analysts' discourse is that stock prices and shareholder wealth may 
be affected when investors, relying on an analyst’s words in a statement, anticipate a 
change in the future performance of the firm and behave according to that anticipation.   
The next section of this chapter describes the analysts. Then, I discuss the 
motivation for this dissertation. After that, I explain key terms used in this study. The 
chapter concludes with a general overview of the dissertation. 
 
Who Are Analysts?  
Every year, top graduates of MBA programs are hired as securities analysts. 
Securities analysts work in research departments of brokerage companies or investment 
banks. The analysts focus on gathering and analyzing information about firms or stocks. 
They report on businesses or stock offerings, provide information for mergers and 
acquisitions, and evaluate firms’ financial soundness (please see Figure 1 for an example 
report). Usually, analysts are members of the Financial Analysts' Federation, a 
professional body governing their standards and behavior (Friedson, 1986). The Financial 
Analysts' Federation issues the title "certified financial analyst" to analysts who pass 
qualifying exams and sign a code of ethics. This code is the major industry standard 
governing analysts' conduct, and states, inter alia, that:  
 “The financial analyst, in relationships with an issuer of securities . . . shall use 
particular care and good judgment to achieve and maintain independence and 
objectivity; and (2) The financial analyst, when making investment ratings, or 
taking investment actions, shall disclose to his clients any material conflict of 
interest relating to him . . ., which could reasonably be expected to impair his 
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ability to render unbiased and objective advice.” (reprinted in Morley, 1988, p. 
12) 
 
** Insert Figure 1 here ** 
 
In conducting research about a firm, analysts use financial reports such as annual 
reports, make site visits, and interview management personnel regarding firm prospects. 
Analysts research the firm's history, management, products, markets, financing, past 
earnings, and future earnings potential. The output is often a report or a presentation to 
investors or money managers that highlights the analysis of the firms' prospects and 
makes a recommendation for the company's brokers or customers. The recommendation 
is generally to buy, hold, or sell the stocks detailed in the report or presentation. Many 
institutional investors rely on the earnings forecast and stock recommendations provided 
by the securities analyst community. Experienced analysts are also involved in 
investment banking deals or stock offerings. In these situations, they work as part of a 
team to prepare registration statements that are filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  
The typical responsibility of an analyst is to follow 10 to 20 stocks in a given 
industry or economic sector. Analysts are primarily categorized as either buy-side or sell-
side. The ultimate product of a sell-side financial analysis is a report evaluating a firm's 
securities. Although both sell-side and buy-side analysts make recommendations about 
which stocks to buy, sell, or hold, sell-side analysts are the primary producers of earnings 
forecasts. Buy-side analysts tend to be employed by money management companies or 
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institutional investors, whereas sell-side analysts tend to be employed at broker/dealer 
companies that serve individual and institutional investors. Buy-side analysts’ 
recommendations to buy stock can be executed immediately as part of a planned 
investment strategy. Examples of buy-side analysts are analysts from institutional 
investors and mutual fund companies such as Fidelity Investments, T. Rowe Price Group, 
Vanguard Group, and Putnam Investments. Sell-side analysts’ recommendations involve 
placing stocks on a "buy" list, disseminating written reports, and making 
recommendations to their clients.  Examples of sell-side analysts are analysts from 
investment banking companies such as Citigroup Smith Barney, Goldman Sachs, Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch, and J. P. Morgan. In my dissertation, I will explore the 
recommendation differences driven by the type of analyst writing the report.  
 
Rationale and Importance of the Dissertation 
In a market in which intermediaries—that is, those who interface between the 
buyers and the sellers—command significant influence, sellers concentrate on courting 
the intermediaries' opinions (Hirsch, 1972) such that the market, in effect, links sellers 
and intermediaries, rather than sellers and buyers. In the stock market, securities analysts 
play this intermediary role (Burk, 1988). There is controversy in the literature, however 
(e.g., Barker, 1998; Branson, Guffey, and Pagach, 1998), about the importance of the 
securities analyst’s intermediary role in the stock market.   
Researchers have noted that organizational stakeholders exert a strong influence 
on analysts. For example, analysts whose employers are affiliated with a firm through 
underwriting relationships issue more favorable research reports than unaffiliated 
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analysts do (Lin and McNichols, 1998). Lin and McNichols found that stakeholder 
pressure was associated with analysts changing their recommendation to “hold,” when 
“sell” was warranted. Schipper (1991) suggests that because buy-side and sell-side 
analysts work for different types of companies, their incentives probably differ. The 
employer’s influence on the analyst leads to a different recommendation from the analyst, 
which in turn changes the investment community’s interpretation of the analyst’s 
statements regarding a firm's future prospects. I draw on such organizational stakeholder 
ideas for setting up my hypotheses. 
 This dissertation's practical relevance is underscored by the important role 
analysts play in the market as sources of information, mechanisms of information 
efficiency, and providers of benchmarks for consensus valuation (Barker, 1998). In the 
1980s, stock price was a reflection of a firm’s earnings forecast. Currently, the stock 
price, in part, is derived from analysts' estimates (Portnoy and Jastrow, 1999). This means 
that the market’s perceptions of analysts' statements are becoming increasingly more 
important (McGinnis, 2002). 
The majority of the previous research into the overall consequences of analysts' 
forecasts, and the effect of their statements on the stock market in particular, has not paid 
attention to the words in the statements. As several researchers have shown, not all 
numerical forecasts for a given firm carry the same weight in the stock market—even if 
they forecast the same numbers (e.g., Hayward and Boeker, 1998). The market reaction 
varies based on the rationales offered for the numerical forecast. Interestingly, however, 
research on analysts’ forecasts generally has not gone beyond the familiar quantitative 
numbers such as earnings forecasts. Ho and Harris state that “the significant differences 
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in the magnitude and timing of pricing responses to various statements suggest 
opportunities for improved use of analysts’ statements in both empirical research and in 
constructing investment strategies” (2000, p. 466). Research concentrating on 
quantitative data in analysts’ statements may be less useful and not fully applicable in 
understanding the stock market reaction. An inclusion of the words surrounding the 
analyst statement would enable more of an insight into the consequences of the analyst 
statement. I propose that past results are equivocal due to omission of variables that 
would describe analysts’ statements more fully. In this regard, in studies of the research 
and development disclosure environment (Entwistle, 1999) and corporate performance 
(Bettman and Weitz, 1983), researchers have suggested the inclusion of content analysis 
in future studies. Echoing the need for a more complete scrutiny of analysts’ forecasts, 
Rogers and Grant (1997) specifically suggested the inclusion of content analysis in the 
study of analyst reports.  
The variations in types of analyst statements and their effects on the market 
provide detailed insights into the subtle interactions between the analysts and the market. 
Researchers Ho and Harris (2000) examined the full text of analysts' research reports to 
characterize the explanations analysts provide for their recommendation changes. 
Documenting the rationales allowed a perspective into what information analysts provide 
in making their recommendations and whether these rationales differ in positive 
(upgrades) versus negative (downgrades) investment advice. Ho and Harris looked at 
price responses to different rationales provided to investors, paying special attention to 
whether the market reacted more when the analyst presented new information on the 
underlying firm (e.g., revisions in earnings forecasts) as opposed to citing only already 
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publicly available information on changes in share price. Market participants apparently 
paid attention to the words behind analysts' investment advice. Price responses suggested 
that investors placed a higher value on explicit fundamental information (new 
information) provided by analysts rather than the price-basis recommendations. The 
largest price reactions were to recommendation changes supported by an analyst's revised 
earnings forecast (again, new information). For instance, downgrades supported by 
earnings forecast revisions engendered significantly more pronounced (negative) price 
responses than downgrades explained by general business factors or recent share price 
movements (public information). Despite the larger price reactions to explicit 
fundamental information, price responses were significant even when the rationale for the 
rating change was recent movement in the share price with no stated change in the 
assessment of firm fundamentals. Such price-basis changes may indirectly reveal 
analysts' fundamental information and suggest analysts play roles of both information 
collector and information interpreter. 
 In addition, one possible explanation for the equivocal results of studies of the 
effects of analyst statements on shareholder wealth (e.g., Barker, 1998; Branson, Guffey, 
and Pagach, 1998, and many others that will be examined in the Literature Review 
Section in more detail) is that they failed to consider adequately the words, and the 
words' context, of the statements that were studied. Therefore, word analysis represents 
an omitted variable in the body of research done to date. This study will consider a more 
complete content analysis of analysts’ pronouncements than was done in previous 
studies. 
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 In the next section, I define key concepts for understanding the literature reviewed 
in subsequent chapters. 
 
Key Concepts 
The key concepts used in this study are listed and briefly described below: 
market efficiency, abnormal or excess returns, and content analysis of analysts’ 
statements. 
Market efficiency refers to the proposal that "prices fully reflect available 
information" (Fama, 1970: 383) and is articulated in the Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
(EMH). However, when investors have new information, which causes them to revise 
their expectations about the future of a firm, changes in prices can occur. In summary, the 
stock price at any time fully reflects investors' expectations about the future of the firm. 
Abnormal or excess returns is the difference between an observed return and an 
expected return. The observed return is the actual change in the price of a stock over 
some time interval. The expected return is the change for the stock that would be 
expected over the same time interval due to the general market change. I will use 
abnormal or excess returns as the measure of changes in investors’ expectations as a 
consequence of the analyst statements. 
“Content analysis may be described as the systematic, objective, quantitative 
analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 14). It includes careful 
examination of the quantitative investigation of word usage in newspapers, reports, TV 
programs, and the like. The past few years have seen a rapid advancement in computer-
text content analysis software, with a corresponding proliferation of online archives and 
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databases (Evans, 1996). I will use content analysis to study word usage in analysts’ 
statements in reports and media interviews. 
 
Key Definitions 
For the sake of clarity throughout the dissertation, company, and firm are used in a 
specific manner. 
Company refers to the analyst’s employer, and 
Firm refers to the entity that the analyst evaluates. 
 
Summary 
In the foregoing, the key assertion is that we can better understand when and how 
securities analysts matter in the stock market by looking at how investors react to the 
actual words analysts use in statements. One way that an analyst’s statement might matter 
is that it might influence investors’ expectations for the future performance of the firm. 
Content analysis provides a proficient and theoretically feasible way to describe these 
statements and evaluate the dissimilarities among them.  
The outline of the rest of the dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, I cover the literature that is relevant to the argument advanced above, pose 
research questions, and develop hypotheses that will be tested. In Chapter 3, I focus on 
the methodology that will be used. In Chapter 4, I go through the results. In the final 





LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
This study proposes that analysts’ statements and characteristics provide signals 
to the stock market. These signals may be important because investors and stock prices 
may react to analysts’ statements and characteristics on the basis of the words used in 
those statements. Shareholder wealth may change when investors expect a change in the 
prospects of a firm based on the analyst characteristics and the words used by the analyst 
in a statement. The goal in this chapter is to review the literature leading to this argument 
and to develop research questions and hypotheses regarding the analyst characteristics, 
and the antecedents and the effects of such analyst statements. 
Before delving into the literature regarding analyst statements and characteristics, 
I examine the efficient markets theory and its relevance in this study. Another central 
issue is the question of "Do analysts matter?" I will also respond to that question and go 
through the literature surrounding it. 
Previous research has considered the effects of analysts’ forecasts on stock market 
reactions. Researchers have found both large stock price reactions to analysts’ coverage 
(Branson, Guffey, and Pagach, 1998) and no abnormal price reactions (Bidwell, 1977; 
Diefenbach, 1972; Logue and Tuttle, 1973). Moreover, two characteristics of analysts’ 
statements, the quantitative forecast itself and the one-word recommendation buy, 
outperform, hold, or sell, have been scrutinized to a large degree. However, other 
statement characteristics, such as the words in the analyst reports, have received 
negligible attention. There are both analyst-focused and investor-focused reasons, which I 
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will cover in later sections, why such analyst statement characteristics may help mold the 
nature of the market reaction.  
 Now, the stock market is viewed as an efficient market wherein all new 
information is instantaneously reflected in stock prices. In such an environment, how is 
the information in analysts’ statements—the forecast numbers and the words surrounding 
the numbers—assessed by the investors. Before addressing this question, I will briefly 
review efficient markets and the influence of analysts in such markets. 
 
Efficient Markets 
The efficient markets hypothesis (Fama, 1970, 1991) asserts that stock prices 
fully reflect all information about a firm. In addition, if there is new information, 
investors quickly react to the new information and re-price the stock. If there are 
unexpected returns, it means that there is some information that has changed investors’ 
prospects about the future of the firm. 
Although the efficient markets hypothesis has been strongly supported in the last 
four decades, there have been periodic challenges. DeBondt and Thaler (1985), among 
other researchers, have raised questions about the validity of the efficient markets 
hypothesis. The main points of contention relate to excessive reactions of markets by 
amplifying events, reactions to extraneous information, and long-term inconsistencies. 
Chan (1988), Ball and Kothari (1989), and Zarowin (1989) have varying explanations for 
the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) results. Fama (1998) comprehensively countered the 
challenges to the efficient markets hypothesis. As far the excessive reactions of markets, 
Fama showed an even split between apparent overreaction and underreaction anomalies. 
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Also, Fama found that the long-term return inconsistencies are sensitive to methodology 
and tend to become marginal or disappear when exposed to different models for expected 
(normal) returns or when different statistical approaches are used to measure them. In 
summary, Fama showed that even when viewed one-by-one, most long-term 
inconsistencies could be reasonably attributed to chance.   
Researchers (Schleifer, 2000) offer a behavioral explanation as an alternative to 
efficient markets. This view suggests that investors’ response at any given moment may 
be driven by psychology much more than driven by the value of the firm. Now, if there is 
a response to an analyst’s statement, measured by unexpected returns, that would suggest 
a change in investors’ expectations about future performance. For the efficient-markets 
proponent, the explanation for the investors’ response is that investors are rational and 
that any under- or over-reaction is due to the anomalies encountered in event studies 
(Fama, 1998). In contrast, for the behavioral finance advocate, the under- or over-reaction 
is due to investors' underlying behavior in terms of how a problem is framed by the 
investors (Schleifer, 2000). This dissertation looks at investors’ response, irrespective of 
whether it is driven by psychology or by the perceived value of the firm.  
 Given the above background of efficient markets, the next question to address is: 
Do analysts matter? If they do matter, how do they matter? 
 
Do Analysts Matter? 
Analysts are among the most visible individuals in the stock market. In the stock 
market milieu, investors have a difficult time assessing firm prospects, especially because 
the relationships between firm actions and firm performance are uncertain. Analysts help 
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provide explanations for firm outcomes, some of which can pay off practically. As an 
example, in a study of over 1,500 recommendations over a three-year period, Womack 
(1996) reported that a buy recommendation by an analyst could increase a stock price by 
2.4 percent, whereas a sell recommendation could reduce it by 9.1 percent.  
Academic researchers have differing outlooks on whether analysts matter. On the 
one hand, researchers have noted that firms that analysts follow lightly, experience larger 
stock price reactions to announcements of analyst coverage initiation than either 
previously covered firms or more heavily followed ones (Branson, Guffey, and Pagach, 
1998). These authors examined the response of the securities market to the announcement 
of sell-side analysts' decisions to initiate coverage of a firm. The market reaction to the 
initiation announcement and the accompanying investment recommendation were studied 
by disaggregating the sample based on existing analyst coverage at the announcement 
date. Analyses suggested that, on average, there was a significantly larger, positive stock 
price reaction to buy recommendations conveyed in announcements of coverage initiation 
for firms with a small existing analyst following as compared to such announcements for 
firms receiving no prior analyst coverage. All of this suggests that analysts matter in the 
stock market.  
On the other hand, results from other studies have inferred that analysts have a 
limited or nonexistent role in the stock market. For example, Barker (1998) found that 
information from annual reports is more important to price determination than what 
analysts say about the firms. Barker studied an important question for accounting 
research: Does there exist an equilibrium mechanism whereby fund managers' investment 
decisions can be fully informed? He approached this question by developing a grounded 
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theory of the market for information. The evidence suggested a two-part theory. It was 
argued that raw data flowing directly from firms were considerably more important to 
fund managers than processed data generated by analysts. However, it was argued that 
analysts play some role in the market for information—as both mechanisms of 
information efficiency and providers of benchmarks for consensus valuation. Barker's 
theory implied that the research literature has paid insufficient attention to the role of 
accounting information in direct communication between firms and fund managers and, 
related to this, that the role of analysts in share price determination has been overstated 
and only superficially understood.       
Bernstein (1998) goes so far as to question the role of securities analysts in a 
world of computers, efficient markets, and increasingly sophisticated measurement tools. 
His contention is that most analysts are doing what they have always done: massaging 
familiar data, making heroic efforts to explain why the results of the latest quarter differ 
from their forecast, and attempting to make an earnings forecast for the next four quarters 
that will necessitate a minimum amount of explanation afterwards. The abundance of 
sophisticated information available to portfolio managers and individual investors renders 
the bulk of analysts' work duplicative. Bernstein suggests that "analysts' tasks must be 
restructured, or analysts must be disposed of altogether" (1998, p. 4). 
Beginning with Cowles's (1933) well-known study "Can Stock Market 
Forecasters Forecast?," researchers have periodically questioned whether analysts matter 
in the stock market. Scholars, such as Bidwell (1977), Diefenbach (1972), Logue and 
Tuttle (1973), have found that the recommendations of most analysts do not produce 
abnormal returns: that is, analysts do not matter as far as the value of their 
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recommendations. Criticisms of sample bias or imprecise data do lessen the impact of the 
“analysts do not matter” findings (Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1983; Dimson 
and Marsh, 1984; Elton, Gruber, and Grossman, 1986; Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum, and 
Lease, 1979). 
It is true that brokerage companies make enormous investments in collecting, 
analyzing, and publishing research and recommendations (Womack, 1996). Moreover, 
anecdotal evidence (e.g., Portnoy and Jastrow, 1999) suggests that analysts’ 
pronouncements can affect organizations and perceptions about them. One example of 
this is the 12 percent jump in the price of the Razorfish stock after an analyst at Volpe, 
Brown, Whelan and Company began to cover Razorfish. Several researchers cite analyst 
coverage as an important component of firms' information environments. For example, 
Shores (1990) studied the preemption of annual earnings surprises by interim disclosures. 
He found that the analyst following (the number of analysts following a stock) is a proxy 
for the level of interim information available about the firm. Bhushan (1989) equated 
analyst following with the economy-wide amount of information gathering in his model 
of disclosures. All the above indicates that when analysts follow firms, there is an 
increased amount of information available to investors in the stock market. Moreover, 
proponents of the “analysts matter” viewpoint suggest that analysts' access to unique 
information allows them to gain or sustain a competitive advantage (Williams, Moyes, 
and Park, 1996). And top analysts have been cited as the differentiating factor in 
companies identified as the most admired (Stickel, 1992). Schipper (1991) and Francis 
and Philbrick (1993) point out that accounting scholars expend great energy analyzing the 
earnings and cash flow forecasts of analysts, even though producing earnings forecasts is 
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secondary to analysts' main objective of making timely stock recommendations. Buy and 
sell recommendations follow from predictions of stock values using all available sources 
of industry and firm-specific information; therefore, the predictions offer a direct test of 
the ability of well-informed market participants to outperform stock market averages 
(Womack, 1996). 
There is also empirical evidence that suggests analysts’ forecasts matter in the 
stock market. Womack (1996) argues that stock recommendations embody valuable 
information for which the brokerage company should be compensated. The written 
reports of securities analysts are followed closely by news, business, financial, and 
professional publications and were the most frequently cited sources of non-firm 
communication in several studies (Anonymous, 1999a; Latane and Tuttle, 1970; 
McGinnis, 2002). Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) researched the quality of financial 
analysts' forecasts of earnings and their value to investors. They compared analysts' 
forecasts and mechanical prediction models in the formulation of profitable investment 
strategies and found that the analysts' forecasts predicted earnings more accurately than 
mechanical prediction models. Their study evaluated the effectiveness of analysts' 
forecasts as surrogates for the market’s expectation of earnings and compared it with that 
of prediction models commonly used in research. Results indicated that analysts’ 
prediction errors are more closely associated with security price movements, suggesting 
that analysts' forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts 
generated by computer generated time-series models. The study also identified factors 
that might contribute to the performance of the financial analysts' forecasts: the broadness 
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of the information set employed by analysts and, to a lesser extent, their reliance on 
information released after the end of the fiscal year.  
It is possible that the determination of whether analysts matter depends on the 
constraints under which those analysts work. Some researchers have viewed analysts as 
constrained by their environment in many ways. For example, analysts' incentives and 
strategic concerns can influence their forecasts and can cause the analysts to issue biased 
recommendations (e.g., Dugar and Nathan, 1995; McNichols and O'Brien, 1997). 
Womack (1996) found that buy recommendations occur seven times more often than sell 
recommendations, suggesting that brokers are reluctant to issue sell recommendations 
because the costs of issuing these recommendations are greater than the costs of issuing 
buy recommendations. Pratt (1993) describes these costs: (1) sell recommendations can 
harm a brokerage company's present and potential investment banking relationships and 
thus are discouraged by the company's investment bankers, and (2) top management and 
investment contacts may limit or cut off the flow of information if an analyst issues 
unfavorable ratings. Veit and Murphy (1996) investigated the responses of securities 
analysts to a mail survey about their own ethical behavior and the ethical behavior of 
people with whom they work. They discovered that the pressures from environmental 
constraints led to criminal conduct in some situations. The researchers found that 16 
percent of the respondents acknowledged writing reports with predetermined conclusions 
frequently, and an astonishing 40 percent indicated writing reports with predetermined 
conclusions periodically. This particular environmental constraint emanates from senior 
management pressure—29 percent of the analysts had been asked by a senior manager to 
do something considered unethical. 
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However, there has been work that shows that there are very limited amounts of 
environmental constraints on analysts. Researchers (e.g., Barron and Stuerke, 1998; 
Daley, Senkow, and Vigeland, 1988; Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; 
Ziebart, 1990) have found large variance in analysts' forecasts. These researchers have 
used the forecast as a measure for the degree of lack of consensus among analysts. This 
lack of consensus seen by some researchers implies that analysts sometimes have very 
modest constraints.  
Much of the discourse up until now has dealt with the question of whether 
analysts matter. Investors’ reactions to the analysts’ statements lead one to believe that 
investors do indeed think that analysts matter in the stock market. The next level of 
inquiry that comes up is: When and how do they matter? Further, specifically how do 
investors respond to different analysts? In the following section, I go through the 
differences in analysts, as evidenced by the analyst characteristics, and then explore 
reasons as to why analyst characteristics should be studied and the effect of the analyst 
characteristics in the stock market. 
 
Analyst Characteristics 
Analyst characteristics have been defined by academic researchers (Brown, 2001; 
Clement and Tse, 2003a; Clement and Tse, 2005; Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999; Mikhail, 
Walther, and Willis, 1997) as analyst attributes that can be used to distinguish between 
more and less accurate stock forecasts. Prior research has found that analysts’ stock 
forecasts are related to several analyst characteristics such as forecast frequency, broker 
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size, the number of firms and industries that the analyst follows, the analyst’s general and 
firm-specific experience, and past accuracy.  
Lieberman and Asaba (2006) and Sinha, Brown, and Das (1997) show that there 
are differences among analysts, and that there are desirable characteristics of analysts. 
For example, Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) recognized analyst experience as a 
desirable analyst characteristic. Clement (1999) found evidence of experience plus 
number of firms followed, number of industries followed, and size of brokerage house 
among the set of desirable characteristics. Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) validated 
forecast frequency as a desirable analyst characteristic.  
Academic researchers have identified specific intuitively appealing analyst 
characteristics (covered below) that enable investors to distinguish between superior-
performing and inferior-performing analysts.  
Number of firms and industries covered  
The number of firms and industries covered by an analyst is simply the number of 
firms and industries that the analyst follows in the stock market. Clement (1999) utilizes 
the number of firms and industries that the analyst follows as a proxy for the analyst task 
complexity. Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) and Clement (1999) find that the analysts’ 
performance is worse when they follow more firms and industries when compared to the 
performance of other analysts that follow fewer firms and industries. 
Analyst experience 
 The analyst experience can be classified as general experience, namely the 
analyst’s experience as an analyst, and firm-specific experience, which would be the 
experience that the analyst has covering a specific firm. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 
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(1997) and Clement (1999) identify analyst experience as an important analyst 
characteristic. Clement (1999) uses the analyst's firm-specific and general experience as a 
proxy for ability.  Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) posit that analysts "learn-by-
doing,” and demonstrate that analysts with longer experience forecasting a particular firm 
produce more accurate forecasts. Sinha, Brown, and Das (1997) studied the performance 
of analysts over time and noted that analysts improve their performance with experience. 
Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) and Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) find that analysts’ 
performance improves when they gain firm-specific experience, but the researchers found 
no association for general experience. On the other hand, Clement (1999) finds that 
forecast accuracy increases with both firm-specific and general experience. Furthermore, 
Clement (1999) and Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) (based on the results from one 
subsample) observed that analysts with the incremental firm-specific experience show 
superior performance as compared to incremental general experience. 
Company size 
The analyst’s employer has been identified by researchers as an important 
characteristic. Clement (1999) utilizes company size as a proxy for resources for which 
an analyst has access. He finds that the analyst performance is explained by company size 
more so than by analyst experience. Clement (1999) proposes that analysts backed by 
better resources and those with greater experience will perform better, and that task 
complexity reduces their performance. He shows that analysts employed by larger 
brokerage houses, those with more focused experience, and those with less complex 
portfolios produce more accurate forecasts. Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1997) also document 
that analyst performance is positively associated with brokerage size. In addition, Hong 
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and Kubik (2003) find that better performing analysts move to a high-status (namely, 
large and prestigious) brokerage company.  Moreover, they find that high-status 
companies are more likely than other companies to dismiss an analyst for poor 
performance. 
Forecast frequency 
 Forecast frequency is defined as the number of forecasts the analyst makes 
regarding a firm in a time period. Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) demonstrate that forecast 
frequency is an important factor in explaining analyst performance. They used forecast 
frequency as a proxy for the amount of time the analyst devotes to following a firm. 
Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) predict that analysts who update more frequently will 
improve their performance, and find results consistent with that prediction. Jacob, Lys, 
and Neale (1999) also confirmed Clement’s (1999) result that company size is more 
important than experience in explaining analyst performance. However, Jacob, Lys, and 
Neale (1999) find that forecast frequency was the most important analyst characteristic. 
Prior forecast accuracy 
Brown (2001) has extended prior studies by investigating how well all of the 
above-mentioned analyst characteristics, except forecast frequency, predict analyst 
performance. He finds that the analyst’s past performance has greater predictive power 
than all of the other analyst characteristics combined. However, past accuracy is a noisy 
measure for determining analyst performance (Clement and Tse, 2003b). For example, 
able forecasters occasionally make a large error, and inept forecasters sometimes forecast 
accurately simply by chance 
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The next two sections cover analyst actions and investor assessments as they 
relate to analyst characteristics. The analyst-oriented research delves into what we can 
learn about analysts from the analyst characteristics and the relationship between analyst 
characteristics, behavior, and performance. The investor-oriented research explores the 
method through which investors assess analysts and their influence on the firms’ stock. 
 
Analyst Characteristics and Actions 
Analyst characteristics may shed light on analysts’ actions and their performance. 
The connections between analysts’ characteristics, actions, and performance are due, in 
part, to the attributes of the analyst task. The tasks of analysts are marked by high 
uncertainty and variety (Francis and Philbrick, 1993). Analysts conduct complicated 
decision-making in a multifaceted environment. In such an environment, analysts are 
likely to depend on cognitive shortcuts and decision-making heuristics evolved from past 
practices (Hopkins, 2003).  
Bonner (1999) found that an analyst’s judgment and decision-making (JDM) 
skills are shaped partly by his or her characteristics. Having certain characteristics 
enables the analyst to notice and think through alternatives that others cannot, and 
consequently, performs well in his or her function. However, JDM skills of analysts are 
hard to compute in general. Individual investors and even professional investors are not 
apt to have information on these JDM skills. However, characteristics such as experience 
and others covered in the beginning of this section, can be used to deduce these skills. 
Researchers, like Birnberg and Shields (1989), have shown empirical relationships 
between analysts’ JDM skills and analysts’ characteristics. Thus, an analyst’s possession 
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of specific characteristics may be considered by investors as a sign that the analyst will 
deliver better performance. 
 
Investors’ Assessments of Analyst Characteristics 
In this section, I will cover the instantaneous effect on investors of analyst 
characteristics. To understand the effects of analyst characteristics, it is imperative to take 
into account the process by which the investors might measure such characteristics. Thus, 
it is essential to ascertain what investors will pay attention to, and why, and also how they 
will react to what they have observed. Investors face an unsure and multifaceted situation 
in the stock market while gauging an analyst. How do investors develop opinions, and 
what information do they utilize while considering the impact of the analyst? The 
reasoning that follows in the rest of this section proposes that with incomplete and unsure 
information, investors will defer to using easily accessible, easy-to-infer information.  
In the financial economic literature, stock market reactions are viewed as 
providing hard numbers that reflect the true underlying value of a firm. In addition, in the 
financial economic literature, the stock price is considered to be derived from logical 
behavior and perfect information. However, in practice, the market operates quite 
differently. Prices in the stock market and reactions to events are the perceptions of a 
heterogeneous rational audience (Baker, 1984). The perceptions are based on information 
processing by individuals either superficially or systematically (Chaiken, Liberman, and 
Eagly, 1989). Individuals will exert whatever effort is required to attain a sufficient 
degree of confidence that they have accomplished their processing goals (Eagly and 
Chaiken, 1993). The individuals’ processing goals can vary, and this variance influences 
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how the individuals go about obtaining the requisite information, superficially or 
systematically, to make their decisions (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)  
Stock market investors make their decisions by examining the available 
information provided by the analyst and arriving at their conclusions regarding the 
outlook for a firm under consideration. However, investors, including professionals, are 
likely to have limited background knowledge regarding the antecedents for the 
information provided by the analyst. Brown and Mohd (2003) have noted that even 
though many appealing attributes of individual analyst earnings forecast accuracy have 
been identified, there is no evidence regarding the predictive validity of these attributes. 
In such a situation in the market, investors will base their decisions on easily 
understandable and accessible information. Investors would likely rely on easily 
communicated information, such as analyst characteristics provided in accounts of 
analysts, when they do not have personal knowledge of an analyst for their investment 
decisions (Clement and Tse, 2003b). 
Investors are stymied by limited attention, recall, and processing competencies 
when faced with the copious amounts of information streaming in the stock market 
(Shiller, 1999; Hirshleifer, 2001). In addition, the investors have to contend with 
incomplete information about an analyst and his or her abilities (Hopkins, 2003). Under 
such circumstances, investors are likely to base their decisions by relying on available 
information about the analyst. Analyst characteristics information about the top analysts 
is readily available in web sources and in other media reports. The available 
characteristics information enables the investors to form expectations about the 
performance of the stock.  
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We tend to categorize individuals based on prototypes (Rosch, 1978). Investors 
form their perceptions of analysts in terms of how the analysts match their own 
stereotypes and prototypes (Burk, 1988). Moreover, investors develop biases that are 
activated instantly by information about analyst characteristics, for example, employment 
in a high status company (Hong and Kubik, 2003).  
Researchers (Gilbert and Hixon, 1991) have shown that perceptions are more 
driven by stereotypes when the resources for information processing are limited. When 
investors are faced with evaluating an analyst statement about a firm, they may use 
stereotypes about the analyst to determine the expected performance of that firm. The 
analyst stereotypes may be described by the analyst’s characteristics. In addition, 
according to the efficient markets hypothesis, when new information from the analyst 
statement changes expectations about the future firm performance, then investors respond 
with stock price changes. If the investors utilize analyst characteristics to form their 
expectations of future firm performance, then the firm stock price response, in part, will 
be determined by the analyst characteristics when the analyst delivers the report. 
A follow-up research question pertains to whether certain analyst characteristics 
elicit a positive or negative response in the firm stock. Are the investors looking for or 
responding to a preferred set of analyst characteristics? If there is more of a match with 
the preferred analyst characteristics, the investors would have more of a favorable view 
of what the analyst is reporting. 
This dissertation proposes that the stock market will respond favorably to an 
analyst who fits a general prototype that contains desirable characteristics. When analyst 
characteristics match the desired profile and that analyst recommends a stock, there will 
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be a positive reaction from the investors. The upward stock movement is from a positive 
reconsideration of firm expectations by the market participants, and the investors’ actions 
would lead to a positive change in a firm’s stock price.   
 
The previous sections covered the subject of efficient markets. Also, the sections 
covered the questions of if, when, and how analysts matter. Arguments presented above 
suggest that the characteristics of analysts are an important way in which they are 
different and that investors may be influenced by such characteristics. In addition, an 
analyst statement also allows us to assess the impact of analysts by looking at the analyst 
statement’s consequences. While other researchers have considered the consequences of 
analyst statements on shareholder wealth, such research has taken a limited view of how 
the analyst statements are different. In the section that follows, I will go into more details 




Analysts’ statements, in the form of reports, present an opportunity to research the 
effects of analysts. Although, there has been much attention directed towards analysts’ 
statements resulting in hundreds of research papers, there is much that is not known and 
that has not yet been studied (Ghosh and Whitecotton, 1997). This dissertation focuses on 
how analysts’ statements affect the immediate changes in a firm's stock price when the 
analyst statement is issued. There has been work done in that particular topic, the 
consequences of analysts’ statements, which will be covered below. During the topic 
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discussion, some holes will be identified that this dissertation will explore. However, 
before doing that, a general review of the studies on the consequences of analysts’ 
statements is conducted below. 
Analysts’ statements are key because of the real and the perceived importance of 
the analyst (Williams, Moyes, and Park, 1996). The analyst is the evaluator who provides 
guidance on a firm's earnings expectations and is held answerable to investors (Britt, 
2002; Palepu, 1990). The analyst’s statement is often what the public views as the 
assessed firm’s position in the market (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Moyer, Chatfield, and 
Sisneros, 1989). In addition, a change in the recommendation by an analyst is an 
occurrence that generates anxiety for firm employees (Jorge and Rees, 2000) and for 
outside parties as well (Womack, 1996). The analyst’s statement often transmits 
information regarding the prospective course of the firm (for example, Anonymous, 
2002). 
Research on analysts’ statement consequences has been done from three 
standpoints. The first standpoint proposes that the analyst statements have a beneficial 
influence on the firm because they help motivate the firm’s managers (Chung and Jo, 
1996). The second standpoint proposes that the interruptions caused by analysts’ 
statements have an adverse impact on firm functioning (Lin and McNichols, 1998; 
Williams, Moyes, and Park, 1996). The third standpoint proposes that analysts’ 
statements have no influence (Colker, 1963; Diefenback, 1972; Logue and Tuttle, 1973) 
on the firm, and that any connection between the analyst statement and the firm 
performance is simply coincidental (Anonymous, 1999b). 
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Given the hundreds of studies on analyst statement consequences, there is backing 
for all three standpoints. As an example, analysts’ statements were found to have a 
beneficial influence on the firm when the objectives of the analysts and the firms were 
aligned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Analysts have been found to mitigate agency 
conflict—conflict that arises due to misaligned objectives among the stakeholders of a 
firm. For example, Wright and Ferris (1997) have found that in some situations, senior 
executives adopt corporate strategies in response to political pressures even if these 
strategies may be costly to shareholders. They found that noneconomic pressures may 
influence managerial strategies perversely. In such cases, the analyst can have a 
beneficial influence on firm functioning by reducing the level of agency conflict between 
the firm's shareholders and management. The beneficial influence is because the analyst 
provides a monitoring function similar to a board of directors (Fama, 1980), or a bond-
rating entity (Fama and Jensen, 1985). Chung and Jo (1996) report a positive and 
significant correlation between firm quality and the number of analysts following the 
firm. This evidence is consistent with the benefit of analysts serving as independent 
monitors. 
In contrast, Lin and McNichols (1998), Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003), 
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000), and Michaely and Womack (1999) among others 
found a strong negative effect for analysts’ statements on organizations. By issuing 
biased recommendations, the analysts affected organizations’ performance negatively. 
For example, Lin and McNichols (1998) and Eccles and Crane (1988) examined the 
effect of underwriting relationships (relationships between the firms that analysts 
evaluate and the analysts’ employers) on analysts' recommendations. They found that the 
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affiliated analysts' recommendations were significantly more favorable than those made 
by unaffiliated analysts, although the underlying earnings forecasts did not justify such 
bias. Affiliated analysts are analysts whose companies have investment banking 
relationships with the evaluated firms. Unaffiliated analysts are ones with no 
relationships between their company and evaluated firms. 
Finally, support for the standpoint that analysts’ statements do not matter has also 
been found (example, Anonymous, 1999b). The Walker Information Global Network 
survey reported that financial analysts came in last when business executives worldwide 
were asked to prioritize their stakeholders' importance. The survey spanned 26 countries 
over a seven-month period during 1998 and 1999 and canvassed more than one thousand 
multimillion-dollar firms worldwide.  
The differing conclusions from the studies above note that analyst statements 
sometimes do have influence, but when and how remain unclear. 
Initial research on stock market responses to analysts’ statements concentrated on 
the announcement of the statements themselves. Cowles (1933) saw no significant effect 
on stock prices as a result of the analyst statements themselves. Colker (1963), 
Diefenback (1972), and Logue and Tuttle (1973) confirmed this result. However, Davies 
and Canes (1978) noted that there is significant average abnormal stock-price 
performance due to the publication of analysts’ recommendations. Their study has 
received support from empirical studies by Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum, and Lease 
(1979), Copeland and Mayers (1982), and Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1983). 
Ambiguous results in research driven by these standpoints on analyst statements, 
and which rely on stock market response to measure their effect, suggest that answering 
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the “when and how” questions require the addition of contingent factors (Bjerring, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1983). Contingent factors could be the words in the analyst 
statement in addition to the sole focus on the numerical forecast. Some study (Ferreira 
and Smith, 2003) has been done in this area, in response to calls for additional research 
addressing the hypothesis that “the words behind the investment advice matter” (Ho and 
Harris, 2000, p. 466). Up until now, investigators have given hardly any consideration to 
the words in a statement, especially the words’ characteristics, when attempting to 
evaluate the influence of an analyst’s statement. 
Hitherto, the main advance in the analyst statement research involving the study 
of word characteristics has been to consider the one-word recommendation in the analyst 
report, e.g., sell, hold, outperform, or buy. It would seem that the stock market reaction to 
an analyst statement is not easily accounted for solely as a reaction to the one-word 
recommendation. To advance a full model of the reactions to analysts’ statements, 
researchers must consider variables that previously have been ignored (Ho and Harris, 
2000). One overlooked area where work remains to be done is in looking at the words in 
an analyst’s statement: the word characteristics in the reports. I suggest that past results 
are equivocal due to omission of variables that would describe analysts’ statements more 
fully. 
One paper has considered content analysis of analysts’ reports:  namely, the 
analysis words surrounding the numerical forecasts (Ho and Harris, 2000). These 
researchers derived the broad rationales for the analysts’ recommendations from the 
report and used these rationales as the variables. Their findings show that the language 
used in justifying an upgrade is likely to cite general business prospects, whereas the 
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language in referring to a downgrade is accompanied by a forecast of reduced earnings. 
My research will move beyond prior work by looking at a fuller characterization than this 
paper does. In the next section, I go into details of additional word characteristics in 




As described above, most of the research that has looked at the impact of 
analysts’ statements on the stock market has utilized either the quantitative forecast 
number or the one-word recommendation to capture the characteristics of a statement by 
an analyst. However, analysts’ statements vary from each other on more measures than 
just these two (Breton and Taffler, 2001; Entwistle, 1999; Previts, Bricker, Robinson, and 
Young, 1994; Rogers and Grant, 1997). To improve our comprehension of how analysts’ 
statements might vary and when and how these variances might be important, it is 
essential to study a fuller characterization of analyst statements. 
The enhanced description I propose includes additional word characteristics, such 
as optimism, pessimism, activity, certainty, uncertainty, realism, and commonality. There 
are two main motivations for researchers to study these analysts’ statement. The first 
reason is analyst-centered and has to do with what we can understand about analysts from 
these characteristics and the connections between statement characteristics, analysts’ 
actions, and analyst performance. The second reason is investor-centered and has to do 
with understanding how investors might evaluate analyst statements and the influence of 
the analyst statements on firm performance. 
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Statement Characteristics and Analyst Actions 
 One of the concepts in this dissertation on analysts’ statements is that the 
complexity of the firm-evaluation task and the analyst’s decision-making process allows 
us to draw inferences about analysts’ actions from statement characteristics. Traditional 
research has assumed that financial analysts are rational experts in the market for 
information (Kahn and Rudd, 1999). This view presumes that analysts incorporate new 
information immediately and in an unbiased manner. However, several studies have 
reported inefficiencies and/or biases on the part of analysts in incorporating new 
information into their statements (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Mendenhall, 1991; 
Teoh and Wong, 2002). For example, Hunton, McEwen, and Bhattacharjee (2001) found 
a propensity among analysts to engage in risky choice behavior and several studies have 
suggested that motivational incentives at analysts’ companies can influence forecast 
accuracy and lead analysts to issue biased statements (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; 
Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Hunton and McEwen, 1997; Schipper, 1991). 
Researchers have emphasized statement characteristics, in part, because of the 
difficulties in measuring attitudes, behaviors, and decision-making processes, especially 
among analysts. Statement characteristics (such as optimism, uncertainty, activity, 
realism, and commonality) are defined as features in a statement that help to distinguish 
one statement from another. Differences in bias, optimism, or other statement 
characteristics provide indicators of differences in analysts’ choices (Dugar and Nathan, 
1995; Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Hunton and McEwen, 1997; Kahn and Rudd, 1999; 
Lin and McNichols, 1998; Schipper, 1991).  
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 Statement characteristics may provide hints about analysts’ biases because 
analysts have a range of word choices available for use in their statements. Further, the 
presence of certain statement characteristics may be looked upon as a signal of analyst 
intent, which in turn may influence market participants’ expectations regarding the 
evaluated firm’s future performance based on the characteristics in the analyst statement. 
 
Investors’ Assessments of Analyst Statement Characteristics 
 In this Section, I look at the instantaneous effect of the characteristics of the 
words in a statement by an analyst on the securities market. Stock market prices and 
responses to events are not rational, nor are they entirely irrational. The market consists 
of a diverse set of participants that are purposeful but constrained (Westphal and Zajac, 
1998) who arrive at their outlook for the future based on their analyses of existing 
information. Specifically, where a statement by an analyst is concerned, the market 
participants are likely to have limited knowledge and likely lean on quickly accessible 
data that they can comprehend effortlessly. The market participants are likely to have 
confidence in simple, socially imparted information, such as can be communicated by the 
characteristics of the words used in a statement by an analyst, because they do not know 
the analyst personally (Beneish, 1991; Ho and Harris, 2000). 
 To deal with partial information about a statement by an analyst (Ho and Harris, 
1998), market participants may make decisions, at least in part, based on the analyst’s 
statement. Why? First, because market participants are restricted in their capabilities due 
to their limited concentration, comprehension, and recall competencies (Hirshleifer, 
2001; Shiller, 1999). Second, because the words in an analyst’s statement are easily 
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available and regularly highlighted through the ubiquitous media outlets. In fact on the 
day a statement is issued, the characteristics of such words may be the only information 
the market participants have.   
Analysts’ statements allow us to measure the influence of analysts by looking at 
the consequences of their statements. Prior research has delved into the influence of 
analysts’ statements on the market. However, the extant research has primarily looked at 
the impact of the numerical forecast. As shown above, there is a research opportunity to 
look at analysts’ statements beyond the hitherto studied numerical forecast or one-word 
recommendations. 
Analysts’ statements have also been shown to be strongly influenced by the nature 
of the financing that the evaluated firms choose to obtain. The brief section below delves 
into the links between firm financing and the analysts, and how such links could likely 
influence analysts’ statements.  
 
Analysts and Firm Financing 
Research papers show that analysts, whose employers are investment banking 
houses with ties to the firms the analysts cover, issue reports that are more favorable 
towards the evaluated firms as compared to the reports issued by analysts with no such 
ties to the firms (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Michaely and Womack, 1999). It would seem 
that if such biases exist, then the analyst biases would be greatest if there is more 
potential for increased investment banking business. The potential for investment 
banking business would be higher if the firm is issuing new securities in the stock market. 
Investment banking pressures should be the greatest for the firms that are issuing the 
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most new securities, and they should be the lowest for the firms that have the least need 
to issue new securities (Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 2000; Lin and McNichols, 1998; 
O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin, 2005). Indeed, Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003) 
found evidence of such analyst bias and favoritism when they analyzed the analysts’ 
forecasts and recommendations. Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003) found evidence 
that sell-side analysts’ (ones whose employers are investment banking houses) forecasts 
and recommendations are most optimistic for firms that are issuing securities and least 
optimistic for firms that are repurchasing securities. The analysts’ positive bias towards 
affiliated firms seems to be more egregious given that researchers have found that stock 
returns tend to be unusually low in the three years following securities issuances and 
unusually high in the three years following securities repurchases (Ritter, 2003; 
Richardson and Sloan, 2003). Unlike past work which focused on the numerical forecast 
to tease out analyst bias, I will examine the words surrounding the forecasts for evidence 
of analyst bias. 
In the preceding sections, I have presented arguments suggesting that the 
characteristics of the analysts and their statements are an important way in which the 
analysts and their statements vary and that investors are influenced by such 
characteristics. In addition, the analysts are influenced by the investment banking ties to 
the firms that the analysts evaluate. In the sections that follow, I expand the arguments to 
posit hypothesized relationships between the analyst characteristics and the reactions of 
the investors to the analyst statements. 
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Hypotheses Development  
The hypotheses below postulate that the presence of particular word 
characteristics in statements by analysts will be considered desirable by investors. The 
match of the desirable word characteristics will lead to an upward movement in the stock 
price of the firms evaluated by the analysts.  
 
Hypotheses relating to the market reaction to analysts’ words 
 “Word choice is considered as unimportant by many people, the least 
consequential of the complex decisions that people make when communicating with one 
another” (Hart, 2000, p. 35). Whorf (1956) found that the use of subtle word distinctions 
disclose the author’s particular concerns. For example, if the analyst is convinced through 
his or her research that the outlook for a firm is positive, that analyst is motivated to issue 
an optimistic statement. Optimistic statements contain language endorsing some person, 
group, concept, or event, highlighting their positive entailments. Words of praise (good, 
loyal), satisfaction (exciting, cheerful), or inspiration (courage, trust) contribute to the 
optimism in analysts’ statements, whereas terms of denial (won’t, cannot), hardship 
(conflict, despair), or blame (annoying, guilty) lower the strength of the optimism in the 
statement. 
Ho and Harris (2000) looked at the price responses in the market that resulted 
from different recommendation rationales provided by analysts to investors, paying 
special attention to the words behind the investment advice. They found that analysts 
conveyed more information with more explicit categories and words when their belief in 
the recommendation was strong. Investors appear to give more weight to revelations of 
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fundamental firm information (such as analysts' revisions of earnings forecasts) and the 
interpretation of the information by the analyst. Investors generally passed over 
explanations focusing on stock market information that is already public. When analysts 
discussed such items as earnings forecast revisions or assessments of business factors, 
they accompanied their more optimistic descriptions with more details substantiating 
their recommendations.  
In the present system of conveying recommendations, analysts are constrained by 
their companies’ rating systems, which include a finite number of categories. Some 
companies adopt a triage approach (buy, neutral, and sell), whereas others have finer 
partitions. Investors interested in more fine-grained information look to the 
accompanying report or the media interview for additional information. Ho and Harris 
(1998) found that sometimes the market effect is as large for a one-level recommendation 
change as for a three-level recommendation change, even though a reading of the 
category description would not signal such a portfolio action.  
Just as optimistic statements seem to be favored by analysts (Ferreira and Smith, 
1999), they are also likely to be favored by investors, who for many reasons might see 
optimistic statements as indications of stronger future performance. Beneish (1991) and 
Sant and Zaman (1996) provide support for this view in their finding of a positive market 
response to optimistic statements. Therefore: 
H1: There will be a positive relationship between analysts’ statements that have 




Analysts are more optimistic when the companies they work for either underwrite 
the securities of the firms they cover (Lin and McNichols, 1998) or act as the firms’ 
investment bankers (Dugar and Nathan, 1995). Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003) 
provide evidence that sell-side analysts’ forecasts and recommendations are most 
optimistic for firms that are issuing securities in the market, and least optimistic for firms 
that are repurchasing securities in the market. Analysts are more likely to exhibit an 
optimistic bias because they are paid, in part, by the amount of commissions they 
generate (Dorfman, 1991). In addition, sell-side analysts have added incentives to provide 
optimistic forecasts so as not to upset their companies’ clients (Siconolfi, 1992). Dugar 
and Nathan (1995) showed that the stock market is aware of, and adjusts for, this bias. 
Therefore: 
H2: The magnitude of the market response to analysts’ statements showing 
optimistic words will be less for firms issuing securities than for firms 
repurchasing securities. 
 
Brown, Foster, and Noreen’s (1985) finding that stock price is a leading indicator of 
analysts’ forecast revisions suggests that the analysts’ information advantage may be 
attributable to the incorporation of publicly available stock prices into their forecasts. If 
so, analysts’ comparative advantage over simple automated time-series models may arise 
from their utilization of public rather than private information. However, this explanation 
for the analysts’ advantage has been challenged. Stickel (1990) shows that the analyst’s 
comparative forecasting advantage appears to result at least partly from the utilization of 
firm-specific, private information, not from public information reflected in the stock 
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price. Analysts have been able to generate superior forecasts of firms’ future earnings due 
to the possession of private information and its utilization in their statements (Brown, 
Richardson, and Trzcinka, 1991; Coggin and Hunter, 1983; Copeland and Mayers, 1982; 
Dimson and Marsh, 1984; Elton, Gruber, and Grossman, 1986).  
Larger firms have richer information environments than smaller firms due to the 
information acquisition and dissemination activities of analysts and institutional investors 
(Atiase, 1985; Bamber, 1987; Bhushan, 1989). Thus, it is more difficult for larger firms’ 
managers to withhold their private information, and this is reflected in the fact that the 
stock prices of larger firms incorporate new information more rapidly (Brown and Kim, 
1993). Moreover, the number of analysts following a firm is positively related to firm 
size (Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Shores, 1990). The larger firms have more information 
dissemination activities, lower earnings variability, more homogenous analyst 
expectations, and more analyst coverage (Brennan and Hughes, 1991). Thus, the 
analysts’ comparative advantage when covering larger firms is less as compared to 
covering smaller firms. Therefore:  
H3: The magnitude of the market response to analysts’ statements showing 
optimistic words will be inversely related to the size of the covered firm. 
 
Analysts’ pay is often based, in part, on the reputation of the analyst, however; 
and forecast accuracy is one of the four criteria used to determine membership on 
prestigious research teams (Stickel, 1992). If reputation is important for analysts, then the 
negative reputation associated with inaccurate forecasts should reduce the incentive to 
issue intentionally biased forecasts. However, analysts are subject to costs, such as loss of 
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client income and access to management, when communicating recommendation changes 
(Ho and Harris, 2000).  The costs of issuing pessimistic recommendations are greater 
than those associated with optimistic recommendations (Womack, 1996), and analysts are 
well aware that there can be substantial costs or risks in disseminating pessimistic 
recommendations. Pratt (1993) describes several costs. First, pessimistic 
recommendations can harm a brokerage company’s present and potential investment 
banking relationships and thus are discouraged by the company’s investment bankers. 
Second, top management and investment contacts in analyzed firms may limit or cut off 
the flow of information. Also, pessimistic statements are less frequent than optimistic 
statements (Womack, 1996); thus, they would be more visible.  
Analysts thus expend greater care and effort before issuing a pessimistic report 
than an optimistic one, and investors react more strongly to pessimistic analyst reports 
than to optimistic reports (Francis and Soffer, 1997). Taking these findings together, 
investors would react more strongly to pessimistic statements. Therefore: 
H4: Changes in stock price will be of greater absolute magnitude in response to 
pessimistic analyst statements as compared to optimistic statements with the 
same score when the analysts are from the sell side. 
 
Note that the current literature, which utilizes forecast revisions and rating changes, 
supports H4. My contribution would be the following: (a) the study will provide evidence 
on the impact of words, and (b) the results will provide additional evidence on whether 
H4 more accurately describes the data. 
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Certainty is shown in language when it becomes unyielding (Johnson, 1946). 
Certainty suggests resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness. Equality terms (all, 
everyone), group terms (headquarters, organization), and tenacious terms (will, shall) 
make for high certainty statements, while hesitant terms (almost, might), specificity (i.e., 
numerical citations), and self-references (I, me) reduce certainty. Insistence (a measure of 
how tightly focused a text becomes) and variety (an index of how many different words 
are used) also contribute to certainty (Hart, 2000). 
The valuation models described by analysts are derived from a logic that is more 
or less directly adopted from financial theory, such as discounted cash flow or 
comparisons of price-earnings ratios. The models that the analysts use have well-defined 
inputs, which generally are taken from the firms’ financial reporting. Qualitative 
parameters typically enter the analyst’s quantitative valuation model via the back 
entrance of the yield requirement, which is primarily estimated on the basis of firm-
specific risk. Here, management’s trustworthiness is essential. The more open the firm 
management, the lower its cost of capital. This is because the degree of openness affects 
the amount of certainty with which the analyst can make his or her forecast (Bildstein-
Hagberg, 2003). Assessments of management credibility by analysts are made through 
personal contacts with the management (Previts, Bricker, Robinson, and Young, 1994). If 
the communicative link between the analyst and management is maintained well, the 
analyst can reduce information asymmetry between investors and management (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros, 1989). 
In cases where analysts, in making their earnings calls, get an opportunity to 
interrogate management, they are able to read signals and messages that are not explicitly 
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expressed. For example, an analyst has reported the following about meetings with a 
forestry firm: “In good times, when the order book is sufficiently large, this fact is 
spontaneously reported at the analyst meetings. If ordering is slowing down, this is not 
mentioned at all, and the firm gives vague answers to questions about future ordering. 
This is ridiculous, as such answers give you enough information anyway” (Bildstein-
Hagberg, 2003: 447). Dahya, Karbhari, Xiao, and Mei found similar results when 
evaluating the comments from management: “What is written is true; the problems are in 
what is missing” (2003: 316). O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) have observed that analysts 
seek to avoid uncertainty. They suggest that analysts prefer regulated industries because 
regulatory oversight and disclosures provide operating information that supplements 
financial disclosures, thus reducing uncertainty. 
Investors, when evaluating a rating recommendation or quantitative earnings 
forecast, may not fully understand the firm-risk factor used by the analyst to arrive at the 
recommendation. The accompanying report or the media interview, however, provides 
more fine-grained information regarding the degree of certainty the analyst wants to 
convey. 
Similar to the preference for optimism, the preference for certainty may be shared 
by analysts and shareholders. Therefore: 
H5: There will be a positive relationship between analysts’ statements that show 
high certainty and the market response to those statements. 
 
Active language displays motion, alteration, the execution of thoughts, and the 
evading of inaction. The active language subcategories include belligerence (clash, 
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attack), achievement (advance, push), action (launch, leap), and communication (insist, 
encourage). Inert terms (quiet, hesitant), intellectualism (decide, believe), and 
exaggeration (a measure of heavy modification) would decrease the activity in the 
language (Boder, 1940). Researchers (e.g., Beneish, 1991) have noted that analysts pay 
special attention to activity related to matters such as price policy, court decisions, 
monthly output, and dividends. I would suggest that active words in analysts’ statements 
would convey higher confidence in an optimistic or certainty-laced statement. Again, the 
active statement may match investors’ expectations. Therefore: 
RQ1: What is the contribution of activity to analyst statements with optimistic 
words as measured by the magnitude of the market response to those 
statements? 
RQ2: What is the contribution of activity to high certainty analyst statements as 
measured by the magnitude of the market responses to those statements? 
 
Hypotheses relating to analysts’ word choice based on their employer relationships  
    Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003) provide evidence that sell-side analysts’ 
forecasts and recommendations are most optimistic for firms that are issuing securities 
(equities and or debt), and least optimistic for firms that are repurchasing securities. 
Investment banking pressures should be the greatest for the firms that are issuing the 
most new securities, and they should be the lowest for the firms that have the least need 
to issue new securities (Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 2000; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin 
and McNichols, 1998; O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin and, 2003; Michaely and Womack, 
1999). Thus: 
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H6: Analysts will use words showing high optimism for firms issuing equity and 
debt and less for firms repurchasing equity and debt. 
 
Analysts are constrained by the rating system of conveying recommendations, which 
include a finite number of categories. Ho and Harris (2000) found that analysts conveyed 
more information with words in the accompanying report.  Investment banking pressures 
should be the greatest for the firms that are issuing the most new securities (Dechow, 
Hutton, and Sloan, 2000; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998; O’Brien, 
McNichols, and Lin, 2003; Michaely and Womack, 1999). Again, analysts, when faced 
with the investment banking pressures and constrained by the number of rating 
categories, would convey their certainty in the stock recommendation in the 
accompanying report.  
Analysts, in general, seek to reduce their uncertainty. This inclination is evidenced 
by their preference for regulated industries (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990). In their 
interactions with firm management, the analysts seek out clear explanations from firm 
management (Bildstein-Hagberg, 2003). Analysts ask precise questions and tease out 
inconsistency from firm management explanations in their quest to reduce uncertainty 
(Dahya, Karbhari, Xiao, and Yang, 2003). In addition, investment banking pressures are 
greatest for the analysts, when the firms they cover are issuing the most new securities 
(Dugar and Nathan, 1995). Consequently, the natural tendency of the analysts to reduce 
uncertainty is further accentuated when the firms they cover issue new securities. Thus: 
H7: Analysts will have higher certainty in their statements for firms issuing equity 
and debt and less certainty for firms repurchasing equity and debt. 
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As described in the arguments leading up to Research Questions 1 and 2, active 
language is denoted by words that signify motion, change, the carrying out of initiatives, 
and the embrace of activity. Analysts monitor activity in firms by noting items such as 
price policy, court decisions, monthly output, and dividends (Beneish, 1991). In addition, 
investment bankers often coerce analysts who cover firms bringing securities to the stock 
market (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998). Because the rating system 
is constrained to a few categories, analysts have restricted options to display their 
confidence of activity in the evaluated firm. The accompanying report, however, allows 
analysts to express their opinions more expansively. Active words in analysts’ statements 
in their reports would convey higher confidence in an optimistic or certainty-laced 
statement. Therefore: 
RQ3: What is the contribution of activity to analyst statements with optimistic 
words as measured by the degree to which firms are issuing equity and debt? 
RQ4: What is the contribution of activity to analyst statements with high certainty 
when firms are issuing equity and debt as opposed to when firms are 
repurchasing equity and debt? 
 
     Sell-side analysts have long faced allegations that have been corroborated by 
research that pressures to generate investment banking business cause them to bias their 
recommendations (Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 2000; Dugar and Nathan 1995; Ho and 
Harris, 2000; Lin and McNichols, 1998; O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin, 2003; Michaely 
and Womack, 1999; Pratt, 1993). These allegations resulted in a historical $1.4 billion 
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settlement between the investment banking companies and regulators (Smith, Craig, and 
Solomon, 2003). There is evidence of a systematic relationship between corporate 
financing activities and future stock returns. Stock returns are usually low in the three 
years following securities issuances and unusually high in the three years following 
securities repurchases (Ritter, 2003; Richardson and Sloan, 2003). Bradshaw, 
Richardson, and Sloan (2003) found that analysts issue their most optimistic 
recommendations around the time of securities issuances. This pattern is consistent with 
sell-side analysts attempting to promote the stock of issuing firms by touting 
unrealistically high target prices in the period surrounding and immediately following 
their securities issuance (Ritter, 2003; Richardson and Sloan, 2003). Therefore: 
H8: Analysts will use words with high optimism for firms right around the time of 
securities issuance. 
 
Hypotheses relating to the market reaction to analysts’ characteristics based on their 
words’ usage 
 The hypotheses that follow suggest that possession of certain 
characteristics on the part of analysts will be viewed as desirable. The analyst 
characteristics considered in H9-13 and RQ5 below are the number of firms and 
industries covered, the analyst experience, company size, forecast frequency, and prior 
forecast accuracy as covered in the section on analyst characteristics on pages 19 through 
22. More positive characteristics for the analysts mean fewer firms and industries 
covered, more experience, bigger company sizes, higher forecast frequencies, and higher 
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forecast accuracies for prior forecasts. Please refer to the section on analysts 
characteristics for more details. 
The characteristics’ desirability will lead to a positive response in the capital 
market based on the expectation of good analyst performance. Links between 
characteristics and performance established in prior academic research may play a role in 
the creation of expectations. More importantly, and more likely, such stock market 
responses may be the result of perceptions arising from the analyst’s possession of 
characteristics that match investors’ expectations.  
Analysts provide investment analysis and advice. Accurate proprietary analysis 
brings new clients to the analyst’s company for investment management services 
(Kuperman, Athavale, and Eisner, 2003). Thus, if the analyst is convinced through his or 
her research that the outlook for a firm is positive, that analyst is motivated to issue an 
optimistic statement. Just as optimistic statements seem to be favored by analysts 
(Ferreira and Smith, 1999), they are also likely to be favored by investors, who for many 
reasons might see optimistic statements as signals of stronger future performance. 
Beneish (1991) and Sant and Zaman (1996) offer backing for this notion in their research 
results of a positive market response to optimistic statements. Therefore: 
H9: High-optimism statements elicit a higher magnitude market response for 
analysts with more positive characteristics.  
 
While evaluating the performance of a firm, analysts use a quantitative valuation 
model. However, some of the parameters that are inputted into the valuation model are 
qualitative. One such qualitative parameter is the yield requirement. The yield 
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requirement number is primarily estimated by the analyst on the basis of firm-specific 
risk. The analysts arrive at the estimate of firm-specific risk by evaluating the firm 
management. Here, management’s trustworthiness is essential (Bildstein-Hagberg, 2003). 
Investors, when evaluating a rating recommendation or quantitative earnings forecast, 
may not fully understand the firm-risk factor used by the analyst to arrive at the 
recommendation. The accompanying report, however, provides more fine-grained 
information regarding the degree of certainty the analyst wants to convey. Certainty is 
demonstrated in word choice when it becomes inflexible (Johnson, 1946). Similar to the 
characteristic of optimism, the inclination for certainty may be shared by analysts and 
shareholders. Therefore: 
H10: High-certainty statements elicit a higher magnitude market response for 
analysts with more positive characteristics. 
 
Active language, as noted in the research questions RQ1 and RQ2 above, features 
movement, change, the implementation of ideas, and the avoidance of inertia. 
Investigations (e.g., Beneish, 1991) have found that analysts are interested in matters 
such as price policy, court decisions, monthly output, and dividends that demonstrate 
firm activity. Active words in analysts’ statements would convey higher confidence in an 
optimistic or certainty-laced statement. Also, similar to statements with optimism or 
certainty, the statement with activity may match investors’ expectations. Therefore: 
RQ5: Would high activity statements elicit higher magnitude market responses for 
analysts with more positive characteristics? 
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Hypotheses relating to analysts’ word choice based on their characteristics and employer 
relationships 
 Analyst’s pay is often based, in part, on the reputation of the analyst, however, 
and forecast accuracy is one of the four criteria used to determine elite membership, 
namely, top positions in rankings that survey analysts (Stickel, 1992). Thus, both analysts 
with the less positive characteristics and those with more positive characteristics will 
have reduced incentives to issue intentionally biased incorrect optimistic forecasts. In 
addition, prior research documents that analysts’ characteristics such as forecast 
frequency, broker size, general and firm-specific experience, and the number of firms and 
industries that the analyst follows is associated with forecast accuracy (Clement, 1999; 
Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 1997). Also, analysts who 
issue more accurate forecasts are more likely to attain high status (Hong and Kubik, 
2003). Thus, over time, analysts with more positive characteristics belong to the higher 
status coterie or remain as elite members (Stickel, 1992). The higher-status coterie 
analysts, due to their past record, would have more license with the tone of the firm 
research report. Moreover, investment banking pressures (Ritter, 2003; Richardson and 
Sloan, 2003) would cause an analyst to display more optimism in the affiliated firms (Lin 
and McNichols, 1998). Affiliated firms are ones with investment banking ties to the 
analyst’s company. Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003) provide evidence that sell-
side analysts’ forecasts and recommendations are most optimistic for firms that are 
issuing securities and least optimistic for firms that are repurchasing securities. 
Investment banking pressures should be the greatest for the firms that are issuing the 
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most new securities, and they should be the lowest for the firms that have the least need 
to issue new securities.  
 Therefore: 
H11: Analysts with more positive characteristics will use statements with more 
optimistic words for firms issuing equity and/or debt as compared to the firms 
repurchasing equity and/or debt. 
 
 As noted in hypothesis H11 above, analyst characteristics are associated with 
forecast accuracy (Clement, 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999; Mikhail, Walther, and 
Willis, 1997). Analysts who issue more accurate forecasts are more likely to attain high 
status (Hong and Kubik, 2003). Thus, over time, analysts with more positive 
characteristics belong to the higher status coterie.   
Analyst’s pay, as noted in the hypothesis H11 above, is often based, in part, on the 
reputation of the analyst. Forecast accuracy is one of the four criteria used to determine 
elite membership (Stickel, 1992). Thus, both analysts with the less positive characteristics 
and those with more positive characteristics will have reduced incentives to issue 
intentionally biased forecasts. Also, as shown in the argument advanced for Hypothesis 
H11 above, specific analyst characteristics are associated with forecast accuracy 
(Clement, 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 1997). High-
performing analysts with more positive characteristics over time attain high status (Hong 
and Kubik, 2003; Stickel, 1992). The higher-status analysts, due to their past record, 
would have more license with the thrust of the firm research report. Links to investment 
banking leads to higher pressures on the analysts (Ritter, 2003; Richardson and Sloan, 
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2003). Consequently, the natural tendency of the analysts to reduce uncertainty 
(Bildstein-Hagberg, 2003; Dahya, Karbhari, Xiao, and Yang, 2003) is further accentuated 
when the firms they cover issue new securities. Due to the small number of 
recommendation labels (Ho and Harris, 2000), high-status analysts could convey more 
information regarding their bias in the accompanying report. Therefore: 
H12: Analysts with more positive characteristics will display a higher certainty for 
firms issuing equity and/or debt as compared to the firms repurchasing equity 
and/or debt. 
 
Analyst’s pay is often based, in part, on the reputation of the analyst, which in turn is 
driven by the accuracy of their forecasts (arguments from Hypothesis H3). Thus, both 
analysts with the less positive characteristics and those with more positive characteristics 
will have reduced incentives to issue intentionally biased forecasts. Following from 
hypothesis H8, analysts with more positive characteristics would use the recommendation 
report to convey their bias for affiliated firms. Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003) 
found that analysts issue their most optimistic recommendations around the time of 
securities issuances. Analysts have been shown to endorse their covered firm stock by 
setting very high earnings numbers especially for the duration when the firm stock comes 
into the market (Richardson and Sloan, 2003). Thus: 
H13: Analysts with more positive characteristics will be more optimistic for firms 
the closer it is to firms’ securities issuance. 
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A summary of the hypotheses and the research questions is presented in Table 1. 
The research questions and hypotheses presented in this chapter draw on the efficient 
market hypothesis. In my research questions and hypotheses, I expect the analyst 
characteristics and their statements to lead to a response in the capital markets. In Chapter 
3, I describe the methodology I plan to use in testing the research questions and 
hypotheses that I have posed. 
 







This Chapter reviews the methods applied for testing the research questions and 
hypotheses that were developed in Chapter 2. In the first part of this chapter, I detail the 
two methods—event study and content analysis—that were used for this study. In the 
latter part of the chapter, I explain how the sample was generated and what data were 
utilized to collect the sample. Then, I delve into the research variables and their 
measures. Finally, I finish with a discussion of the analytical plan. 
 
Event Studies 
 Event study methodology has been widely employed in finance and economics to 
study the stock price reactions to events (Binder, 1998). Dolley (1933), Myers and Bakay 
(1948), Barker (1956, 1957, 1958), and Ashley (1962) were the early pioneers in the use 
of event studies. The methodology was improved by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll 
(1969) and Ball and Brown (1968); and it is this form that is utilized now. The technique 
assumes the validity of the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama, 1970) and measures the 
impact of some event on the firm’s shareholders.   
The event study method allows a researcher to determine if an event is significant 
by evaluating the stock price change of the firm. The event study method starts by 
estimating a market model for a particular firm. The abnormal returns are then calculated 
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to reflect the reaction to unanticipated events. The calculation is done in the following 
way (McWilliams and Sigel, 1997): 
Rit = αi + βmt Rmt + ε it 
 
where 
Rit, = the rate of return on the share price of firm i on day t, 
Rmt = the rate of return on a market portfolio of stocks (such as Standard & Poor's 500 or 
a market index) on day t, 
a = the intercept term, 
β = the systematic risk of stock i, 
and 
ε it = the error term,  
 
One can then estimate the daily abnormal returns [AR] for the ith firm using the 
following equation: 
ARit = Rit – (ai + bi Rmt) 
 
where ai and bi are the ordinary least squares parameter estimates from the regression of 
Rit on Rmt over an estimation period preceding the event. 
The event study method has been widely used since the 1980s because of the 
availability of powerful computers and financial databases. The event study method is 
superior to other methods because it does not rely on accounting-based measures where 
firm profits can be manipulated (Benston, 1982). Rather, the method relies on stock 
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prices that should incorporate all relevant information. Finally, the data sources needed in 
the method, such as the daily stock prices, are available from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). 
The event study method relies heavily on a set of assumptions (Brown and 
Warner, 1980, 1985), namely, that markets are efficient, that the event was unanticipated, 
and that there are no confounding effects. In addition, it is important to pay attention to 
research design issues, such as sample size, nonparametric tests to identify outliers, and 
the length of the event window (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). The assumptions and the 
design issues were taken into account in my study and are discussed in the rest of the 
section below.  
Events and Sampling 
In this study, the event of interest is the statement that an analyst makes regarding 
a firm that he or she is covering. The analyst statement would provide new information to 
the market, and thus, it would be appropriate to use the event study method. Researchers 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) using the event study technique recommend that for the 
proper use of this technique, one should outline hypotheses that justify a financial 
response to the new information. My theory is that the stock market investors are 
influenced by the analysts’ statements. I have outlined hypotheses in the Hypotheses 
Development sections above that justify a financial response to the new information in 
the analysts’ statements. My contribution to the body of research is the supposition that 
the characteristics of the analyst statements, important missing variables in prior research, 
are influential in determining the market response. The research questions and hypotheses 
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presented in Chapter 2 were tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Such 
tests are unbiased when sample sizes are greater than 50 (Binder, 1998). 
Since this study was not looking at longitudinal effects, I was interested in picking 
a stable representative year, one without major disruptions, and where accurate data is 
available. I picked 1995 as that year where accurate data for this study were available. 
Discussions with IBES officials indicated that prior to the early 1990s, the forecast 
release date IBES recorded often differed from the actual forecast date by a few days; 
however, the accuracy of the forecast dates improved in the early 1990s (Clement and 
Tse, 2003b). Clearly, accurate release dates are needed to measure return responses to the 
forecast revisions. This argued for the research year to be after early 1990s. A major 
disruption in the financial markets was the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). I 
considered Regulation FD in picking the analysis year so as to minimize the impact of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). Regulation FD, issued by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 2000, requires that firms issue material information publicly. During the 
period of the impending approach of Regulation FD and some years after Regulation FD, 
there was concern that the analysts would communicate in a different fashion than in a 
“normal” year when such regulations were not on the horizon or in the rear-view mirror 
(Levinshon, 2001). To prevent confounding effects from Regulation FD, I did not wish to 
select samples up to 4 years on either side of Regulation FD. During the data analyses 
period of this study, analyst data from 1995 rather than 2005 and later were available. 
This study focused on industries with high earnings response coefficients. 
Earnings response coefficients are a measure of the firm stock price response to the 
firm’s earnings (Ball and Brown, 1968; Kothari and Sloan, 1995). I chose those industries 
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since analyst coverage of the high earnings response coefficient industries tends to be 
high because the predictability of the stock price is lower allowing analysts to provide 
useful information to the stock market (Pincus, 1983).  
I used the Institutional Investor annual rankings to identify the analysts from the 
All-American Research Team. This source has been used in other studies of responses to 
analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Brown and Chen, 1991). Analysts in the All-American Research 
Team are clearly valued in the capital market, as evidenced by their high salaries 
(Dorfman and McGough, 1993). In addition, given their good reputations (Stickel, 1992), 
they are more apt to be quoted in the press than other analysts are, thus providing more 
statements for my analysis, increasing my sample size, and averting concerns related to 
sample size. Analyst statements were obtained from the Thomson Financial First Call 
database. From the population of analyst statements, analyst statements for inclusion in 
the sample were selected randomly. This sampling procedure is referred to as simple 
random sampling. The steps in this simple random sampling are detailed as follows: First, 
a single number was assigned to each analyst report in the list of the reports that the 
analyst had written in the year. Then, a table of random elements was used to select 
reports from the list. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) suggest using bootstrap methods and 
discussing outlier impacts when confronted by small, N<30, sample sizes. I did not have 
the small sample issue, as the sample size in the study was larger—N>200.  
Next, I had to decide the length of the event window. Researchers (Brown and 
Warner, 1980; Peterson, 1989) prescribe an event window of 2 days: the event day and 
the day before the event. However, I followed the conservative suggestions by 
MacKinlay (1997) and used a three day window to accommodate any analyst statements 
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that might have come out after the close of the stock market. Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985) recommend against using much longer event windows because of the reduction in 
the power of the test of excess returns, thus, resulting in false inferences regarding the 
event’s importance. Moreover, empirical studies (Ryngaert and Netter, 1990) have shown 
that the short event windows capture the significant effect of the event. Dann, Myers, and 
Raab (1977) demonstrated that the stock price fully adjusted within 15 minutes of the 
release of firm-specific information, and Mitchell and Netter (1989) found the stock 
response within 90 minutes of news wire stories regarding tax legislation. 
Abnormal Returns 
Abnormal or excess returns is the difference between an observed return and an 
expected return. The observed return is the actual change in the price of a stock over 
some time interval. The expected return is the change for the stock that would be 
expected over the same time interval due to the general market change. I use abnormal or 
excess returns as the measure of changes in investors’ expectations. Abnormal returns 
were measured by excess returns obtained from the CRSP Daily Excess Returns file, as 
recommended by Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers, and Owers (1986) and used later by 
Westphal and Zajac (1998) and Lee (2001). The significance of excess returns will be 
measured using At/S(At), as suggested by Brown and Warner (1985) for event studies 
using daily returns. Here, At represents the average cumulated excess returns over the 
observation period, and S(At) measures the variance in returns over a previous period, to 
estimate the expected return. The statistic has a student-t distribution under the null 
hypothesis, and simulation studies show that it is well specified for samples of 50 or more 
(Brown and Warner, 1985; Dodd and Warner, 1983).  
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The other technique used in the dissertation is content analysis. This technique 
and its application in the dissertation are discussed in the next section below. 
 
Content Analysis 
Content analysis has a long history of use in communication, journalism, 
sociology, psychology, and business. In a comprehensive review of the content analysis 
methodology, Neuendorf describes it as "a summarizing, quantitative analysis of 
messages that relies on the scientific method . . . and is not limited as to the types of 
variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or 
presented" (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 10). Neuendorf (2002) presented an extensive review 
and critique of the use of content analysis in communication research. Her study reports 
that communication researchers have used the technique to assess the impact of a wide 
variety of messages. 
Researchers generally use content analysis methodology to study a message pool, 
as in the following scenarios:  
1. Interpersonal communication that occurs in a dyad or a small group. Bales (1950) 
developed a comprehensive coding scheme that has been used subsequently 
(Bales and Cohen, 1979; Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills, and Roseborough, 1951; 
Greenberg, 1980; Neuendorf and Abelman, 1987).  
2. Messaging within a defined organization that occurs in surveys (DiSanza and 
Bullis, 1999), voice mail (Rice and Danowski, 1991), manager-subordinate 
control patterns (Fairhurst, Rogers, and Sarr, 1987), and brainstorming discussion 
groups (Larey and Paulus, 1999). 
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3. Mass messaging for a large, undifferentiated audience, the overriding (34.8 
percent) methodology used in mass communication (Riffe and Freitag, 1997).  
Content analysis is an attractive technique to use in studying the role of analysts 
because it relies on meeting the standards of the scientific method (Bird, 1998; Klee, 
1997) and fits the social research paradigm of rigorous objective investigation of 
behavior (Gunter, 2000).  
  For researchers, studying words and their contexts in analysts’ statements, content 
analysis is generally more reliable than alternatives, such as assessing analyst behavior 
and attempting to determine intent (Baldwin and Rice, 1997; Bouwman, Frishkoff, and 
Frishkoff, 1987; Veit and Murphy, 1996). Analyzing the words used in analysts’ 
statements also allows for data collection through secondary sources, provides objective 
measures, and permits research replication (Clatworthy and Jones, 1999; Previts, Bricker, 
Robinson, and Young, 1994; Rogers and Grant, 1997). Moreover, specific to the 
responses of investors and the impact of analysts, Rogers and Grant suggest that in terms 
of the practical utility of research results, "content analysis has the advantage that it 
focuses on the analyst reports . . . and mitigates the possibility that analysts' responses 
may be unrepresentative or self-serving" (1997, p. 18). 
Use of the content analysis technique is based on some strong assumptions 
(Neuendorf, 2002), however, and requires careful implementation. The key assumptions 
concern meeting the standards of the scientific method. Below, I describe how my 
proposed study follows Neuendorf’s recommendations regarding objectivity, measures, 
sampling and hypotheses. 
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Objectivity and Measures 
In their classic work, The Social Construction of Reality, Berger and Luckman 
(1966) point out, that there is no such thing as true objectivity--"knowledge" and "facts" 
are what are socially agreed on. According to this view, all human inquiry is inherently 
subjective. However as researchers, we still must strive for consistency among inquiries, 
however (Neuendorf, 2002). We do not ask, "Is it true?" but rather, "Do we agree it is 
true?" In this study, the event of interest is an analyst’s statement by an analyst. I hope to 
identify generalizable findings from analyses of multiple analyst statements with well-
defined characteristics (see the “Events and Sampling” subsection in the “Event Studies” 
section above), per Te'eni’s recommendation (1998). All decisions regarding variables 
and their measurement must be made before observations begin (Neuendorf, 2002). To 
meet the required objectivity, I have outlined an a priori design as shown in the 
“Research Variables and Measures” section below.  
The next step was to choose an appropriate measure that will adequately reflect 
what I want to measure. The full process of validation of measures must be conducted 
over a series of studies (Janis, 1949). Due to the paucity of content analysis of analysts' 
statements (which, incidentally, is an impetus for this study), however, I used the 
measures from the one study to date that have considered content analysis of analysts’ 
statements (Ho and Harris, 2000) as a starting point. They looked at the stock market 
reaction to analysts’ statements and considered content analysis of those statements—
namely, the words surrounding the numerical forecasts—rather than just the numerical 
forecasts themselves (Ho and Harris, 2000). As described in the “Hypotheses 
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Development” section in Chapter 2, this study moved beyond prior work by considering a 
more complete profile than this lone example.  
Sampling and Hypotheses 
It is important to select a sample such that the findings can be applied to other 
cases in the defined population. The sampling is described in the “Event and Sampling” 
subsection in the “Event Study” section above. For a content analysis to be generalizable 
to the population of statements, the sample for the analysis should be randomly 
generated. Because of the random sampling in my study, I should be able to generalize 
my findings to the entire population. 
A cornerstone of the scientific method is to pose hypotheses and research 
questions before the data are collected. As described in the “Statement Characteristics” 
section in Chapter 2, statement characteristics are important in the formation of investors’ 
expectations regarding future firm performance. The research questions and hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 2 indicate how these characteristics are expected to influence 
shareholder response and abnormal returns. 
 
Sample and Data Sources 
As stated earlier in this chapter, I relied on the Institutional Investor annual 
rankings to identify the All-American Research Team analysts. This source has been used 
in other studies of responses to analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Brown and Chen, 1991). These 
analysts are clearly valued in the capital market, as evidenced by their high salaries 
(Dorfman and McGough, 1993). In addition, given their good reputations (Stickel, 1992), 
they are more apt to be quoted in the press than other analysts are, thus providing more 
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statements for my analysis. The data sources used in this study were CRSP Eventus, 
COMPUSTAT, and Thomson Financial First Call I/B/E/S. 
 
Research Variables and Measures 
Excess returns  
The calculation of this variable involves measuring the difference between an 
observed return and an expected return, as described in the sections titled “Key 
Concepts” (in Chapter 1) and “Event Studies” (in this chapter). Data are available in the 
CRSP Daily Excess Return file. 
Analyst Recommendation 
Analyst recommendation is the recommendation provided by the analyst 
regarding a firm. As many analysts have different ratings, I/B/E/S maintains a standard 
set of recommendations, each with an assigned numeric value: 1. Strong Buy, 2. Buy, 3. 
Hold, 4. Underperform, and 5. Sell. Each recommendation received from the analysts is 
mapped to one of the I/B/E/S standard ratings. The analyst recommendation was used as 
a control variable. 
Firm size  
This variable was measured in stock equity or firm assets at the time of a 
statement by an analyst. 
Financing Variables 
Following from Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2003), external financing was 
measured as ∆XFIN =  ∆EQUITY + ∆DEBT, where EQUITY represents the preferred 
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and common shareholders’ equity and DEBT represents total long-term (including 
amounts due within 1 year).  
∆EQUITY was measured as the annual change in common equity (Compustat 
date item #60) plus the change in the preferred equity (data item #130) minus net income 
(data item #172). Since the hypotheses and research questions pertain to the influence of 
external financing on the analysts, net income was deducted because it is viewed as an 
internal source of financing. Fair value and foreign currency translation do affect equity. 
However, such adjustments amount to a small proportion of the equity changes and, in 
addition, are not systematically associated with returns (Richardson and Sloan, 2003). 
The change in equity, as measured by change in common and preferred equity and 
subtracting net income changes, accounts for the external financing transactions. The 
calculated equity change amount would include all net issuances, repurchases, and 
dividends for the year. Richardson and Sloan (2003) replicated their balance sheet study 
using cash flows and found that the results were unchanged. I have used balance sheet 
data to allow for greater data availability.  
∆DEBT was measured as the annual change in total long-term debt (data item #9) 
plus the annual change in total debt due within 1 year and included in current liabilities 
(data item #34). ∆DEBT would thus include convertible debt, subordinated debt, notes 
payable, debentures, and capitalized lease obligations. Also, ∆XFIN, ∆EQUITY, and 
∆DEBT are scaled by average total assets to express them as a proportion of firm size and 
are winsorized at +/- 1 to minimize the influence of outliers. 
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Analyst Characteristics Variables  
Forecast frequency is the number of forecast revisions that the analyst makes in 
the year. # of firms and # of industries (2 digit SIC codes) is the number of firms and 
industries that the analyst follows. General and firm experience is the analyst’s general 
and firm-specific experience in years. The lag forecast accuracy is a measure of the 
analyst’s forecast accuracy for the previous year.  
Statement Characteristics Variables 
To deal with the large amounts of analyst statement word data, a large capacity 
text analysis program that can also manage the language complexity was needed. I chose 
the software program called DICTION (Hart, 1997), a lexically based program that 
examines a passage by utilizing about 40 dictionaries or word lists.  
 Many researchers (Fielding and Lee, 1991; Tesch, 1990, 1991: Weitzman and 
Miles, 1995; Evans, 1996; Klein, 1997; Roberts, 1997; Alexa and Zuell, 2000) have 
reviewed the different distinguishing features of content analyses software packages 
available. AQUAD (Huber, 1997), ATLAS.ti (Muhr, 1996, 1997), HyperRESEARCH 
(Depuis and Tornabeane, 1993), NUD_IST (Richards, 1998), QED and Win-MAXpro 
(Kuckartz, 1998) are typically considered to have a qualitative research focus, while 
CoAn, DICTION, DIMAP-MCCA, KEDS (Schrodt, 1998), TEXTPACK (Mohler and 
Zuell, 1998), TextSmart (TextSmart, 1997) and WordStat are generally used for 
quantitative research.  Software packages such as Code-A-Text and TATOE (Rostek and 
Alexa, 1998) support analyses for both qualitative and quantitative applications.  
During my selection process for a content analyses software package, I considered 
programs which run on the Windows operating system.  Some of the programs have 
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limitations. DIMAP-MCCA, for example, does not support the definition of a structure 
element for desired metrics for each analyst report. This inadequacy is because the 
content analyses module is integrated in the dictionary development and maintenance 
program. Such inadequacies can lead to loss of information (McTavish and Pirro, 1990; 
McTavish, Litkowski, and Schrader, 1997). AQUAD, for example, cannot accommodate 
text lines with more than 60 characters. While, the Win-MAXpro program does allow for 
the setting of the line length. The basis for such line based coding might be useful for 
genres such as poetry, but would be more of a hindrance for my analyses of analyst 
reports.  
As noted in the Hypotheses Development in Chapter 2, my focus was on 
capturing on metrics such as optimism, certainty, and activity for the analysts’ reports. I 
was thus looking for programs that would support automatic coding based on 
dictionaries. Therefore, I ruled out the qualitative focused programs that would operate 
according to a scheme of categories. As this dissertation was a first look at the content 
analyses of analyst reports, I was particularly interested in a software package that had 
succinct clear summarizations of texts. DICTION matched quite well due to the main 
dimensions or super categories such as scores of optimism, certainty, and activity that are 
provided as summaries of a text passage (Hart, 1985: 111). Another attractive feature of 
the DICTION software was the ability of the program to export to SPSS as it was 
important for me to statistically analyze the content analyses output with the other stock 
market and financing variables. Unlike TextSmart which does not allow for categories to 
be re-used in other projects, the DICTION analyses material is independent from the text 
analyses package itself. This DICTION feature enables different researchers to exchange 
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dictionaries and coding schemes in order to validate and cross check their work. Finally, 
the DICTION program was developed and has been widely used at the University of 
Texas and thus there is a deep understanding of the uses and the limitations of the 
program. that a University of Texas at Austin researcher, such as me, can draw upon. 
All text analysis programs consist of dictionaries that are used as bases for text 
searches. Each of DICTION's dictionaries produces its own set of scores. The typical 
application of dictionaries results in a ratio measurement. For example, using the 
DICTION program, a text may obtain a tenacity score ranging from 0 (if no tenacity 
words are counted) to a high numeric score (say 55, if many tenacity words are counted). 
When dictionary scores are combined (after standardization), they contribute to five 
"additive variables" that provide a concise approximation of a text's characteristics. 
DICTION's five additive variables are defined as follows:  
1. Certainty: language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness.  
2. Optimism: language endorsing a concept or a group, highlighting its positive 
entailments.  
3. Activity: language featuring movement, change, implementation, and 
avoidance of inertia. 
4. Realism: language describing tangible, immediately recognizable matters that 
affect the analyst’s subject matter.  
5. Commonality: language highlighting agreement.  
In addition to the 5 main semantic features, there are 35 subfeatures (including 
tenacity, blame, ambivalence, motion, and communication). The results for each of the 
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dictionary categories are compared to a normal range of scores that were established by 
running more than 20,000 texts through the program (Hart, 2000).  
 
Analytical Plan 
As laid out in Chapter 2, I posed hypotheses and research questions regarding 
analyst statement characteristics. Some hypotheses suggested relationships where the 
statement characteristics were independent variables, while other hypotheses proposed 
statement characteristics that were dependent variables. The four models that fall out 
from the hypotheses are: 
Excess Returns = f (Statement Characteristics, Analyst Recommendation, Firm 
Size, External Financing) 
Statement Characteristics = f (External Financing, Analyst Recommendation) 
Excess Returns = f (Statement Characteristics, Analyst Recommendation, Analyst 
Characteristics) 
Statement Characteristics = f (External Financing, Analyst Recommendation, 
Analyst Characteristics) 
The hypotheses and research questions were tested using OLS.  OLS was used 






In this Chapter, I go through the results of the tests that were conducted in the 
study. Details are provided regarding data collection effort, the research design and the 
data analysis, the descriptive statistics used for the variables, and the data from the event 
study and the cross-sectional hypotheses tests. As indicated in the preceding chapter, the 




As described in Chapter 3, analysts were selected from the Institutional Investor 
All-American Research Team. Randomly selected reports from these analysts were then 
reviewed. The final sample exceeds the guidance of Stevens (1996) that suggests a 
sample size of at least 15 observations per independent variable for multiple regression.  
COMPUSTAT, I/B/E/S, First Call, CRSP, and Thomson Financial were the 
primary sources of data on analyst reports, firm financing, and analyst characteristics. 
Table 2 shows a list of analyst reports, the firm financing data, and the analyst 
characteristics that were used in this study. 
 
** Insert Table 2 here ** 
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Research Design and Data Analyses 
Market reaction to analysts’ words 
The study looked at the incremental effect of words on the market reaction as 
compared to the market reaction expected with the analyst forecast revision. 
The Regression Equation Ia below was the primary one that was utilized for all the 
hypotheses and the research questions. 
Excess Returns = α0 + β0Analyst Recommendation + β1Optimism Score + β2Certainty 
Score + β3Activity Score + χ1Firm Size + δ1 ∆Equity + δ2 ∆Debt +  
ε1(Optimism Score)(Firm Size) + Error 
Analyst Recommendation is the analyst’s stock recommendation,  
Optimism Score, Optimism Score is the analyst statement’s Optimism Score,  
Certainty Score is the Certainty Score,  
Activity Score is the Activity Score,  
Firm Size is the Firm Size,  
∆Equity is the annual change in preferred and common shareholders’ equity,  
∆Debt is the annual change in total long-term debt (including amounts due within 
one year), and  
Hypothesis 1, which is laid out in Chapter 2, says that there will be a positive 
relationship between an analyst’s statement that has words showing high optimism and 
the stock market’s response to that analyst’s statement. Excess returns, as shown in 
Chapter 2, is a measure of the stock market response to an analyst’s statement; and 
optimism score is a measure of optimism in a statement. Therefore, if Hypothesis 1 is 
true, then β1 is significantly greater than 0, meaning that there is a positive relationship 
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between Optimism Score and Excess Returns. In Regression Equation Ia above, this 
would mean that the coefficient β1 of the Optimism Score variable would be significantly 
greater than zero. Thus, I will be testing the following: 
H1: β1>0 
Hypothesis 2 states that the magnitude of the market response to an analyst’s 
statement showing optimistic words will be less for firms issuing securities than for firms 
repurchasing securities. In other words, H2 re-stated in terms of the model, implies that 
the predicted market response for firms with ∆Equity greater than 0 should be less than 
the predicted market response for firms with ∆Equity less than 0. The magnitude of the 
market response, as explained in Chapter 2, is measured by Excess Returns. The 
hypothesis is tested at the average of everything in the model, other than ∆Equity and 
∆Debt. In addition, I need to control for the amount of shares issued. Note that the firms 
issuing securities will have an equity amount (Equity) at the end of the year that will be 
more than that at the beginning of the year. Thus, for the firms issuing securities during 
the course of the year, the annual change in Equity (∆Equity) will be positive. 
Conversely, for the firms repurchasing securities in the market, ∆Equity will be negative. 
The predicted response of the Excess Returns is denoted by Y. Applying similar logic for 
Debt, the hypothesis H2 looks for differences in the predicted values Y, for the analyst 
statements between firms repurchasing and issuing securities (equity and debt). 
Therefore, stating the response in a succinct testable format below: 
H2:  Y(∆Equity>0) – Y(∆Equity<0) < 0 
         Y(∆Debt>0) – Y(∆Debt<0) < 0 
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Hypothesis 3 asserts that the magnitude of the market response to an analyst’s 
statement showing optimistic words will be inversely related to the size of the covered 
firm. The market response is measured by excess returns. The optimism (Optimism 
Score) by size (Firm Size) hypothesis can be tested by looking at the slope of the 
interaction term (Optimism Score)(Firm Size). The slope of the interaction term is the 
coefficient ε1 in the regression equation Ia above. H3 tests for a negative slope, namely, 
H3: ε1<0  
 
Hypothesis 4 proposes that the change in stock price will be of a greater absolute 
magnitude in response to a pessimistic analyst statement as compared to an optimistic 
statement with the same score. The change in stock price is again measured by Excess 
Returns. Let the predicted value of excess returns be denoted by y. The predicted value of 
the absolute value of Excess Returns of pessimistic statements, that is with low Optimism 
Score, represented by LO, will be yLO.  Similarly, the predicted value of optimistic 
statements (designated by HO) will be yHO. H4, looking for a difference of the predicted 
values, can be stated as: 
H4: yLO – yHO > 0  
 
As explained in detail in Chapter 2, Hypothesis 5, H5 states that there will be a 
positive relationship between an analyst’s statement that shows greater certainty and the 
market response to that statement. Excess Returns and the Certainty Score are measures 
of the market response and the certainty respectively. In Regression Equation Ia above, 
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the hypothesized positive relationship would mean that the coefficient has to be positive. 
Thus, the test for H5 would be:  
H5: β2>0 
 
  For testing RQ1, the following regression equation was used: 
Equation Ib: 
Excess Returns =α0 + β0Analyst Recommendation + β1Optimism Score +β2Certainty 
Score + β3Activity Score + χi Firm Size + γγi(Optimism Score). (Firm 
Size) + δ1 ∆Equity1 + δ2∆Debt + ε1Optimism Score. Firm Size + 
φ1(Optimism Score) .( Activity Score) + Error 
 
The research question RQ1 inquires about the contribution of activity to an 
optimistic statement as measured by the magnitude of the market response to that 
statement. Thus, the focus is on the testing is the coefficient φ1 of the interaction term, 
Optimism Score) .( Activity Score):  
RQ1: φ1=?  
 
RQ2 poses a research question regarding the relationship between the magnitude 
of the market response and the activity usage in analyst statements. Thus, from 
Regression Equation Ia, where the magnitude of the market response is the dependent 
variable (measured by the Excess Returns), the question is regarding the value of the 
coefficient β3 of the Activity Score (the measurement of activity): 
RQ2: β3=?  
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Analyst word choice based on their relationship with investment banking 
The following regression equation was used for testing the hypotheses and research 
questions. 
The Regression Equation IIa is:  
Optimism Score = γ0ea + η0Analyst Recommendation + η1∆Equity + η2∆Debt + 
ι1∆Securities Issuance + Error 
where ∆Securities Issuance is the absolute value of the time period between the analyst 
statement and the firm’s securities issuance. 
 H6 hypothesized that the analysts would be more optimistic for firms issuing 
equity and debt, and less optimistic for firms repurchasing equity and debt. ∆Equity and 
∆Debt are the annual change in a firm’s equity and debt position. Therefore, firms that 
are issuing securities during the year would have increased values of ∆Equity and ∆Debt 
respectively. H6 suggests that analysts will be more optimistic (measured by the 
Optimism Score) for firms issuing securities (namely, increased ∆Equity and/or ∆Debt 
values). Thus, for H6, the test would be to see if the coefficients η1 and η2 are positive in 
the Regression Equation IIa: 
H6: η1>0, η2>0  
 
The Regression Equation IIb is:  
Certainty Score = ϕ0 + κ0Analyst Recommendation + κ1∆Equity + κ2∆Debt + 
λ1∆Securites Issuance + Error 
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H7 suggests that analysts will have higher certainty in their statements for firms issuing 
equity and debt, and less certainty for firms repurchasing equity and debt. In Regression 
Equation IIb above, similar to the tests for H6 above, the coefficients κ1 and κ2 would be 
positive if H8 is true: 
H7: κ1>0, κ2>0  
 
Regression Equation IIc is  
Activity Score = π0 + θ0Analyst Recommendation + θ1∆Equity + θ2∆Debt + 
ρ1∆Securites Issuance + σ1∆Optimism Score + τ1 (Optimism Score) . (∆Equity) 
+ Error 
Research Question RQ3 examines the contribution of activity to an optimistic 
statement as measured by the degree to which the firm is issuing equity and debt. 
Regression Equations IIc and IId are used to find the value of the coefficient of the 
interaction terms (Optimism Score) . (∆Equity) and (Optimism Score) . (∆Debt), 
respectively:  
RQ3: τ1=?, τ2=?  
 
Regression Equation IId is  
Activity Score = υ0 + ϖ0Analyst Recommendation + ϖ1∆Equity + ϖ2∆Debt + 
ω1∆Securites Issuance + ξ∆Optimism Score + ψ1(Optimism Score) . (∆Debt) + 
Error 
RQ3: ψ1=?, ψ2=?  
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The two interaction terms, (Optimism Score) . (∆Equity) and (Optimism Score) . 
(∆Debt), had a slight correlation. Therefore, in order not to influence the Statement 
Characteristics = f (External Financing, Analyst Recommendation) model, it was 
decided to run the model separately, once, with each interaction term. 
 
The Regression Equation IIe is:  
Activity Score = ζ0ie + αα0Analyst Recommendation + αα1∆Equity + αα2∆Debt + αβ1∆ 
Securities Issuance + Error 
RQ4 considers the extent of activity language in an analyst statement’s language, 
and asks how that activity is affected by the nature of the analyst-covered firm’s 
financing structure. The financing structure is determined by the change in the equity 
∆Equity and debt ∆Debt positions. With the model, Statement Characteristics = f 
(External Financing, Analyst Recommendation), the values of high Activity Score 
resulted in a minimal variation of the Optimism Score compared to the whole range of the 
Optimism Score. Similarly, for the low values of the Activity Score, there was a minimal 
variation of the Optimism Score compared to the whole range of the Optimism Score. 
Therefore, the Optimism Score variable was not considered in the Regression Equation 
IIe. RQ4 tests for the value (αα1 and αα2) of the ∆Equity and ∆Debt coefficients: 
RQ4: αα1=?, αα2=?. 
 
The Regression Equation IIf is:  
Optimism Score = π0 + θ10Analyst Recommendation + θ1a∆Equity1 + θ1∆Debt + ρ1∆ 
Securities Issuance + Error 
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H8 hypothesizes that analysts will be most optimistic for the firm right around the 
time of securities issuance. Thus, H8 tests for the coefficient of ∆ Securities Issuance (the 
time period between the analyst statement and the firm’s securities issuance): 
H8: ρ1>0 
 
Market reaction to analysts’ characteristics based on their words used 
Model is 
Excess Returns = f (Statement Characteristics, Analyst Recommendation, Analyst 
Characteristics) 
 
Hypotheses H9 and H10 posit that high optimism and high certainty statements 
respectively would elicit a higher excess return for analysts with more positive 
characteristics. Similarly, Research Question RQ5 asks whether high activity statements 
would elicit a higher excess return for analysts with more positive characteristics. Thus, 
in the Regression Equation III below, the excess returns would be higher for higher 
values of the analyst characteristic variable for high optimism and high certainty 
statements, implying that the coefficient α has to be positive if H9 and H10 are true. As 
noted in Chapter 2, the hypotheses will be tested for all the analyst characteristics. 
Similarly, RQ5 tests for the value of the coefficient α as it relates to activity. 
The regression equation III is given below. 
Excess Returns = α + α0Analyst Recommendation + αAnalyst Characteristic + Error 
H9, H10: α > 0 
RQ5: α = ? 
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Analyst word choice based on their characteristics and investment banking relationship 
The Model for these of hypotheses and research questions us the following: 
Statement Characteristics = f (External Financing, Analyst Recommendation, Analyst 
Characteristics) 
Hypothesis H11 suggests that analysts with more positive characteristics will use 
statements with more optimistic words for firms issuing equity and/or debt and as 
compared to firms repurchasing equity and/or debt. Issuing debt and equity would mean 
that the annual change in ∆Equity and ∆Debt will be positive. Thus, in Regression 
Equation IVa below, for testing H11, coefficients δ5 and δ6 of the interaction terms 
(∆Equity) (Analyst Characteristics) and (∆Debt)(Analyst Characteristics) will be tested 
to see if positive. 
 
The Regression Equation IVa is 
Optimism Score = δ0 + δ0Analyst Recommendation + δStock Rating + δ2∆Equity + 
δ3∆Debt + δ4Analyst Characteristics + δ5(∆Equity) (Analyst Characteristics) + 
δ6  (∆Debt)(Analyst Characteristics) + Error 
For each characteristic: 
H11: δ5>0, δ6 >0 
 
Hypothesis H12 suggests that analysts with more positive characteristics will be 
display more certainty in their statements for firms issuing equity and/or debt and as 
compared to firms repurchasing equity and/or debt. As advanced in the arguments for 
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H11, issuing debt and equity would mean that the annual change in ∆Equity and ∆Debt 
will be positive. Thus, in Regression Equation IVb below, for testing H12, coefficients ε5 
and ε6 of the interaction terms  (∆Equity)(Analyst Characteristics) and (∆Debt)(Analyst 
Characteristics) respectively will be tested to see if positive. 
The Regression Equation IVb is 
Certainty Score = ε0 + ε0Analyst Recommendation + εStock Rating + ε2∆Equity + 
ε3∆Debt + ε4Analyst Characteristics + ε5(∆Equity)(Analyst Characteristics) + 
ε6(∆Debt)(Analyst Characteristics) + Error 
For each characteristic 
H12: ε5 > 0, ε6>0 
 
Hypothesis H13 suggests that analysts with more positive characteristics will be 
more optimistic in their statements regarding a firm right around the time of securities 
issuance. Securities issuance is when the firm issues equity and/or debt in the market. 
(∆Securities Issuance) is the time difference between the analyst statement and the 
securities issuance. Thus, in Regression Equation IVd below, the test for H13 looks at the 
coefficient of the interaction term (∆Securities Issuance) (Analyst Characteristics). 
The Regression Equation IVc is 
Optimism Score = γ + γ0Analyst Recommendation + γStock Rating + γ2∆Equity + 
γ3∆Debt + γ4Analyst Characteristics + γ5 (∆Securities Issuance)(Analyst Characteristics) 
+ Error 
For each characteristic 




Means and standard deviations for the dependent and the independent variables 
are summarized in Table 3. The distributions of the dependent and the independent 
variables are displayed in Figure 2. 
 
** Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 here ** 
 
The Optimism Score median of all the analysts in this study was 0.5003, very 
close to the midpoint, 0.5, of the 0 to 1 range. This aspect shows that the analyst 
statements studied included about an equal mix of optimistic and pessimistic statements. 
The Activity Score median was at 0.4853, again close to the midpoint of the 0-1 range, 
and again showing that the analyst statements researched here displayed both inactive and 
active language to an equivalent degree. However, the lower Certainty Score median, 
0.3518, and the distribution of the Certainty Scores ranging from 0 to 0.5335, the lower 
end of the 0 to 1 range scale, demonstrate that analysts on an average used ambiguous 
language in their statements.  
The ∆Equity mean was 0.083, higher than the mean, 0.061, in the Bradshaw, 
Richardson, and Sloan (2003) study. A higher ∆Equity number signifies more equity 
issuances by the firms. The higher ∆Equity mean observed in this study may be due to 
the fact that I focused on the Institutional Investor All-American Team, which being 
prestigious can compete for, and pay more attention to, firms that generate more lucrative 
investment banking business. In addition, the ∆Equity and ∆Debt numbers were positive. 
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The positive numbers suggest that the analyzed firms were characterized by a 
predominance of net issuances rather than repurchases in the stock market. Net issuances 
means that the firms issued net securities (issuances – buybacks) in the market. The two 
categories of securities in the market are debt and equity. Among the issuances, most of 
the activity takes place in the equity category, with mean issuances of 8.3% and standard 
deviation of 14.1%. Debt financing plays a somewhat lesser role with a mean of 2.0% 
and a standard deviation of 12.9%. The mean (median) of the firm size by equity of the 
sample firms is $2,797 ($703) million, much larger than the $930 ($241) million of all 
COMPUSTAT firms. The relatively large market values of the sample reflect the 
selection bias inherent in firms that attract analyst coverage. 
There were some interesting observations in the analyst characteristics. The mean 
of the IBES Recommendation Code was 1.96, close to a Buy, which is a code 2. This 
analysts’ bias towards buying stocks could be due to the bullish year 1995, which this 
study focused on. Or, it could be driven by the analysts’ link to investment banking and 
the strong pressure to recommend the stock (Lin and McNichols, 1998). The descriptive 
statistics from this study were compared to the Clement and Tse (2005) paper. This study 
focused on highly regarded analysts, while the Clement and Tse (2005) paper considered 
general analysts. The comparison of the characteristics between the general analyst pool 
and the highly regarded All-American team analysts allowed for some interesting 
insights. The mean of forecast frequency (the number of forecasts by the analyst in a 
given year) in this study was about 3.12, close to the Clement and Tse (2005) study of 
3.8. The means of firm and general experience in the Clement and Tse (2005) paper were 
3.8 and 5.7 years, respectively. These numbers compare well to the means of this study—
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3.5 and 7.2 years. The means of the number of firms followed was 21, very close to the 
ones (21) calculated in the Clement and Tse (2005) paper. However, the number of 
industries followed in this study was 4.2, which was much lower than the number (5.9) in 
the Clement and Tse (2005) paper. One possible explanation for this difference is that in 
this study, the analysts, being from the All-American Team, were prestigious and highly 
paid. These analysts are expected to be highly accurate in their forecasts. Past research 
(Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999; Clement, 1999) has shown that the forecast accuracy 
declines as analysts follow more industries. Thus, the analysts in this study would tend to 
cover a lower number of industries.  
The correlations among the variables showed some interesting results. A 
summary of the numbers is shown in Table 4. I focused mainly on the correlations tied to 
the language content analysis, as this was the study’s main contribution. Other variables’ 
relationships, ones tied to External Financing and Analyst Characteristics, have been 
researched earlier, as detailed in Chapter 2.  The relationship (R2 = 0.05, t = 3.68, df = 
257, p<0.001) between the Optimism Score and the Activity Score was significant but the 
correlation was weak, highlighting the aspect that when the analysts were endorsing a 
concept with optimism, they may not use active language at the same time. There was no 
relationship between the Optimism Score and the Certainty Score (R2 = 0.006, t = 1.27, df 
= 258, p = 0.21), and between the Certainty Score and the Activity Score (R2 = 0.001, t = -
0.58, df = 257, p = 0.56).  
 




The sample provides adequate power as discussed in MacKinlay (1997). Results 
from the power computation for the various regression equations are displayed in Table 
5. Tests of the hypotheses were performed using cumulative abnormal returns during the 
2-day (-1, 0) and 3-day (-1, 1) event windows. The Analyst Recommendation was 
insignificant in 86% of the cases, so the Analyst Recommendation variable was dropped 
from all models. This enabled the models to be more parsimonious and more directly 
comparable to each other. A summary of the results from the testing is shown in Table 6. 
The results are presented below. Discussions of the findings are included in Chapter 5. 
 
** Insert Tables 5 and 6 here ** 
 
Market reaction to analyst words 
 H1, where the test was to check for the existence of a positive relationship 
between an optimistic analyst statement and the market response, was not supported. H2, 
which tested for the predicted optimistic bias for firms that issue securities as opposed to 
repurchasing securities was not supported either.  
H3, which tested for the magnitude of the market response to an analyst’s 
statement showing optimistic words as it relates to firm size, was supported. H3 was 
supported for large firm sizes, >$600M by equity and >$1B by assets. H3 support was 
both for firm size as measured by equity (R2 = 0.083, t = -2.04, df = 115, p<0.05) and for 
firm size as measured by assets (R2 = 0.095, t = -2.18, df = 116, p<0.05) for the 3-day 
event window. Thus, the market response showing optimistic words was negative for 
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larger firms that were covered.  H4 was not supported. The hypothesis looked for the 
market response of a pessimistic versus an optimistic statement.  
H5, which tested for the relationship between an analyst’s statement that has 
words conveying certainty and the market response was not supported. The interaction 
between activity and optimism in the statements was tested. The results did not show any 
relationships (RQ1).  However, there was support for the posited relationship between 
active words usage in analyst statement and the market response (RQ2). The support was 
for the groups of statements that had low activity words. For firm size measured by 
assets, support was observed both for the 2-day (R2 = 0.132, t = -1.84, df = 211, p<0.1) 
and the 3-day window (R2 = 0.130, t = -1.72, df = 210, p<0.1). Likewise, tests conducted 
when the firm size was measured by equity were supported – 2-day window (R2 = 0.140, 
t = -2.12, df = 210, p<0.05) and 3-day window (R2 = 0.140, t = -2.04, df = 210, p<0.05).  
 
Analyst word choice based on their relationship with investment banking 
The lack of support in this study for the majority of the hypotheses relating to 
word choice and investment banking relationships was a surprise. Analysts did not seem 
to show any bias towards potential or current investment banking clients in their 
statements (H6, H7, and RQ4). The word usage bias also did not coincide with the timing 
of new issuances (H8). However, there was a relationship between the analysts’ use of 
active words in optimistic statements with both equity issuances (R2 = 0.072, t = -1.85, df 
= 196, p<0.1) and debt issuances (R2 = 0.070, t = 1.76, df = 196, p<0.1). The direction of 
the slope coefficient was opposite to the direction expected (RQ3).  
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Market reaction to analysts’ characteristics based on their words used 
This set of hypotheses was tested to see if the possession of certain characteristics 
on the part of analysts who have issued statements will be viewed as desirable. The 
desirability would lead to a positive response in the capital market based on the 
expectation of good analyst performance.  Some analyst characteristics’ hypotheses  were 
supported. 
Optimistic and pessimistic statements 
Among the seven characteristics tested, (forecast frequency, belonging to the 
largest decile, number of firms and industries followed, general and firm-specific 
experience, and lag forecast accuracy), support was observed for H9 for three of them. 
H9 was testing for incremental excess returns from optimistic analyst statements from 
analysts that had more positive analyst characteristics. There was a relationship between 
the market reaction for the ‘forecast frequency’ analyst characteristic and analyst 
optimistic statements for both the 2-day (R2 = 0.031, t = 1.84, df = 106, p<0.1) and the 3-
day window (R2 = 0.042, t = 2.15, df = 106, p<0.05). Also, when the tests were performed 
against the analysts who were in the largest decile cohort (a total of 55), the relationship 
was significant between the largest decile cohort and pessimistic statements.  Pessimistic 
statements from these analysts in large companies produced marked negative excess 
market returns for both the 2-day (R2 = 0.349, F = 9.10, df = 17, p<0.1) and the 3-day 
window (R2 = 0.293, F = 7.06, df = 17, p<0.05). The analyst experience characteristic 
showed a relationship (R2 = 0.208, t = 2.11, df = 17, p<0.05) with pessimistic analyst 
statements for the 2-day window.  
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Certain and uncertain statements 
The magnitude of the market response was related to analyst statements with 
words conveying certainty (H10) for a 2-day window (R2 = 0.040, t = 1.90, df = 88, 
p<0.1), and for a 3-day window (R2 = 0.053, t = 2.21, df = 88, p<0.05). The uncertain 
statements by these same analysts who made frequent forecasts were significant related to 
the market reaction for the 2-day window excess returns tests (R2 = 0.126, t = -2.25, df = 
35, p<0.05). Finally, tests with the analyst characteristic of firm experience for the 2-day 
window were supported (R2 = 0.207, t = -3.03, df = 35, p<0.005). Thus, the market 
reacted when an experienced analyst used uncertain language in his or her statement.  
Statements conveying activity or inactivity 
In the research question (RQ5) pertaining to analyst statements with words 
conveying activity, relationships were observed for analysts with more general and firm-
specific experience. The ‘experience’ analyst characteristic was also related to the market 
for a 2-day window (R2 = 0.069, t = -1.97, df = 52, p<0.1) for the general experience, and 
the 3-day window (R2 = 0.023, t = -1.11, df = 52, p<0.05) for the firm-specific 
experience. The direction of the market reaction was negative when the analysts made 
uncertain statements.  
 
Analyst word choice based on their characteristics and investment banking relationship 
H11 was testing whether analysts with more positive characteristics would use 
statements with more optimistic words for firms issuing equity and/or debt as compared 
to firms repurchasing equity and/or debt. The results showed that analysts who followed 
more industries were found to be more optimistic (R2 = 0.133, t = 1.73, df = 99, p<0.1) 
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when they reported on firms issuing equities as compared to firms repurchasing equities. 
However, the direction of the result was opposite to what was predicted. No such 
relationship with the ‘industry coverage’ characteristic was seen for debt securities. 
Another analyst characteristic hypothesis relating to their use of words pertained to 
analyst firm experience. More experienced analysts used more optimistic words for firms 
with equity issuances (R2 = 0.141, t = -2.23, df = 99, p<0.05). Here, too, the direction of 
the result was opposite to the prediction of the hypothesis. 
When looking at statements for the use of words conveying certainty or 
uncertainty, the relationship relating to analyst firm experience was observed. Analysts 
who were more experienced used more words that displayed uncertainty for firms that 
were issuing equities (R2=0.108, t = -2.83, df = 99, p<0.01).  The direction of the result 
was counter to what was expected. No such hypothesis support or relationship was 
observed for debt issuances. There was no support for H13. H13 suggested that analysts 
with more positive characteristics would use more optimistic words in their statements 
right around the time of the firms’ securities issuance. 
  
Some overall conclusions from the above results would be the following: 
1. Words in the analyst statements conveying activity, namely aggressiveness, movement, 
change, and implementation, influenced investor actions. Moreover, investors reacted 
to statements with concurrent optimism and activity.   
2. Analyst firm experience seems to be a key characteristic that investors focus on among 
the characteristics researched in this study. 
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3. I found a relationship between analysts using words conveying activity or lack of 
activity and the companies’ investment banking relationships. 
 
 As noted in this Chapter above, some of the research hypotheses were not 
supported. However, as will be discussed in the following Chapter 5, there were new 
insights that were gleaned from the results of this study. The next Chapter will also cover 





 CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, I explored the language that analysts use. The study focused on 
when and how securities analysts’ statements matter by analyzing the reactions to 
analysts' statements. The dissertation reviewed variables, hitherto unexplored, to 
construct a more complete profile of analysts’ statements. Moreover, this dissertation 
explored how the firms’ financing, issuances and repurchases of debt and equity, 
influenced the analysts. Finally, the effect of analysts’ characteristics was also studied. 
The body of research in the area that deals with the consequence of analyst statements 
has failed to consider an important set of variables—the words in the analyst statements. 
These variables were included in this study’s models to attempt to understand the 
equivocal results that have been obtained in earlier work in the area of analysts’ 
statements. 
Analysts’ words are crucial for investors because of what they may say about 
firms in the capital markets. Also, extant literature shows that analysts’ statements can 
guide us regarding analysts’ behavior and choices. Empirical research using the above 
logic has led to much work where the analyst statement characteristics are liked to firm 
performance. These characteristics often influence our core beliefs about analyst-covered 
firms, particularly when the information about the firms is limited. Capital market 
participants, often facing limited information about firms, are likely to pay attention to 
and lean on the information in analysts’ statements. The information is easily accessible 
in the media and easy to understand. Given our nonstop news coverage, the investors can 
access the information rather quickly and draw their conclusions about a statement. If the 
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investors see the link between the analyst statement and the firm performance, this might 
reinforce the statement-performance link for successive statements. In an efficient 
financial market, the market values that are assigned to firms by investors are based on 
expectations of future performance. Any information by analysts that alters those 
expectations changes stock prices.  
This study developed hypotheses that explored the links between the analyst 
statements and the market performance of the firms covered by the analyst. The research 
set out to buttress the following points: (1) stock markets are efficient, (2) analysts and 
their statements matter, and (3) whether or not analysts’ statements matter depends on the 
words used in them. Some of the hypotheses were not supported, some were supported. 
All in all, the points above were supported in some way in this research leading to some 
key findings. 
The event study results show that analysts matter to investors, thus confirming 
earlier work in this area (Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1983; Copeland and 
Mayers, 1982; Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum, and Lease, 1979). The market response—
positive or negative depending on the statements—to the analyst statements in this 
research suggests that the investors are of the opinion that “analysts matter.” In addition, 
the results of this study substantiate earlier research showing the importance of the 
numerical forecast and the one-word recommendation.  
The key focus of this study was to study analyst statements in more depth, beyond 
the numerical forecast and the one-word recommendation. As noted in this study, 
statement characteristics, that were not studied previously, were included in this study. 
However, the inclusion of statement characteristics yielded mixed results. My supposition 
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was that investors would pay attention to and favor the analyst statements that possess 
characteristics that match recent trends in capital markets. However, the supposition was 
not supported for all statement characteristics in all circumstances. The addition of some 
of the characteristics improved the predictive ability of the model, and the addition was 
statistically significant. Significant relationships were obtained when testing some of the 
analyst characteristics, but the direction was opposite to some of the trends and the 
hypotheses, suggesting that further investigation is necessary. Past research, which was 
covered in the Literature Section, has shown equivocal findings for these analyst 
characteristics. Possible reasons for the equivocal findings could be missing variables. 
Variables that could be included in future research, namely those related to the non-
verbal portions of the analyst communications, may lead to better predictability. 
The most interesting results of this research are the findings with regard to when 
exactly investors pay special attention to the words in the analyst report. The analysts 
provide information with their numerical forecast and the one-word recommendation; but 
in certain circumstances, this study saw incremental attention from investors. One was 
that the lack of active language in the reports caused a negative market reaction. The 
study showed that there was a bias of the analysts (in the sample period studied) to issue 
positive recommendations. Investors, aware of this bias, pay special attention to the lack 
of words supporting the one-word recommendation. A summary of the findings and the 
tie-in to previous research are reported below.   
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Market reaction to analyst words 
There is evidence (Branson, Guffey, and Pagach, 1998) that there are market 
reactions to analysts’ forecasts. Researchers have found abnormal stock-price 
performance on the day of the analysts’ reports (Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 
1983; Copeland and Mayers, 1982; Davies and Canes, 1978; Groth, Lewellen, 
Schlarbaum, and Lease, 1979; Womack, 1996).  This study moved beyond the prior 
work, by looking at the actual words used in the analysts’ statements. The results of the 
test of the hypotheses regarding statements characteristics show that these characteristics 
do make a difference in the market’s response to the statement. However, not all the 
hypothesized characteristics showed significant relationships.  
The results of the hypotheses testing of the market reaction to the analyst’s 
statements are shown in Table 6. The magnitude of the market’s response to analysts’ 
level of optimism in their statements was tested for all statements and there was no 
significant relationship observed. However, when a subset of the analyst statements were 
tested, namely the optimistic ones, the magnitude of the market response was found to be 
inversely related to the size of the covered firm. The support was significant both when 
firm size was measured by equity as well as by assets. The conclusion one can draw from 
the market reaction to the analysts’ statements is that investors believe that analysts have 
a comparative advantage in larger firms (possibly due to the utilization of firm-specific, 
private information) that was not reflected in the stock price prior to the analyst 
statement.  Although, larger firms having a richer information environment than smaller 
firms (Atiase, 1985; Bamber, 1987; Bhushan, 1989) and afford less opportunity for the 
firms’ managers to withhold private information from the analysts (Brown and Kim, 
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1993), this study demonstrates that the choice of words in the analysts’ reports pertaining 
to the larger firms does provide new relevant information to the investors. However, the 
result was only teased out for the 3-day window, indicating that more than 2 days might 
be necessary for investors to digest and appreciate the information in the analyst reports 
covering larger firms. 
Another set of tests that were supported related to the use of active words by 
analysts. Lack of active language in the analyst reports caused a negative reaction in the 
market. This was a revealing result that did not match the analysts’ one-word (Buy, Sell, 
etc.) recommendations necessarily. Interestingly, when investors did not see sufficient 
supporting active language in the accompanying analyst report, the one-word 
recommendation did not matter. Rather, the lack of active language signaled to the 
investors the lack of confidence in the aggressiveness and accomplishment in the firm’s 
management. 
 Lack of support for the other hypotheses also provides useful information. 
Researchers were right in not exploring analyst words for incremental information, 
beyond the numerical forecast. The results indicated lack of support for hypotheses that 
posited a relationship between analyst reports containing words denoting optimism and 
certainty and the market reaction. Thus, it appears that the numerical forecast and the 
one-word recommendation are sufficient to explain the market reaction to analysts’ 
pronouncements. 
The hypothesis asserting that the magnitude of the market response to the level of 
optimism in an analyst’s statement would be directly related to the degree of firm 
equity/debt issuances was not supported. The non-support for this hypothesis ran counter 
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to prior research. The reasons might have to do with the analysts’ employers. Analysts 
have been found to be more optimistic when the companies they work for either 
underwrite the securities of the firm (Lin and McNichols, 1998) or act as the firms’ 
investment bankers (Dugar and Nathan, 1995). Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003) 
provide evidence that sell-side analysts’ forecasts are most optimistic for firms that are 
issuing securities, and least optimistic for firms that are repurchasing securities. However, 
the results of this study show that the words do not convey such optimism. This is more 
fully explained in the following section. 
 
Analyst word choice based on their relationship with investment banking 
Richardson and Sloan (2003) showed that the analysts manipulate their 
investment advice in response to investment banking pressures. However, the lack of 
support for the majority of the hypotheses (pertaining to the analyst word choice and 
investment banking relationship) show that the analyst words convey no such bias in the 
accompanying analyst reports. The one exception was for optimistic statements that had 
active language. These types of statements were used by analysts when the firms were 
issuing securities. This relationship was demonstrated for both equities and debt issuance. 
However, the direction of the results was opposite to the direction predicted. The 
investigation of statements with concurrent optimism words and words conveying 
certainty and the market response was posed as a research question because there was 
insufficient extant research to justify setting up a hypothesis. From this result, it seems 
that analysts view issuing equities very differently from issuing debt. The predominance 
of equity issues, as shown in the mean and the standard deviations in the Descriptive 
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Statistics section, leads me to believe that the analysts pay more attention to equities. 
However, analysts either are anxious or are subconsciously conveying their doubts about 
the aggressiveness of the firm in the words that they use. In the past, the accompanying 
analyst forecasts and their recommendations that show bias have been shown to be 
positively biased (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan, 2003). Understanding the reason for 
the discrepancy between the analyst forecast and the recommendation (which shows bias 
towards the affiliated firms) and the words (which lack bias or are sometimes biased in 
the opposite direction) used in the analyst report would be a fruitful avenue for future 
research.  
 
Market reaction to analysts’ characteristics based on their words used 
This set of hypotheses was tested to see if the possession of certain characteristics 
on the part of analysts who have issued statements will be viewed as desirable. The 
desirability will lead to a positive response in the capital market based on the expectation 
of good analyst performance.  Some analyst characteristics showed significant 
relationships. 
Optimistic and pessimistic statements 
Market reaction was seen for a 2-day window and for a 3-day window for analysts 
who made frequent forecasts with optimistic statements. Forecast frequency is a proxy 
for the amount of effort an analyst devotes (Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999) to following a 
firm and can be important for explaining future accuracy. Interestingly, another result 
was that if analysts from companies that were in the largest decile of companies were 
pessimistic, then the market reacted negatively. This result was observed for a 2-day 
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window and for a 3-day window.  The largest decile companies have a huge retail outlet 
to make their opinions known, and the market would have a higher probability of reacting 
due to the widespread dissemination of information. Interestingly, there was no market 
reaction observed for optimistic news indicating that the market seemed to pay more 
attention to words that convey bad news.  
The direction of one result that follows below was unexpected and opposite of 
what was predicted. The excess returns were more positive for analysts with more general 
experience and who made pessimistic statements. My study will add to the list of studies 
that have found confounding results for this analyst characteristic. Mikhail, Walther, and 
Willis (1997) and Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) found that forecast accuracy increases as 
analysts gain firm-specific experience, but they found no association for general 
forecasting experience. On the other hand, Clement (1999) found that analyst forecast 
accuracy increases with both firm-specific and general forecasting experience, although 
he found that an additional year of firm-specific forecasting experience was associated 
with greater improvement in forecast accuracy than an additional year of general 
forecasting experience. This study has added another data point in the research 
concerning the analyst characteristic pertaining to general experience. 
Certain and uncertain statements 
Market reactions were observed for a 2-day window and for a 3-day window for 
analysts who made frequent forecasts with statements that conveyed certainty. As noted 
above, forecast frequency is a proxy for the amount of effort an analyst devotes (Jacob, 
Lys, and Neale, 1999) to following a firm and can be important for explaining future 
accuracy. Investors reacted strongly to analysts who made frequent forecasts with 
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certainty, as shown in their words usage in the reports.  The converse was also true, 
namely, that the market reacted negatively to uncertain statements from an analyst who 
makes frequent forecasts. Also, market reaction was seen for statements by analysts with 
more firm-specific experience. The results showed that if an analyst with substantial firm 
experience conveyed uncertainty in the words used in his or her statements, the market 
reacted very negatively. Investors seem to place a large weight on the analyst 
characteristics of forecast frequency and firm experience.  This conclusion fits well with 
allied research on analyst characteristics that looked just at the numerical forecast (Jacob, 
Lys, and Neale, 1999; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 1997). The present study shows that 
the words that display certainty or uncertainty in the analyst statements provide 
incremental predictive ability in the market reaction, beyond that inferred from the 
numerical forecast.  
Statements conveying activity of inactivity 
As noted earlier in the chapter, market reaction was observed for low activity 
statements by analysts with more firm-specific and general experience convey in their 
statements. The investors pay attention, to the paucity of active words and the market 
reacts negatively. This result did not match the analysts’ one-word (Buy, Sell, etc.) 
recommendation necessarily. Thus, additional information (above and beyond the 
numerical forecast) pertaining to the expected market reaction can be gleaned from the 
words in the accompanying analyst report.  
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Analyst word choice based on their characteristics and investment banking relationship 
The relationship between analyst characteristics and their optimism for firms 
issuing equity and/or debt was compared to their optimism for firms that were 
repurchasing securities. The hypothesis was not supported, but there was a relationship in 
the opposite direction to that which was predicted. Extant research shows that 
investment-banking pressures (Ritter, 2003; Richardson and Sloan, 2003) may cause an 
analyst to display more optimism in the affiliated firms (Lin and McNichols, 1998). This 
study looked at the support for this thinking in the words that were used in the analyst 
statements. Interestingly, the more experienced analysts actually muted their optimism 
and used uncertain words for such affiliated firms. Analyst’s pay is based, in part, on the 
reputation of the analyst (Stickel, 1992). Thus, experienced analysts seem to have less of 
incentive—rather, they have a disincentive as seen in the results of this study—to show 
any bias in the affiliated firms. Savvy investors would do well to avoid the pitfalls of 
falling for these forecast and recommendation biases. It would serve them well to pay 
more attention to the words in the accompanying analyst report. The words in the 
accompanying report seemed to deemphasize the enthusiasm in the forecast and 
recommendation. Sell-side analysts have long faced allegations that pressures to generate 
investment banking business compromise the soundness of their investment research. The 
allegations resulted in a large $1.4 billion settlement (Smith, Craig, and Solomon, 2003), 
even though, the evidence was largely restricted to anecdotes involving a small number 
of analysts. A comprehensive examination of the recommendations (Bradshaw, 
Richardson, and Sloan, 2003) provided evidence of the over-optimism by the analysts for 
firms that were current or potential investment banking candidates. The Bradshaw, 
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Richardson, and Sloan (2003) paper examined short-term earnings forecasts, long-term 
earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and target prices. However, this study 
showed that if one scrutinizes the words that the analysts use in their reports, the 
optimism does not exist. Rather, the opposite is true. The analysts were muted or even 
pessimistic in their reports if words’ usage is employed as the metric. Moreover, the 
analysts in this study use words conveying uncertainty in reports of affiliated firms, again 
counter, to the extant research noted above in this paragraph. An extension of this work 
could be to see if the counter bias in the words of the reports, counter to the one-word 
recommendation, is intentional or subconscious. “Word choice is considered as 
unimportant by many people, the least consequential of the complex decisions that people 
make when communicating with one another” (Hart, 2000: 35). Also, people have limited 
ability to monitor their language patterns (Hart, 2000). An extension of this work could 
be to explore if the analysts signal their discomfort with the bias towards affiliated firms 
knowingly or subconsciously. 
No support of hypotheses relating to the use of active words and the timing of 
their bias in the reports was found. The reason for lack of support  might be that analysts 
have already telescoped their desire with the use of pessimistic and uncertain words, and 
may not want to go overboard to make their desire known too overtly. This might result 
in tipping off the investors unintentionally, as well as incurring the wrath of the 
investment bankers, with the resultant lower bonuses or termination. 
Word choice by the analysts did not seem to be related to the number of firms and 
industries that they followed. One reason could be that the word choices do not provide 
any incremental information to the investors. Another possibility could be that the 
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information related to the analysts may not be as accessible to investors. The analyst 
characteristics that the investors responded to were characteristics such as experience and 
forecast frequency. These characteristics may well satisfy the need by investors for an 
expansive understanding, which from the investors’ perspective seems to be 
accomplished by the experience, especially the firm-specific experience, and the forecast 
frequency characteristics. In the same vein, the fact that the lagged forecast accuracy did 
not matter suggests that those same investors utilize other explanations and different  
mechanisms for evaluating an analyst statement. 
 
Implications for Practice 
There are broad implications for practice from the research covered in this study 
for affiliated firms’ relations and investment management subjects. As stated above, 
research on the consequences of analysts’ statements has generally ignored the 
examination of the characteristics of the words in the statements, beyond a consideration 
of the one-word recommendation. This research has answered the call to advance our 
understanding, in spite of limitations inherent in teasing out analyst intent. As stated by 
Previts, Bricker, Robinson, and Young in their research on analysts, "We acknowledge 
that there are constraints on our ability to rationalize the patterns of analysts' behavior. 
Continued attempts to increase our understanding will add to our knowledge in a capital 
market environment comprised of many different investors" (1994, p. 67).. 
It is clear from this research that the characteristics of an analyst statement matter, 
and how those characteristics are expressed are vital in affecting capital market 
participants’ expectations. The choice of words can have a profound legal and financial 
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implication for sell-side stock research companies. Parties that deal with investment 
management and investment-banking management may find the results from this study 




Now I will cover the limitations that I see in this dissertation. First, I did not 
directly query investors as to the reason for their choices. Instead, I assumed that the 
investor choices would be reflected by what areas they would invest. I did so by using a 
model that expanded on the previously considered variables. I added additional variables 
that were not considered previously. Although my research incorporated previously 
omitted variables, there may be others I have not considered, however; and it is possible 
that I found relationships due to other spurious sources—namely, due to other 
unobserved variables. 
A second limitation is the sample, which is restricted to statements by U.S.-based 
analysts with strong reputations. Also, firm size did have an impact on the influence of 
analysts’ statements, and I undersampled small firms. Lack of available data makes 
consideration of smaller firms very difficult. "The variable quality of research between 
different houses (Central and Eastern European)…and across the different offices of the 
same company" (Capon, 1997, p. 30) raises issues that one would need to be cognizant of 
when researching non-U.S. companies. As a result of my focus on large U.S. companies, 
the generalizability of my findings will be limited. 
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A third limitation is associated with using analyst reports. The reports do not 
necessarily include all the information the analyst used to arrive at a recommendation. In 
all cases, however, I assume that the analyst used the information cited. Schipper states 
that "a necessary condition for inclusion in the report is inclusion in the decision process, 
so the report sets a lower bound in the information items analyzed" (1991, p. 120). I also 
do not know what sorts of information might have been useful to the analyst but were not 
available. This question is addressed by many studies that have surveyed analysts on their 
information needs (e.g., Baldwin and Rice, 1997). 
A fourth limitation is that the content analysis method used in the study assumes 
that the relative proportions of categories of information reflect greater or lesser concern 
with the categories (Weber, 1990). If securities analysts issue reports that include 
extraneous information, the interpretations of those proportions may need to be modified. 
I assume that analysts prepare reports to produce efficient and effective communication 
of relevant information.  
A fifth limitation of this study pertains to the generalizability of the findings 
beyond the time period (1995) covered. The business and the stock market environment 
are changing and the emphasis of different characteristics by investors to that in 1995 is 
possible. Such emphasis will undoubtedly change over time. An interesting extension of 
this study would be to find how the preference for certain characteristics’ variables 
changes over time by conducting a longitudinal study. For example, Regulation FD, the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, and other such changes in the regulatory environment 
would likely change the preference of desirable characteristics over time. 
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A sixth limitation is the choices of words that fit within the categories in the 
content analyses software. The DICTION software reports normative data based on a 
20,000-item sample of contemporary discourse. However, it might be possible that words 
that imply uncertainty, for instance, in the sample of this software not imply the same in 
the analyst language. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
I have detailed below some directions for future research. There are many 
avenues for further work in this area. During the study of over 700 analyst reports it 
occurred to me that the way the analysts and their reports are covered in the media would 
influence investors’ expectations. Media reports often play out over a longer period and 
the dissection of the reports sometimes can create precipitous events themselves that 
investors would notice. Investors’ opinions of analyst statements that are discussed in the 
media thus would shape the reactions of the investors beyond the event windows studied. 
We have all seen instances of analysts who promote a firm’s stock while concurrently 
unloading their positions in the firm’s stock. Future research may want to tie analyst 
statements to how the media portrays those statements.  
One other avenue for further study would be the use of more elaborate ways to 
analyze what may be a more interwoven initial assessment of the statement 
characteristics by investors. Researchers could explore interaction effects, especially 
between the statement characteristics, the financing variables, and the analyst 
characteristics included in this study.  
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One could also develop a more complex profile of analyst statement 
characteristics. Specifically, one could imagine the creation of a new variable, "statement 
profile," that would be a composite of some or all of my independent variables. Investors’ 
responses to such a composite variable could be more accurately predicted. 
Another extension of this research would be to a different set of firms, either 
smaller firms or those based outside the United States. The world is becoming global, and 
cultural considerations might lead to different results in non-U.S. firm studies. Similar 
meaning words might carry different weights in other cultures. For example, a higher 
usage of optimistic words in a culture might be needed to elicit the same investor 
response expected in the U. S. Although this extension could prove interesting, it might 
be difficult to obtain data, especially for smaller firms.  
An additional possibility is the analysis of the "body language" of analysts issuing 
statements and research into the influence on investors of such nonverbal cues. This study 
was limited to written reports. Do the same conclusions hold true for spoken statements?   
Lastly, an interesting avenue would be to examine whether investors’ initial 
expectations did actually turn out as they had envisioned. Abnormal returns signal that 
the value of the firm has gone up and the investor expectations are that the firm would 
generate increased earnings in the future. Does this actually turn out to be true? 
 
Analysts’ statements—reports issued and/or media interviews granted by 
analysts—provide an opportunity to assess the impact of analysts. In spite of a high level 
of interest and hundreds of studies, when it comes to analysts’ statements, there is still a 
fair amount of equivocation and much needs to be studied (Ghosh and Whitecotton, 
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1997). In this study, I have added to the body of research on the reactions to analyst 
statements. However, much work still needs to be done. If I had obtained more 
significant results in this study, we could arrive at a more definitive understanding of 
analyst statements. However, the non-finding of significant relationships when such 
relationships were postulated is an important finding in itself and can lead to new 
directions in research and new practice implications.  
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•  Thirty percent earnings growth over next two years is achievable and has 
been 
clearly articulated by management. 
•  LDDS represents an excellent combination of strong management, 
outstanding 
growth, attractive track record, and sustainable differentiated position in the 
industry. 
•  While the fundamental nature of the company is changing following the 
IDB and 
WilTel mergers, we expect continued consistent and strong performance. 
•  Underlying fundamentals of the long distance business are attractive, and 
LDDS is 
one of the strongest operators within this attractive industry. 
•  Strong recent stock performance, combined with a well-communicated 
story to 
investors, leaves the stock fully discounting the attractive outlook. Thus, we 
initiate 
coverage with a Hold rating. 
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Opinion: Initiating Coverage 
with a HOLD. 
Price Target Mkt. Value 52-Week 
4/13/951 (Dec. 1995) Dividend Yield (Millions) Price Range 
253/4 $28 — — $5,047.0 27–13 
Annual Previous Abs. Relative Pretax Cash 
EPS Est. P/E P/E Flow/Share 
12/96E $1.80 14.3X 104% $6.06 
12/95E 1.38 18.7 129 5.18 
12/94A 1.05 24.5 134 2.25 
Fiscal 
March June September December Year End 
1995E $0.28 $0.32 $0.38 $0.40 Dec. 31 
1994A 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.28 
Common Shares 2 196 mil. Relative P/E Range — 
Book Value/Share (12/94) 3 ($11.32) Est. 5-Year EPS Growth 22.6% 
Return on Equity (12/94) NM Est. 5-Year Dividend Growth — 
Debt/Total Capital (12/94) 4 65% Total Debt (12/94)4 $3.4 billions 
1On 4/13/95 DJIA closed at 4208.2 and S&P 500 at 509.23. 
2Reflects fully diluted shares outstanding; regular shares outstanding are 160 mil. 
3Tangible book value. Estimated pro forma reflecting WilTel merger. 
4Estimated pro forma reflecting WilTel merger. 
NM = Not meaningful. 
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Summary and Recommendation 
LDDS Communications is the nation’s fourth largest 
long distance carrier, with anticipated revenue of 
$3.7 billion in 1995. It operates its own 11,000-mile 
digital fiber optic network and resells the capacity 
of other carriers outside its network reach. Formed 
in 1983, and based in Jackson, Mississippi, LDDS 
has grown rapidly through internal sources and acquisitions. 
In 1994, the company leapt into the big 
leagues through its $2.5 billion cash acquisition of 
WilTel and its $700 million stock swap for IDB 
Communications, giving it a domestic network with 
an international reach. 
The company’s strategy has been, and will continue 
to be, to focus on the low-end business market. 
While its horizons have expanded with recent mergers, 
looking upward to large business customers, it 
still plans to differentiate itself from the larger carriers 
by specializing in the needs of small business. 
It is largely absent from the hotly contested residential 
market segment. In the more competitive new 
world of telecom, where bundling and cross-selling 
of services will be more important, LDDS is well 
suited for the opportunity. We anticipate a five-year 
growth rate for LDDS of about 26% per 
year in earnings, with free cash flow expanding 
at approximately the same rate. 
We rate LDDS a Hold owing to its strong fundamental 
position but equally strong recent price 
performance, which has pushed its valuation back 
to reasonable levels. We view LDDS as a fundamentally 
attractive company, with above average 
growth and profitability. It has a differentiated 
strategy that we think can be executed successfully 
by current management. Valuation measures compared 
to the market and to other long distance 
carriers suggest the stock is at fair value and should 
perform in line with the overall stock market. On a 
year-to-date basis, the stock is up 33%. Our yearend 
1995 price target is $28. This price target is 
supported by comparative P/Es, P/E to growth rate, 
and market capitalization to revenue comparisons. 
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Short Review of Key Issues 
Established Track Record—Management has 
effectively produced a solid track record of 
accomplishments, growing revenues from internal 
sources and through acquisitions. As our analysis 
will show, while doing this, the company has 
successfully expanded margins and improved profitability 
beyond that achieved by other long distance 
companies. The company has nearly tripled revenues 
since 1991 and more than tripled net income in 
the same period. 
Strong Earnings Outlook—We expect that LDDS will 
be able to expand earnings over the next couple of 
years at a 30% rate (off the $1.05 1994 base) and 
over the next five years at a 23% compounded 
annual rate. This should be driven by five-year 
revenue growth of 14% and free cash flow growth 
of 24%. 
WilTel and IDB Acquisitions—The company appears 
well on it’s way toward the successful integration of 
its two most recent and significant acquisitions, 
WilTel and IDB. These two companies essentially 
transform the company from the nation’s largest 
regional long distance company to the nation’s 
smallest national long distance company. The definition 
of its new role is not as important as its 
competitive position within its new context. We are 
convinced the company retains a strong competitive 
position versus its larger national carrier competitors, 
even as it faces the important challenge of 
integrating the acquisitions of IDB and WilTel. 
With WilTel, LDDS gets a nationwide fiber optic 
network, which will lower its line costs by now allowing 
the company to transmit most of its traffic 
over its own facilities. With IDB, it obtains an international 
networking capability that gives it direct 
operating agreements with 59 countries, which represent 
80% of outbound U.S. traffic. This gives 
LDDS the ability to receive return traffic and to 
market itself as a full service operator. The combination 
of the networking infrastructure, with the 
marketing skills LDDS has honed over the years, 
should keep the company in good stead as it faces 
increasing industry competition. 
LDDS Communications, Inc. 
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Ability to Compete Successfully—LDDS has historically 
focused on the low-end business market for its 
source of growth. As Chart 1 demonstrates, the 
company has 80% of its business in the small business 
sector and is, to a large degree, avoiding the 
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rough and tumble competition of the residential and 
national accounts market. Continued success for 
LDDS will be driven by its ability to satisfy customers 
in the small business arena, in the same way 
it has done this historically. We believe this can be 
achieved even as the size of the average customer’s 
bill rises. LDDS will continue to use direct marketing 
to service its customers. This is a major 
differentiating factor for the company, since the 
larger players simply cannot afford direct contact 
with customers that generate less than $1,000 per 
month in revenues. 
Long-Term Strategy—The company’s long-term strategy 
is to continue saturating the low end of the 
business market with its direct-marketing approaches, 
along with superior customer service. It 
will continue to avoid a high concentration on the 
national accounts and residential market segments. 
In addition, the potential for additional acquisitions 
exists, although there are increasingly fewer attractive 
candidates. Finally, the company plans to 
generate strong earnings growth over the next couple 
of years simply by exploiting the synergies that 
should be available in its mergers with WilTel and 
IDB. The company has identified total synergy 
benefits of $0.16-0.17 per share per year through 
these mergers. This is comprised of the $0.05 per 
share gain from IDB, $0.07 per share from WilTel, 
and an additional $0.04-0.05 per share for the 
combination of the three companies together. 
Acquisitions have been an important part of the 
LDDS growth strategy. This element of the long-term 
strategy is still important, but the potential 
incremental growth from acquisitions is smaller, 
since there are clearly fewer companies available to 
purchase. In its guidance for 30% growth in 1995 
and 1996, management was not assuming any contribution 
from new acquisitions. LDDS’ acquisition 
policy requires that mergers become accretive to 
earnings in very short order. As CEO Bernard 
Ebbers declares: If LDDS can find acquisitions 
that contribute to earnings, it will be active on the 
acquisition trail. 
Chart 1 
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Valuation Approaches—Long distance stocks are primarily 
driven by P/E valuation approaches, with 
cash flow multiples and market cap to revenue 
comparisons also being important comparative 
tools. As Table 1 reflects, LDDS’ 1995 P/E multiple 
of 18.7 is higher than the group average, but its 
P/E relative to its growth rate is not out of line. 
Looking at valuation on the basis of revenues, 
which is appropriate in industries where bottom-line 
margins will converge over time, makes sense. In 
this situation, the market cap to 1995 estimated 
revenue comparison for LDDS of 2.0 is again in 
line with the faster growth companies and higher 
than the slower-growth larger companies. Our price 
target of $28 by year-end is based on our expectation 
that the company will achieve the 30% growth 
rate it is targeting in 1995 and 1996. 
Table 1 
Comparative Valuation Data 
LDDS ALC LCI ACC AT&T Sprint MCI 
Price: 
4/13/95 $25.75 $38.25 $25.88 $16.19 $51.38 $32.13 $22.00 
52-week range 27 - 14 38 - 26 27 - 13 26 - 13 57 - 47 40 - 26 28 - 1 7 
Earnings per Share: 
1993A $0.85 $1.07 $0.34 $0.24 $2.59 $1.99 $1.28 
1994A 1.05 1.68 0.99 (1.60) 3.13 2.47 1.47 
1995E 1.38 2.04 1.20 (0.70) 3.53 2.70 1.55 
1996E 1.80 2.46 1.54 NA 4.05 3.00 1.70 
5-YrEPSCAGR(1989-1994normalized) 51.9% -169.4% -214.6% -240.7% 4.6% 7.5% 4.9% 
5-YrEPSCAGR(1989-1994asreported) 25.3% -170.1% -157.0% -240.7% 3.8% 8.2% 4.9% 
5-YrProjectedEPSGrowthRate 22% 18% 24% 15% 12% 10% 10% 
Historical P/E Range 
1993A 24.9 - 30.9 11.7 - 28.7 29.4 - 62..1 44.8 - 90.6 19.6 - 25.0 12.8 - 19.8 14.8 - 23.1 
1994A 14.2 - 27.9 16.4 - 22.7 13.6 - 27.0 (8.1)-(15.9) 15.1 - 18.1 10.9 - 16.2 12.2 - 19.4 
P/E 
1995E 18.7 18.8 21.6 (23.1) 14.6 11.9 14.2 
1996E 14.3 15.5 16.8 NA 12.7 10.7 12.9 
Operating Cash Flow ($in millions) 
1993A $2.33 $2.48 $4.62 $1.00 $6.89 $8.45 $4.14 
1994A $2.25 $3.68 $2.94 $0.40 $7.69 $9.36 $3.98 
1995E $5.18 $4.31 $3.88 $1.80 $9.06 $10.38 $4.56 
1996E $6.06 $5.04 $4.89 $3.61 $9.91 $11.42 $5.24 
Historical OCF Multiple Range 
1992A 11.6 - 18.8 3.8 - 8.3 - 8.1 - 12.5 6.8 - 9.1 3.3 - 3.8 5.4 - 6.8 
1993A 11.0 - 13.2 6.1 - 13.4 3.2 - 5.6 11.0 - 22.0 9.6 - 11.6 4.7 - 6.4 5.7 - 8.2 
1994A 5.6 - 9.5 7.9 - 10.8 6.0 - 10.5 43.3 - 74.1 8.1 - 9.4 4.4 - 5.8 4.8 - 7.5 
OCF Multiple 
1995E 8.3 9.7 9.0 11.3 7.3 4.4 5.1 
1996E 7.1 8.3 7.2 5.6 6.7 4.0 4.4 
Adjusted Market Cap / Revenues 
1993A 7.4 3.2 3.0 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 
1994A 4.9 2.5 2.2 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 
1995E 2.3 2.1 1.7 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.1 
1996E 1.9 1.7 1.4 0.5 1.1 1.0 1.0 
P/E to Earnings Growth Rate 
1995E 0.8 1.0 0.9 (1.5) 1.2 1.2 1.4 
1996E 0.7 0.8 0.7 NA 1.1 1.1 1.3 
OCF Multiple / OCF Growth Rate 
1995E 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.5 
1996E 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Note: Estimates of earnings and growth rates for ALC, LCI, and ACC reflect consensus estimates from 
and information gleaned from discussions with 
LDDS Communications, Inc. 
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Expansion of Key Issues 
Company History 
LDDS has flourished through a variety of notable 
acquisitions. In 1989, the company acquired long 
distance operations in St. Louis, Kansas City, 
Tennessee, Kentucky and Texas through the 
acquisition of Inter-Comm. Advantage Companies, Inc. The addition of 
Mercury, Inc. and TelaMarketing Corp. in 1990 
extended LDDS’ reach into Louisiana. Mercury 
was a reseller with annual revenues of $15 million 
and TelaMarketing was a long distance company 
with revenues of close to $22 million from its 
business in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and 
Florida. 
Nineteen ninety-one was a year of further expansion. 
The first acquisition of the year was National 
Telecommunications, a reseller of long distance 
services mainly in Texas but branching into 
Arkansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, New Mexico and 
Arizona as well. With yearly revenues of nearly $35 
million, this acquisition gave LDDS a strong operational 
base in its first Southwestern state. The next 
purchase in 1991 was Phone America of Carolina, 
which gave LDDS a strong complement to its 
already-existing business in the Southeast as Phone 
America provided a $16 million long distance resale 
business in the Carolinas and Tennessee. To finish 
out the year, LDDS took over the business of 
MidAmerican Communications Corporation, a 
supplier of long distance in Nebraska, Missouri, 
Kansas, Illinois and Arizona. This was the company’s 
largest acquisition yet as MidAmerican 
generated annual revenues of approximately $75 
million. 
In 1992, LDDS continued its expansion into the 
Southwest through the acquisitions of Prime 
Telecommunications, Shared Use Network Systems, 
Inc., and Automated Communications. These 
additions strengthened the company’s presence in 
Arizona, Colorado and New Mexico, as well as 
added two new states, Nevada and Utah. In 
December, the company merged with Advanced 
Telecommunications Corporation (ATC). ATC 
produced $400 million in revenues per year by providing 
long distance service in 26 southern states. 
This merger clinched the number four ranking for 
LDDS among long distance carriers. TeleMarketing 
Investments was the final acquisition for the year. 
The company provided long distance service in 
Ohio, Nebraska and Iowa with approximately $24 
million in revenues. 
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The acquisitions of Dial-Net and Touch 1 Long 
Distance were finalized in 1993. They contributed 
approximately $80 and $30 million in revenues, 
respectively, and added services in the midwestern 
and northwestern states and refortified the southeastern 
states. Metromedia Communications 
Corporation and Resurgens Communications 
Group, Inc. were merged into LDDS on September 
15, 1993, which helped to expand annual revenues 
from $800 million in 1992 to $1,145 million in 
1993. The areas of concentration for these two 
companies were in the Northeast and Southeast. 
Of course, the big acquisitions, which we discuss 
below, were IDB and WilTel in 1994 (WilTel 
actually closed in January 1995). These two additions 
were different from all others in that they 
changed the basic nature of the company. These 
acquisitions not only expand the geographical 
reach and add revenues (as all other previous acquisitions 
had done), but they take LDDS into new 
market segments and change the basic operations 
of the company. Responding to this momentous 
change, LDDS also plans a name change to LDDS 
WorldCom to better reflect its new global presence. 
WorldCom is a name that has been in the international 
long distance market for many years, first as 
an international record carrier, and then as a full 
private line voice and data company eventually 
owned by IDB. 
Company Management 
LDDS is fortunate to be led by an experienced crew 
of managers who have put in their years in the industry 
both at LDDS and other leading companies. 
Bernard Ebbers leads the team and remains the 
company’s chief spokesman to the financial community. 
The renowned John Kluge is chairman of 
the company and holds this non-executive position 
by virtue of his company’s merger into LDDS, 
through which he gained his 16% stake and became 
the company’s largest shareholder. A short review 
of the top three managers’ backgrounds follows. 
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Bernard J. Ebbers—President and CEO, LDDS 
Communications—It was 1983 when Bernard Ebbers 
made an investment in LDDS and it was in 1985, 
when the company was fighting off bankruptcy, 
that he took over as chief executive officer. Ebbers 
was born in Edmonton, Alberta, and moved to the 
United States to attend Mississippi College. Prior to 
joining LDDS (then called Long Distance Discount 
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Service), Ebbers ran a chain of Best Western motels 
in Mississippi. Ebbers has served as president and 
chief executive officer since April 1985. He remains 
the head cheerleader of its troops and the chief 
strategist of its game plan. 
Roy A. Wilkens—WilTel President and CEO—Roy 
Wilkens started WilTel as a subsidiary of Williams 
Pipeline Company in 1985. He was chairman of the 
National Telecommunications Network in 1988 and 
served a one-year term as chairman of CompTel in 
1991. In 1992, he was appointed as a member of the 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Council by President George Bush. Today, Wilkens 
serves as president and chief executive officer of 
WilTel, a wholly owned subsidiary of LDDS, as 
well as a member of the board of directors of 
LDDS. Wilkens will be responsible for all wholesale 
activities for LDDS, both domestically and 
internationally, as well as network planning, engineering 
and MIS. 
Gregory A. LeVert—President, Communication 
Services—Greg LeVert joined LDDS as president of 
Communication Services in December 1994. Prior 
to his appointment at LDDS, he spent five years at 
MCI as president of MCI Global Accounts, president 
of MCI Central Division, and vice president of 
MCI National Accounts Marketing. In the 20 years 
before his career at MCI, LeVert was vice president 
and regional manager of Xerox Corporation’s 
southern region and spent time as national manager 
of sales and training and development. LeVert was 
recently appointed as a member of LDDS’ board of 
directors. 
Chart 2 











LDDS Communications, Inc. 
9 
Company Operations 
LDDS primarily serves small to medium-sized 
businesses that generate up to $5,000 a month in 
revenues. This market represents about 70% of 
LDDS’ business. LDDS’ largest business markets 
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are in Florida, Texas, California and New York. 
As Chart 2 shows, LDDS’ revenues on a pro forma 
basis, including those of WilTel and IDB, will be 
comprised of the following segments: residential 
4-5%; commercial 47-48%; wholesale 25%; private 
lines 17%; and operator services 6%. The highest 
growth sector at LDDS is the wholesale (carrier) 
business in the 20-25% range, with other segments 
growing in the 10-20% range. 
To support its operations, the company has over 
160 offices serving customers nationwide. Part 
of LDDS’ strategy lies in the practice of keeping 
deep roots in its local and regional operating areas. 
Within each operating region, each state preserves 
its own sales, customer service, and technical support 
staff. This gives LDDS the opportunity to 
provide its customers with a sense of local affiliation, 
while at the same time offering nationwide long 
distance service and direct-dial access to more than 
220 foreign countries. LDDS’ 800 services are 
available in all 50 states, Canada, and parts of the 
Caribbean, while international toll-free services are 
accessible from more than 50 countries. 
In general, LDDS’ rates are designed to be lower 
than AT&T’s yet competitive with all other long-distance 
carriers. However, this is always subject to 
change based upon the adjustments that AT&T and 
other long distance carriers may make. AT&T’s 
recent 2.9% price hike in the low end of the business 
segment is a very positive development for LDDS, 
since AT&T’s offsetting price reductions on the 
consumer side essentially don’t affect the company. 
Successful Integration of Acquired Companies 
LDDS has put together a rather remarkable track 
record of successfully buying companies and capitalizing 
on the new growth opportunities. LDDS did 
not so much merge its acquisitions into its existing 
businesses as much as it added the new additions to 
its “confederation” of companies. In this way, the 
company retained the identity and entrepreneurial 
spirit of its new acquisitions and minimized the disruption 
to customer relationships. Its primary billing 
system, designed and operated by EDS, is flexible 
enough to handle all the new additions, as well as to 
respond to pricing changes that were inevitable. 
LDDS also managed to successfully acquire its new 
companies at attractive prices that allowed it to 
achieve its goal of doing only accretive acquisitions. 
Not many companies can make this claim. 
In the case of IDB and WilTel, LDDS is retaining 
some of the elements of its historical acquisition 
 117
policies, but in other respects is venturing in new 
directions. The similarity is that LDDS is trying to 
avoid disrupting customer relationships as much as 
possible and retain as much management and sales 
staff as makes sense. The differences are also significant. 
In the case of IDB, the company lacked 
strong operating and financial management, so this 
element of the operation is clearly being subsumed 
into LDDS. In addition, because of the significant 
opportunity for synergies, the integration of IDB’s, 
WilTel’s, and LDDS’ network operations were put 
on a fast track. WilTel will retain a greater share of 
its independence it seems, even retaining its brand 
name, in order to avoid any carrier reaction against 
buying services from LDDS, a potential competitor. 
In addition, the fact that WilTel’s president, Roy 
Wilkens, is assuming one of the top three spots at 
LDDS is a sure sign that WilTel won’t fade into the 
woodwork. 
Given LDDS’ track record in acquisitions and its 
knack for identifying and fixing problems early, we 
are optimistic about the company’s ability to capitalize 
on the potential available from the IDB and 
WilTel transactions. 
Historical Earnings and Profit Comparisons with Other 
Companies 
LDDS’ historical operating and financial performance, 
compared with other long distance carriers, is 
the best indication of its past success and the potential 
for its future performance. Charts 3 through 5 
give a good snapshot view of the company’s relative 
performance versus its peers. The comparative 
margin analysis in Chart 3 looks at LDDS on a pre-merger 
basis over the past three years. At this point, 
it doesn’t make any sense to compare it on a post-merger 
basis, since the historical restatements 
wouldn’t reflect any of the expected synergies, and 
instead would reflect the weak operating performance 
of IDB. We have not included AT&T in the 
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comparisons because it does not disclose its depreciation 
and operating expenses for its long distance 
unit. 
Chart 3 shows that LDDS has consistently produced 
higher operating margins than any company 
in the group, and enjoys the second best improvement 
in operating margins over the past three years. 
As this chart shows, LDDS’ superior performance 
is the result of lower SG&A and depreciation. On 
the other hand, since it historically has not been a 
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facilities-based carrier, its telecommunications costs 
were higher than any company in the group. This, of 
course, was more than offset by the savings in other 
areas. The actual operating margin in this three-year 
period rose from 14.8% to 18.0%. 
Chart 4 reflects the company’s strong performance 
from another perspective. It demonstrates that 
although LDDS’ growth rates in revenue and operating 
income are no longer the highest in the 
industry, they still are much larger than the bigger 
carriers, and certainly competitive with the smaller 
ones. Over this period, LDDS has grown revenues 
by 113% and operating income by 160%, which 
contributed to the improvement in operating margin 
described above. Chart 5 shows that LDDS expanded 
operating income by 42% in 1992, 68% in 
1993, and 55% in 1994. Again, ALC and LCI managed 
to beat these figures because of lower bases of 
earnings and weaker margin levels. 
Chart 3 
Comparative Margin Analysis 
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Chart 4 
Income Statement Composition 
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Chart 4 
Income Statement Composition continued 
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Chart 5 
% Change in Operating Income 
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How Has LDDS Exceeded Industry Norms for Growth and 
Profitability?—We think it comes down to several 
factors. First, LDDS focuses on that part of the industry 
where growth is the highest. The low end of 
the business market is expanding volumes currently 
at around 15%, much higher than the industry 
average of only 9.4%. Second, the company has 
profitably acquired growth externally, which has 
leveraged it strong internal growth rate. The combination 
of internal and external growth has propelled 
the 40% compounded annual billed minutes growth 
over the last four years. Revenue growth has lagged, 
of course, as the mix of business has changed. But, 
as Chart 6 shows, revenue per minute has remained 
within a tight range since mid-1991. The precipitous 
decline in revenue per minute since 1990 is a 
function of changing business mix and lower 
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transmission costs. If this had not occurred, the 
company would have been able to generate the 
margin gains and bottom-line growth of the last 
three years. 
A third explanation for LDDS’ strong performance 
is a simple one: it clearly runs a tighter ship than the 
standard long distance company. This is evident in 
its lower SG&A level, reflecting low customer acquisition 
costs and low customer churn. It is also 
evident in efficient network operations, the fourth 
area of advantage. LDDS has been very successful 
in obtaining low-cost transmission capacity. Being 
the largest reseller in the industry (for example, 
LDDS is MCI’s largest customer), LDDS has been 
able to negotiate very low-cost contracts. 
The follow-up question, of course, is, Will this industry 
leading position last? As a facilities-based 
carrier, LDDS will face different challenges and 
different opportunities, but we think it will be 
equally successful in the future, as we describe later 
in this report. 
The WilTel Acquisition 
On August 22, 1994, LDDS announced that it 
would acquire WilTel, a subsidiary of The 
Williams Companies. Under the terms of the 
agreement, LDDS acquired WilTel’s network services 
operations for $2.5 billion in cash. WilTel 
provides private line (data, voice and video) and 
switched long distance products and services 
through two business units, WilTel U.S. and WilTel 
International. A third unit, WilTel Undersea Cable, 
has been formed specifically for construction of an 
undersea cable between the United States and Cuba. 
The domestic operations are comprised of 11,000 
miles of fiber optic cable and digital microwave 
facilities, making it the fourth largest nationwide 
network. Including network sharing and leasing, 
WilTel has access to an additional 30,000 miles of 
network facilities and the capability of reaching 
virtually all major U.S. cities. 
In 1993, one-third of WilTel U.S.’s income was 
derived from its switched services (a comparable 
figure is not available for 1994). WilTel entered this 
market in 1991 by offering facilities for resale to 
other carriers. The contracts WilTel signed with 
these resellers have one- to five-year lives. WilTel 
also offers its products, services and switching directly 
to commercial customers, but this is a much 
smaller part of its business. WilTel also operated 
Vyvx, which carries video traffic on the WilTel 
network. This specialized business will stay with 
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Williams Companies, but WilTel will continue to be 
the underlying network for the service. 
WilTel has been a leader in the introduction of high-speed, 
high-capacity network services. WilTel was 
the first carrier to offer a public frame relay service 
under the name of WilPak. The product was introduced 
a full year ahead of any of the company’s 
major carrier competitors. In late 1993, the company 
became the first carrier to offer nationwide 
ATM service. WilTel distinguished itself early in its 
formation by initially using decommissioned gas 
pipelines for its network rights of way. By pulling 
the fiber through pipelines, WilTel was able to 
avoid the risk of cable cuts, which at that time was 
dogging the larger carriers. Thus, it developed its 
early identity as a very secure network provider, not 
subject to the typical fiber-cuts. Today, at least 32% 
of WilTel’s fiber network is installed in decommissioned 
pipelines. In 1986, WilTel was recognized by 
the National Society of Professional Engineers as 
one of the “Outstanding Engineering Achievements” 
because of this technique. The rest of WilTel’s cables 
are buried along secured rights of way that are 
subject to continuous ground and aerial monitoring 
and control. To maintain its differentiation, WilTel 
buries non-pipe fiber at least 40 inches in the ground, 
substantially deeper than the industry standard. 
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To finance the acquisition of WilTel, LDDS received 
commercial bank commitments totaling 
$3.41 billion, which are being used not only to finance 
the acquisition but to refinance LDDS’ 
existing credit facilities and fund working capital. 
The lending facility is actually in two parts. Facility 
A is a $2.16 billion, six-year revolving credit facility, 
and Facility B is a $1.25 billion, two-year term 
facility. Quarterly payments on Facility A will begin 
on September 30, 1996, with the final installment 
due December 31, 2000. Facility B will mature with 
only one payment on December 31, 1996. These 
facilities will be unsecured and require compliance 
with specific financial and operating covenants, including 
the prohibition of paying shareholders’ cash 
dividends without the prior approval of the banks. 
The acquisition of WilTel was completed on January 
5, 1995. 
Acquisition of IDB Communications Group 
On December 30, 1994, LDDS completed its 
$700 million pooling of interest with IDB 
Communications. IDB, based in Culver City, 
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California, provides broadcast transmission and 
international private line and switched services on a 
wholesale basis. It has 160 private line agreements 
and 59 switched voice agreements with telephone 
companies around the world. LDDS managed to 
buy IDB after the company failed to adequately 
follow normal accounting practices, lost its accountants, 
and was forced to restate previous 
results. This episode sent the stock tumbling and 
essentially forced management to sell the company. 
The fire-sale price LDDS was able to negotiate 
reflects this turn of events, as well as the hefty 
reserves LDDS took to ensure the elimination of 
any residual IDB problems. 
According to the terms of the merger, each outstanding 
share of IDB common stock, $0.01 par value 
per share, was converted into the right to receive 
0.476879 of a share of LDDS common stock, $0.01 
par value. Simply put, LDDS issued 35,881,087 
shares of LDDS Communications for all of the 
outstanding shares of IDB common stock. Upon 
effectiveness of the merger, each unexercised IDB 
option, exercisable for an IDB common share, 
became exercisable for shares of LDDS. However, 
the conversion ratio is proportionately different than 
it was for shares of IDB. 
The $195.5 million in convertible subordinated 
notes issued by IDB will remain outstanding, and 
the note-holders will receive the corresponding exchange 
ratio adjustment to their common stock 
conversion price. These convert into about 5.1 million 
LDDS shares at $38 per share. 
Pre-merger, IDB provided international private line 
and switched services to most of the important 
countries (relative to U.S. telephone traffic) in the 
world. In addition, it provided broadcast services 
over leased satellite transponders and resold mobile 
satellite services. Finally, IDB also sold systems for 
fixed and mobile satellite transmission. At year-end 
1993, IDB was the fourth largest provider of international 
long-distance calls in the United States and 
the second largest U.S.-based provider of international 
private line telephone service in the world. In 
1993 alone, IDB WorldCom experienced 363% 
growth in minutes through the acquisition of TRT 
Communications and WorldCom Europe. The company’s 
minutes of long distance use more than 
doubled in 1993, with 279 million minutes reported 
versus 128 million in 1992. (Although, as LDDS 
describes it, much of this traffic was unprofitable 
because management did not know its costs. Therefore, 
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LDDS plans to slow the growth, but make it 
profitable.) IDB was both an important LDDS customer 
and an international facilities supplier to 
WilTel, which included assisting WilTel in expanding 
its European data services. 
Integration of IDB and WilTel, and Sources of 
Synergy 
Management sees the integration of IDB and WilTel 
as a rather easy transition. As management describes 
it, integrating IDB requires simply rerouting 
traffic generated on the domestic network 
over the IDB international network. IDB has direct 
switched service agreements with 59 countries. 
Since the top 20 countries represent 72% of all U.S. 
international traffic, the company is obviously already 
well positioned to exploit the international 
opportunity. 
LDDS Communications, Inc. 
16 
WilTel is a little different. WilTel management is 
still running the operation, and the company is still 
conducting business as usual, except for exiting the 
commercial sector. WilTel still is predominantly a 
wholesaler of capacity to resellers and most importantly 
to LDDS. In fact, the WilTel brand name will 
remain, at least for the immediate future, in order to 
avoid disrupting relationships with other long distance 
carriers that would prefer not being perceived 
as reselling LDDS’ service to customers. 
WilTel salesmen who had been focused on the 
commercial sector have been reassigned to the 
LDDS commercial accounts effort. The full transition 
of the employees and the network will take four 
to six months. By transitioning the LDDS traffic 
onto the WilTel network, and achieving economies 
in sales, marketing and MIS, LDDS expects to save 
$100 million annually, half of this amount coming 
from network costs ($4 million a year in system 
costs alone is planned to be saved). Another $30-40 
million will be saved from the merger with IDB, 
mostly from the utilization of IDB’s international 
facilities. 
One-time costs of completing the IDB merger were 
taken in the fourth quarter of 1994. In addition, a 
one-time $76 million charge to settle shareholder 
suits was taken in the third quarter. As Table 2 
shows, $130 million in pretax charges were taken in 
the quarter for a variety of items associated with the 
IDB merger. This amount is significantly higher 
than management originally anticipated. One reason 
for the excess is that the company appears to be 
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more aggressive in cleaning up IDB’s accounting, 
and also more aggressive in eliminating unprofitable 
customers and network service providers. A second 
reason for the steep charges, in our opinion, is management’s 
desire to eliminate any risk that they’ve 
under-reserved. Thus, we doubt there is much, if 
any, risk that the IDB merger creates negative surprises 
during 1995. More than ample reserves 
appear to have been taken. 
Unlike the IDB merger, the WilTel acquisition, 
which is a purchase of assets, presents no risk of 
charges. No restatements will occur because the 
company has adjusted the asset values that it purchased 
from WilTel, with any excess value being 
assigned to intangibles. The three companies—IDB, 
WilTel and LDDS—will be run as an integrated 
entity. The two basic businesses that LDDS will be 
in, carrier and retail, have been organized to cut 
across each of the three companies’ traditional lines 
of business. 
Table 2 
IDB Related Fourth Quarter One-Time Charges 
$ in thousands 
Restructuring Costs 
Severances $18,702 
Duplicate facilities/unfavorable leases 11,050 
Litigation reserve 8,000 
Write-off business segment 2,423 
Other restructuring costs 2,940 
Miscellaneous balance sheet 589 
43,704 
Direct Merger Costs 
Investment banking/SEC/proxy 12,027 





Line cost accruals 14,163 
14,163 
Selling, General and Administrative 
Accounts receivable reserves 22,866 
Broadcast write-down 13,500 
Investment write-downs 10,633 
Tax exposures—balance sheet 5,208 
Write-down aeronautical equipment 5,000 
All other 353 
57,560 
Total $130,429 
Cost Savings from Merger—Management has indicated 
that costs savings of $130-140 million is achievable 
in its merger with IDB and WilTel. The sources of 
the savings are in both the networking area and the 
SG&A area. The networking side will see benefits 
from the reduction of leased line costs, as LDDS 
traffic is transitioned onto the WilTel network. In 
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addition, access to the local telephone companies 
can become more efficient by using the access arrangements 
of both LDDS and WilTel. On the 
international side, utilization of the IDB network 
lowers transmission costs both in the private line 
and switched services arena. 
Corporate overhead savings are simply the result of 
cutting back redundant operations among all three 
companies. 
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How Will LDDS Compete Against the Big Boys? 
LDDS will be pursuing its same business strategies, 
with some modification. It will continue to go after 
the residential market segment very conservatively, 
using an outside telemarketing vendor. This keeps 
costs low and makes the market segment profitable 
for LDDS. The low end of the business market will 
also be addressed in much the same way as it has 
been in the past. With the WilTel network and 
IDB’s international connections, there should be 
new capacity to create and bundle services that 
even small businesses buy. So, there could be 
enhanced competitiveness in an already-strong 
market segment. 
The company plans to move up somewhat into what 
it calls major accounts. This is a departure for 
LDDS. It is planning to undertake this effort in 
order to truly capitalize the full capabilities it now 
possesses. The aim is to market to this segment by 
using direct sales and a lot of hand holding. This 
will differentiate it from the larger carriers in the 
same way it has cemented a strong position among 
smaller customers. 
While LDDS inevitably will face stiffer competition 
as it moves up the food chain to larger customers, 
and also as it becomes a larger national competitor 
itself, we believe it can be successful. We expect 
LDDS to retain its strong competitive position 
by continuing to emphasize the same talents and 
capabilities that has provided it with such success in 
the past. Almost by definition, the market segments 
it addresses are less competitive than most. It has a 
differentiated marketing strategy that the largest 
long distance carriers can’t replicate. It has an excellent 
cost structure. And, it has an entrepreneurial 
management team that moves quickly and intelligently 
to capitalize on opportunities. With these 
ingredients, we think LDDS can continue to do very 
well against the “big boys.” 
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Business Composition 
With the acquisition of WilTel and IDB, LDDS has 
greater opportunities to do things in the market than 
ever before. The expectation is that the business 
composition will change significantly over time, as 
will the company’s basic strategy. As Chart 2 demonstrates, 
the business composition of LDDS 
changes substantially with the two mergers, and the 
growth opportunity will change as well. 
The company is trying to change this further by expanding 
the international component, which would 
be very profitable with very high revenue minutes. 
One way of capturing this potential is by putting 
international sales specialists in the system. LDDS 
will try to achieve the industry norm in terms of international 
sales as a percent of total revenues. Prior 
to the IDB purchase, international was only 2.8% of 
total minutes and provided about 11% of revenue. 
But the industry average is double digit on minutes 
and close to 20% in revenues. IDB will help here. 
With IDB international, minutes now equal 5.7% of 
the total and 15-16% of total revenues. 
The bulk of international business will continue to 
come from carrier traffic because that is what the 
composition is today. But as time goes on, LDDS 
will seek to grow the business off the expanding 
domestic base of customers. 
The switched services market is comprised of residential, 
commercial, carrier and operator services. 
The expected minutes growth is 11-12% per year. 
The private line business is comprised of sales from 
both WilTel and IDB. This business is driven by the 
addition of line installations. Because of IDB’s 
strong number two position globally, its growth 
there is basically in line with the market in the mid single- 
digit area. In the domestic marketplace, line 
growth is higher and should allow growth in the 
10-12% range. Combined, total private line growth 
should be in the 10-11% range. 
Residential Market 
Today about 4% of total revenues comes from residential 
customers. As a percent of total revenues, 
LDDS does not expect to see this figure expand. In 
fact, over half of all the company’s present residential 
customers are furnished to LDDS through a 
third-party marketing agent called Touch 1. Once 
Touch 1 secures a certain number of customers, the 
accounts are turned over to LDDS. LDDS services 
the accounts under a three-year management contract, 
for which it receives a fee. Residential 
customers are useful for carriers to fill up underutilized 
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network facilities in the evening. However, 
expanding into the residential business has its costs 
as well. For LDDS, the expectation is that sufficient 
growth and opportunity exists in the small- to 
medium-sized business market to make the residential 
market less attractive. The residential market is 
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the focus of intense mass-market competition 
between the larger long distance carriers. It is questionable 
whether LDDS could be equally successful 
in this segment, as it has been in the business sector, 
since differentiating its offering would be much 
more difficult. Thus, for the time being, and the 
foreseeable future, LDDS has no designs on expanding 
its residential presence. 
Given the company’s current position in the market, 
and the utilization of a third-party marketing agent, 
one might think low growth is expected. However, 
we anticipate revenue growth in the residential 
market, off a relatively small base in the range of 
8-10%. This is based on the assumption that the 
company will continue to utilize aggressive third-party 
marketing agents, which allow growth slightly 
ahead of the market overall. 
Commercial Sector 
The commercial side of the long distance market is 
comprised of small businesses, major accounts and 
national accounts. The company has focused almost 
entirely on the small business sector, but now plans 
to expand into the major account area. National 
accounts is not an area of interest because of the 
intense competition and because of the commanding 
presence of AT&T and MCI in this segment. We 
anticipate that LDDS should be able to grow its 
revenues in the commercial sector by upward of 
11% annually, based upon expectations for strong 
industry growth in this area, with minimal price 
erosion. 
Small Business Market 
LDDS defines its small business market as customers 
generating under $1,000 per month in revenues. 
In this market segment, there are currently 1,428 
sales reps, but there are plans to expand this number. 
Turnover in sales reps is typically quite high in 
the business, and this was a problem for the company 
in 1994 after completing the Metromedia 
acquisition. 
In this market segment, LDDS is most differentiated 
from the larger carriers. Using a direct sales force to 
address this market is a strategy in which the larger 
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carriers will most likely never indulge. Even if the 
larger carriers create and aggressively market service 
packages, or distinct product offerings for this 
segment, the risk of serious erosion of market position 
for LDDS is small. 
Major Accounts 
LDDS defines the major accounts segment as one 
that is comprised of customers generating $1,000 
per month to $5,000 per month in billings. This was 
not a sector of the market that LDDS addressed 
pervasively prior to its acquisition of IDB and 
WilTel. LDDS management feels that success in 
this segment is driven by seven factors: (1) good 
switched product; (2) calling cards; (3) debit cards; 
(4) competitive international pricing; (5) private 
line capability; (6) data expertise in terms of sales 
force and engineering; and (7) multi-location billing 
packages. Combining the resources of all three 
companies here is the expectation that this segment 
can be successfully marketed now. 
The company markets to its major accounts through 
face-to-face meetings of its sales force. There are 
presently 739,000 accounts, and with WilTel and 
IDB included, the count rises to 780,000. Eighty 
percent of the accounts generate less than $250 per 
month in revenues. The remaining 20% of the accounts 
produce 80% of total sales. Because of the 
direct contact with customers, customer churn is 
much lower than that experienced by the larger carriers. 
Management indicates this churn level is a 
little above 2% per month. According to the company, 
AT&T and MCI don’t focus on accounts 
generating less than $5,000 per month through the 
use of a direct sales force. We also believe this is 
true, but neither AT&T nor MCI are willing to 
confirm this point. 
By combining the capabilities derived from recent 
mergers, LDDS should be able to enhance its ability 
to address this market successfully. This market 
segment is still able to sustain higher-than-average 
prices and consequently better margins. 
LDDS plans to redeploy salespeople from its small 
business segment to its major accounts sector, in 
order to capitalize on the perceived opportunity. 
This will leave approximately 700 salespeople in the 
small business account sector and a total of 405 in 
the major accounts sector. The total is comprised of 
125 WilTel salespeople, 200 LDDS salespeople 
shifted from the small business segment, and 80 new 
hires. 
LDDS Communications, Inc. 
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Salespeople move up the feeding chain of responsibility 
and compensation by progressing from small 
accounts to major accounts. The average small 
business salesperson may earn $50,000 per year and 
generate $3,500 of new sales monthly. Major accounts 
salespeople may earn as much $75,000 
annually and generate new sales of $6,000 to 
$9,000 per month. Thus, while LDDS doesn’t intend 
to expand its sales force materially, it does 
expect to upgrade the sales force and generate more 
revenue per average body. 
National Accounts 
The national accounts segment of the long distance 
business is a very tough one for a carrier such as 
LDDS to pursue. The company claims that this 
segment has only 5% gross margins and one which 
no one can make a lot of money. This is true, which 
explains why LDDS avoids this segment. WilTel 
attempted to address this market, but never achieved 
a reasonable penetration. While the company will 
occasionally take a rifle-shot approach to this segment, 
there is no desire by management to make any 
aggressive efforts in this area. 
Carrier Business 
Based upon the strong growth of WilTel’s carrier 
business and good growth in the low-end business 
market (which WilTel’s customers primarily serve), 
we expect carrier business revenues to expand in 
the range of 20-25% annually. This growth will 
also be enhanced by the combination of international 
services, which WilTel will be able to offer 
through IDB’s network service. This should be a 
valuable addition to WilTel’s business because of 
the fact it can now offer a more complete package 
and also because the international market is growing 
upward of 50% faster than the domestic long distance 
business. 
Operator Services 
The operator services segment is essentially a new 
opportunity for LDDS, acquired through its Resurgens 
acquisition. This business segment has above average 
margins because it is value-added in nature, 
and it has above-average growth. In our model, we 
assume the ability to grow this business 8-10% per 
year. 
Earnings Outlook 
Expectations for Industry 
We have been quite bullish about the fundamental 
prospects for the long distance business. This has 
clearly not been the discounted, consensus view reflected 
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in the long distance stock prices over the 
past 15 months. Nevertheless, we think 1995 will 
show that volume growth is still accelerating, prices 
are stable, marketing spending is containable, and 
margins will rise. In addition, we don’t anticipate 
precipitous Bell entry into long distance, and therefore 
are not concerned by a cataclysmic change in 
the industry’s competitive dynamic. At the low end 
of the business market, where LDDS focuses, the 
fundamentals are even more attractive because there 
are more ways for companies to differentiate themselves 
within a segment with higher-than-average 
prices and margins. 
Current long distance industry volume growth is 
about 9.4%. This is comprised of 15-20% growth in 
international, data and 800 service. The low end of 
the business market, where LDDS lives, appears to 
be growing minutes at about a 15% rate. These volume 
growth rates should continue to rise gradually 
for two reasons. First, new applications are being 
developed by long distance carriers to drive usage. 
So, things like interactive, on-line networks will 
drive growth, as will the proliferation of networked 
computers, wireless voice and data applications, and 
any new communications-oriented interactive terminal. 
Further on down the line, video will become a 
big driver of growth. Initially, video calling from the 
desktop will be the main area of growth, but this 
will expand over the next ten years to the home. 
On top of the expansion of applications consuming 
more transmission capacity, we do expect the inevitable 
reduction in access charges to allow lower 
prices. Thus, if access charges fall 40-50% over the 
next five years, this will permit a dollar-for-dollar 
reduction in long distance rates, leading to a 15% 
fall in prices. Long distance usage is very price 
elastic, so we would expect this reduction to spur 
even higher usage. 
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The bottom line on usage is that we anticipate by 
the end of 1995 long distance minutes will be 
growing above a 10% rate. Over the next several 
years, this rate should be able to expand to 11-12%. 
In LDDS’ part of the market, the 15% growth in 
minutes should also expand, although at not quite 
the rate of other market segments, since it seems the 
factors driving accelerated growth will more profoundly 
impact the residential and high-end business 
markets. 
Stable Pricing Environment—The market does not 
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yet seem to buy into the notion that long distance 
rates are stable for all the carriers, but we believe 
this is in fact the case to be demonstrated with 1995 
results. For LDDS, this is not as big an issue since 
its markets have been somewhat (but not completely) 
insulated from competitive pricing actions. 
Most of the concern in the market focuses on the 
residential segment, and, of course, LDDS is hardly 
present in this area. The low end of the business 
market is getting increasing attention by the larger 
carriers, but prices have held up, and, in fact, 
AT&T recently put through a 2.9% rate hike, which 
LDDS gladly embraced. Thus, we don’t view pricing 
issues as of major fundamental importance to 
LDDS or the industry over the next several years, 
but a skittish investor attitude will require this be 
proven through results. Results in 1995 should 
provide this evidence. 
Marketing Spending High for Big Three—AT&T, MCI, 
and Sprint continue to subsidize Madison Avenue, 
the TV broadcasters, and telemarketers with their 
bulging advertising and promotional budgets. 
Fortunately, these budgets don’t appear to be 
expanding for full year 1995. The companies are 
trying to scale back this growth and rationalize their 
efforts in order to boost margins. LDDS does not 
face these same concerns. Its primary marketing 
spending is on direct sales efforts. Until AT&T and 
MCI start sending armies of salespeople to $1,000 
per month accounts, it does not appear that LDDS 
will get caught up in the frenzy. Thus, it can continue 
to enjoy relatively low SG&A, and, in fact, 
benefit from increasing economies of scale in this 
area. 
Bell Entry into Long Distance Years Off—There is no 
doubt the Bell Regionals will enter the long distance 
business . . . some day. “Some day” will probably 
not arrive in a mass-market way for at least three to 
four years. Federal legislation that would allow this 
still has only a 50/50 chance of passage. And, even 
if passed, the Bells will have to open the local exchange 
to competition before they are allowed into a 
specific market. The name of the game in the future, 
in terms of success in the telecom business, will be 
marketing skill, cost structures and responsiveness 
to the customer—all skills that LDDS has honed 
successfully over the past ten years. 
The flip side of the Bell entry question for LDDS is, 
Will it get bought out or benefit in other ways? A 
buyout is possible, but we don’t think a likely scenario. 
We don’t believe any of the Bells want to 
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challenge the long distance carriers outside of the 
areas of strength, which is their home service territory. 
On the other hand, we do expect that LDDS is 
in a good position to sell services to the Bells, which 
will help them compete against the bigger, long distance 
carriers. As we note later on, these services 
include transmission, billing systems, enhanced 800 
services and international connectivity. It is hard, if 
not impossible, to size or time the opportunity in 
this area, but it clearly exists and offsets any risk 
that Bell long distance entry might imply. 
Assumptions Specific to LDDS 
Financial Outlook 
In 1994, LDDS produced earnings per share of 
$1.05 on a stand-alone, operating basis. The reported 
figure, which includes IDB on a restated 
basis, as well as the one-time charges associated 
with the IDB merger, brought earnings down to a 
loss of $0.95 per share. The $1.05 number represents 
a 24% gain in earnings per share, based on 
49% growth in revenues and 55% growth in operating 
income. Minutes volume was up 50% for the 
year. 




Consolidated Quarterly Income Statement Estimates 
$ in thousands, except per share data 
Restated to include IDB 
1994 1994 1995E 
First Second Third Fourth First Second Third Fourth First Second Third Fourth 
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Year Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Year Qtr(E) Qtr(E) Qtr(E) Qtr(E) Year(E) 
Total Revenues 411,280 424,485 439,771 433,078 1,708,614 533,898 545,315 568,558 572,994 2,220,765 862,297 911,944 955,619 
996,681 3,726,542 
Operating Expenses 
Line costs 239,056 239,748 244,868 241,936 965,608 328,442 348,629 365,513 405,049 1,447,633 478,057 504,305 525,591 550,567 
2,058,520 
















SG&A 73,513 75,446 78,071 74,660 301,690 91,465 99,153 100,337 141,405 432,360 152,109 160,046 167,233 175,815 655,203 

















Depreciation and amortization 30,976 33,693 34,943 34,296 133,908 38,067 40,396 42,646 42,719 163,828 79,331 83,443 86,006 89,701 
338,481 
































Operating income 67,735 75,598 81,889 82,186 307,408 75,924 57,137 25,062 (88,385) 69,738 152,799 164,150 176,790 180,599 
674,337 
















Other income (expense) 
Interest expense (7,652) (8,687) (9,940) (10,227) (36,506) (10,129) (11,391) (12,778) (13,005) (47,303) (65,187) (62,773) (57,944) 
(55,530) (241,433 ) 
Shareholder litigation settlement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (76,000) 0 (76,000) 0 0 0 0 0Miscellaneous Income before taxes 61,968 68,618 73,867 
















Income before extraordinary item 35,941 39,799 42,927 43,665 162,332 40,091 19,812 (111,756) (70,305) (122,158) 53,767 62,026 
72,507 76,241 264,543 
Extraordinary item (net of taxes) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net income 35,941 39,799 42,927 43,665 162,332 40,091 19,812 (111,756) (70,305) (122,158) 
53,767 62,026 72,507 76,241 264,543 
Preferred dividends 6,938 6,952 6,938 6,938 27,766 6,938 6,952 6,938 6,938 27,766 6,950 6,950 
6,950 6,950 27,800 
Net income to common 29,003 32,847 35,989 36,727 134,566 33,153 12,860 (118,694) 
(77,243) (149,924) 46,817 55,076 65,557 69,291 236,743 
Earnings per share $0.23 $0.26 $0.28 $0.28 $1.05 $0.20 $0.08 ($0.75) $0.28 ($0.95) $0.29 $0.34 
$0.41 $0.28 $1.48 
Fully diluted earnings per share $0.23 $0.26 $0.28 $0.28 $1.05 $0.20 $0.08 ($0.75) ($0.49) 
($0.95) $0.28 $0.32 $0.38 $0.40 $1.38 
Average shares outstanding (thousands) 127,571 127,726 129,168 129,336 128,684 
163,702 163,758 158,282 159,130 157,805 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 
Fully diluted shares outstanding (thousands) 127,571 127,726 129,168 129,336 128,684 163,702 
163,758 158,282 159,130 157,805 196,000 196,000 196,000 196,000 196,000 




Consolidated Income Statement Estimates 
$ in thousands, except per share data 
Pre-Merger 
Standalone Proforma CAGR 
1993 1994 1994 1995E 1996E 1997E 1998E 1999E 2000E '95-'00 
Revenues 
Residential -- -- -- 160,788 180,082 199,891 220,880 240,759 262,427 10.3% 
Commercial -- -- -- 1,769,785 2,019,324 2,281,836 2,532,838 2,811,450 3,120,710 12 .0% 
Carrier -- -- -- 942,290 1,178,804 1,449,929 1,768,914 2,087,318 2,421,289 20.8% 
Private line -- -- -- 635,672 718,944 805,218 889,766 978,742 1,076,617 11.1% 
Operator services -- -- -- 224,355 245,691 267,803 291,905 318,177 346,813 9.1% 
Total Revenues 1,144,714 1,708,614 2,220,765 3,732,888 4,342,846 5,004,677 5,704,302 6,436,446 7,227,855 14.1% 
(Year-over-year % change) 43.0% 49.3% 94.0% 68.1% 16.3% 15.2% 14.0% 12.8% 12.3% - 
Operating Expenses 
Line costs 657,837 965,608 1,447,633 2,062,025 2,379,879 2,742,563 3,114,549 3,507,863 3,939,181 13 .8% 
As a % of total revenues 57.5% 56.5% 65.2% 55.2% 54.8% 54.8% 54.6% 54.5% 54.5% -0.3% 
SG&A 208,724 301,690 432,360 656,319 774,547 925,865 1,078,113 1,242,234 1,416,660 16.6% 
As a % of total revenues 18.2% 17.7% 19.5% 17.6% 17.8% 18.5% 18.9% 19.3% 19.6% 2.2% 
Depreciation and amortization 79,921 133,908 163,828 339,058 396,734 431,536 469,338 510,740 555,142 10 .4% 
As a % of total revenues 7.0% 7.8% 7.4% 9.1% 9.1% 8.6% 8.2% 7.9% 7.7% -3.3% 
Provision to reduce carrying value o f certain assets 0 0 48,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Direct merger costs 0 0 15,002 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Restructuring and other charges 0 0 43,704 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Total expenses 946,482 1,401,206 2,151,027 3,057,402 3,551,160 4,099,964 4,662,000 5,260,837 5,910,983 14 .1% 
As a % of total revenues 82.7% 82.0% 96.9% 81.9% 81.8% 81.9% 81.7% 81.7% 81.8% - 
Operating income 198,232 307,408 69,738 675,486 791,685 904,713 1,042,302 1,175,609 1,316,872 14.3% 
As a % of total revenues 17.3% 18.0% 3.1% 18.1% 18.2% 18.1% 18.3% 18.3% 18.2% 0.1% 
(Year-over-year % change) 537.3% 55.1% -64.8% 868.6% 17.2% 14.3% 15.2% 12.8% 12.0% - 
Other income (expense) 
Interest expense (27,032) (36,506) (47,303) (241,433) (220,490) (194,483) (154,808) (107,370) (51,870) -26.5% 
Shareholder litigation settlement 0 0 (76,000) 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Miscellaneous income 4,295 7,560 5,223 8,000 8,500 9,000 9,500 10,000 10,500 5.6% 
Income before taxes 175,495 278,462 (48,342) 442,053 579,695 719,230 896,995 1,078,239 1,275,502 23.6% 
Provision for income taxes 71,313 116,130 73,816 176,821 231,878 287,692 358,798 431,296 510,201 23 .6% 
Effective tax rate (%) 40.6% 41.70% -152.7% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 0.0% 
Income before extraordinary item 104,182 162,332 (122,158) 265,232 347,817 431,538 538,197 646,943 765,301 
23.6% 
Extraordinary item (net of taxes) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Net income 104,182 162,332 (122,158) 265,232 347,817 431,538 538,197 646,943 765,301 23.6% 
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Preferred dividends 10,451 27,766 27,766 27,800 27,800 27,800 27,800 27,800 27,800 0.0% 
Net income to common 93,731 134,566 (149,924) 237,432 320,017 403,738 510,397 619,143 737,501 25.4% 
Earnings per share ($) ($0.88) $1.05 ($0.95) $1.48 $2.00 $2.52 $3.19 $3.87 $4.61 25.4% 
Fully Diluted Earnings per share ($) $0.85 $1.05 ($0.95) $1.38 $1.80 $2.21 $2.73 $3.26 $3.84 22.6% 
Average shares outstanding (thousands) 106,734 128,684 157,805 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 
0. 0% 
Fully diluted shares outstanding (thousands) 110,442 128,684 157,805 196,000 197,000 198,000 199,000 200,000 
201,000 0. 5% 




Revenue and Profit Outlook 
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Off this $1.05 base, the company has been emphatic 
about supporting 30% earnings per share growth for 
at least the next two years. Given the 24% increase 
in shares outstanding on a fully diluted basis (196 
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million fully diluted shares, which include full conversion 
of LDDS’ preferred 1 and preferred 2-26 
million shares; and full conversion of the IDB convertible 
notes, 5.1 million shares), this implies a 
hefty increase in net income. Can the company produce 
this? We think it can based upon the internal 
growth from LDDS, the new growth from IDB and 
WilTel, and the cost savings the combination will 
produce. We discuss this in detail below in the following 
paragraphs. 
Prior to last year’s mergers, LDDS’ guidance for 
earnings per share was about $1.25, based on total 
revenues of about $1.85 billion. The new guidance 
is total revenues of about $3.7 billion, with earnings 
per share $1.35-1.40. We believe this is possible, 
and it is reflected in our earnings model in Tables 3 
and 4 as well as in Charts 7 and 8. As our model 
demonstrates, after the first couple of years of 
breakneck growth, capitalizing on the two mergers, 
we anticipate a slowdown in operating income 
growth to the mid-teens level, yielding a compounded 
annual growth rate in operating income of 
14.3% between the years 1995 to 2000. Our estimate 
for compounded annual earnings per share 
growth of 22.6% for this same time period is leveraged 
from the significant decline in interest expense, 
which we have included in the model, due to the 
application of free cash flow to debt reductions. 
Fixing the IDB Problem 
After taking into account one-time charges for IDB, 
its broadcast unit had a $14-15 million loss in the 
fourth quarter. The loss on a pretax basis was $25 
million. This business, which was at the core of 
IDB’s operations, was clearly failing. As a result, as 
of March 9, LDDS essentially exited the management 
broadcast business by essentially putting it 
under a management contract with Keystone Broadcasting. 
This has eliminated LDDS’ financial risk in 
the business. The contract calls for LDDS to collect 
$6-7 million in income in 1995. 
IDB’s Systems business had a $2.0 million pretax 
loss in the fourth quarter, and the Mobile business 
had a $2.8 million loss. LDDS expects to turn 
around these businesses as well, and is confident of 
improved operations in 1995. 
To improve IDB’s international business, it is 
moving traffic onto its network. In the fourth quarter 
of 1994, there were still large amounts of 
minutes overflowing the IDB network, creating serious 
cost problems. This has been corrected as of 
January 9, so that all WATS overflow traffic will 
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go onto the MCI network at LDDS’ preferred rates. 
LDDS started to send all IDB minutes on its international 
direct operating agreements starting in 
August 1994. This was a good move because it will 
accelerate the development of return traffic in 1995. 
Other areas of operating improvement within the 
IDB morass included disconnecting seven carrier 
customers, because the gross margin on their business 
was so poor that profitability was impossible. 
Now LDDS management feels that it has established 
a stable base of carrier customers on the IDB 
network, which will allow a quick improvement in 
1995 profitability. 
The bottom line is that LDDS feels that IDB is now 
under control—the bleeding has stopped. The company 
accepted Jeffrey Sudikoff’s (IDB’s former 
CEO) resignation from the company. 
In contrast to IDB, WilTel’s operations are considered 
clean. LDDS and WilTel have been working 
well together. Roy Wilkens will stay on as president 
and CEO of WilTel. Plus, all of the engineering and 
MIS functions of LDDS will fall under Wilkens’ 
control. 
Revenue Growth of 15% Achievable 
As Chart 6 depicts, LDDS has been able to grow 
volumes very aggressively over the past four years, 
and revenue growth has followed suit. While revenue 
per minute has certainly been trending down 
over this period, most recently the trend is driven by 
a change in the mix of business, not by lower prices. 
In particular, the downward trend in the fourth 
quarter of 1994 was driven both by the mix shift 
and by the seasonally weaker generation of higher yielding 
operator services traffic. Thus, the company 
has not experienced price erosion within 
product groups, nor is it likely to be negatively 
affected by such a trend. 
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Looking forward, we anticipate revenue growth of 
15-16% over the next couple of years, trending 
downward toward 13-14% thereafter. In the near 
term, the higher growth will be driven by volume 
growth of about 25-30% in the carrier market, 15% 
in the commercial market, 18-20% in international, 
and 12% in residential. Private line installs should 
rise by about 13-15% annually. 
Price erosion should be small, as we anticipate 
rather stable long distance pricing overall over 
the next several years. However, volume growth 
will outstrip revenue growth owing to the changing 
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mix of business, lower access charges, and certainly 
some pricing pressure across most business segments. 
Costs Will Remain Competitive 
As our previous comments illustrated, LDDS has 
been a low-cost supplier of long distance services. 
We expect this situation to persist for all the reasons 
described earlier. One major contributor to this 
situation in the near term will be the $130-140 million 
of annual cost savings derived from the IDB 
and WilTel mergers. These benefits will recur and 
indeed expand over time as the company is able to 
more fully exploit the network opportunities. An 
example of the evolving efficiencies is the fact that 
at year-end 1994 the company had 7,200 employees, 
but the company anticipates reducing this 
number by 400 positions by year-end 1995. As 
our model demonstrates, the dynamics of transitioning 
the company from being a pure reseller to 
becoming a facilities-based carrier transforms 
the income statement. We anticipate significant access 
savings, but higher depreciation expenses. 
In addition, as the company broadens its horizons 
domestically and internationally, expanding 
up-market, there will be inevitable marketing and 
administrative cost increases. 
Each of these trends is factored into our forecasts, 
producing the strong profit story that LDDS represents. 
A steady state operating margin of about 
18% is possible, assuming the company manages 
to focus on its present business segments. To the 
extent there is a shift in this strategy, operating 
margins would likely decline. This would not necessarily 
be negative to earnings, because it may permit 
an acceleration in top-line growth, without a commensurate 
increase in deployed capital, which then 
could have a positive impact on earnings growth 
and returns on investment. For the time being, we 
don’t foresee this kind of transition. 
Interest Expense 
In forecasting the company’s interest expense, we 
have assumed a fixed interest rate level of 7.3%, 
representing the weighted average of its revolving 
credit facility along with IDB’s 5% fixed rate note. 
Our forecast reflects strong cash flow generation 
being used to reduce debt in future years, which is 
why the interest expense level declines at a 26.5% 
compounded annual rate in our model. As we discuss 
later, with the level of surplus funds growing, 
and our model not assuming any new acquisitions, 
debt levels decline precipitously over the forecasted 
period. Thus, the model indicates sharp reductions 
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in interest expense over the next five years. 
Taxes 
We have assumed a full tax rate for LDDS, not anticipating 
any events that would be able to reduce 
the statutory rate. In fact, with high levels of intangible 
amortizations, LDDS will continue to report 
premium tax rates for the foreseeable period. As a 
result, we have forecast a 40% tax rate for the next 
five years. 
Cash Flow Exceeds Earnings Growth 
LDDS suggests that capital expenditure requirements 
will be in the area of $275 million annually. 
Higher-than-anticipated growth in carrier services 
could raise fixed investments. We would anticipate, 
as the company grows its business successfully, that 
capital spending will have to rise. This has been the 
case for every other long distance carrier, and we 
don’t think LDDS can avoid the trend. Thus, we 
have factored in capital spending increases of $20- 
30 million each year over the next several years. 
Because of strong cash flow, LDDS will be able to 
fully fund these capital spending increases, plus repay 
debt. Our cash flow model looks to a significant 
amount of free cash flow generation over the next 
five years, starting in 1995. As Table 5 shows, free 
cash flow may increase by a 24% compounded annual 
rate over the next five years. Free cash flow in 
1995, prior to the WilTel cash acquisition, should 
be as high as $300 million. 




Cash Flow Estimates 
$ in thousands 
CAGR 
1993 1994 1995E 1996E 1997E 1998E 1999E 2000E '95-'00 
Net income (before dividends) 104,182 (122,158) 265,232 347,817 431,538 538,197 646,943 765,301 23.6% 
Depreciation and amortization 79,921 163,828 339,058 396,734 431,536 469,338 510,740 555,142 10.4% 
Cash from operations 184,103 41,670 604,289 744,551 863,074 1,007,535 1,157,683 1,320,444 16.9% 
Less - preferred dividends (10,451) (27,766) (27,800) (27,800) (27,800) (27,800) (27,800) (27,800) 0.0% 
Cash from internal sources 173,652 13,904 576,489 716,751 835,274 979,735 1,129,883 1,292,644 17.5% 
Capital Investments 
Capital expenditures (35,629) (50,000) (275,000) (300,000) (320,000) (350,000) (380,000) (400,000) 7. 8% 
Other net (including acquisitions) (175,448) (1,095,941) 0 0 0 (0) 0 (0) - 
Free cash flow (37,425) (1,132,037) 301,489 416,751 515,274 629,735 749,883 892,644 24.2% 
Net change in equity 1,184,966 1,090,797 (600,433) (0) 0 0 0 (0) - 
Net change LTD 192,238 274,020 2,329,600 (300,000) (473,000) (585,000) (680,000) (800,000) - 
Net change NP & CPLTD 2,590 (8,543) 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Net external financing 1,379,794 1,356,274 1,729,167 (300,000) (473,000) (585,000) (680,000) (800,000) - 
Other assets and deferred (1,369,943) (432,880) (1,976,051) 4,551 4,297 4,057 3,831 3,617 - 
Other liabilities 29,063 152,095 (2,020) 27,448 29,782 31,483 32,946 35,613 - 
Changes in working capital 
Changes in current assets (141,787) (364,184) (103,906) (258,377) (158,840) (167,910) (175,715) (189,938) 
12.8% 
Changes in current liabilities 142,319 424,564 58,906 128,091 138,985 146,921 153,750 166,196 23.1% 
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Net change in working capital 532 60,380 (45,000) (130,285) (19,855) (20,989) (21,964) (23,742) -12.0% 
Change in cash 2,021 3,832 7,585 18,465 56,498 59,286 84,696 108,132 70.1% 




Balance Sheet Estimates 
$ in millions, except per share data 
Post WilTel 
1992 1993 1/5/95 E 1995E 1996E 1997E 1998E 1999E 2000E 
ASSETS 
Current Assets Cash and cash equivalents 4,147 6,168 10,000 17,585 36,050 92,548 151,835 
236,531 344, 
663 
Accounts receivable, net bad debt allowance 145,230 268,355 590,000 634,591 868,569 
1,000,935 1,140,860 1,287,289 1,445,571Income taxes receivable 114 
Total current assets 178,176 321,984 690,000 801,492 1,078,333 1,293,671 1,520,867 
1,781,278 2,079,348 
Property& Equipment: Transmission equipment 148,152 173,959 1,416,409 0 0 0 0 0 
0Communicationsequipment 3) 
Net property and equipment 213,140 344,296 1,326,409 1,341,726 1,348,742 1,340,956 
1,325,368 1,298,378 1,246,986 
Excess of cost over net tangible assets acquired, net of accumulated depreciation: Goodwill 
379,576 1,693,608 2,000,000 3,875,625 3,776,875 000 
Other tangibles 11,222 32,713 40,000 38,000 36,100 34,295 32,580 30,951 29, 404 
Total 427,905 1,774,294 2,090,000 3,958,625 3,852,975 3,747,420 3,641,955 3,536,576 
3,431,279 
Line installation costs, net of accumulated depreciation 14,643 26,811 47,000 44,180 41,529 
39,037 36,695 34,493 32, 424 
Other assets 35,758 47,144 144,129 175,000 175,000 175,000 175,000 175,000 175, 000 
Total Assets 869,622 2,514,529 4,297,538 6,321,023 6,496,579 6,596,085 6,699,886 6,825,726 
6,965,036 
LIABILITIES & SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY 
Current Liabilities S-T debt and current maturities of L-T debt 5,953 8,543 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Accounts 
payable 671 
Accrued line costs 60,528 132,394 0 298,631 347,428 400,374 456,344 514,916 578, 228 
Accrued restructuring costs 24,527 1,530 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Other current liabilities 950 
Total current liabilities 164,070 308,979 725,000 783,906 911,998 1,050,982 1,197,904 
1,351,654 1,517,850 
Long-term liabilities, less current portion: Long-term debt 333,742 525,980 800,000 3,129,600 
2,829,600 2,356,600 1,771,600 1,091,600 600 
Deferred income taxes payable 27,472 0 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40, 000 
Other liabilities 1,370 57,905 170,000 167,980 195,428 225,210 256,694 289,640 325, 253 
Total long-term liabilities 362,584 583,885 1,010,000 3,337,580 3,065,028 2,621,810 2,068,294 
1,421,240 656, 853 
Shareholders'EquitySeries1 preferred stock 0 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109Series2 31 
Additional paid-in capital 196,904 1,427,596 2,354,000 1,754,336 1,754,336 1,754,336 1,754,336 
1,754,336 1,754,336Retained earnings shareholders' equity 342,968 1,621,665 2,562,538 
2,199,537 2,519,554 2,923,292 3,433,689 4,052,832 4,790,333 
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity 869,622 2,514,529 4,297,538 6,321,023 6,496,579 
6,596,085 6,699,886 6,825,726 6,965,036 
Debt as a %of total capitalization 49.8% 24.8% 23.8% 58.7% 52.9% 44.6% 34.0% 21.2% 5.7% 
Tangible book value per share ($0.89) ($1.28) $2.99 ($10.99) ($8.33) ($5.15) ($1.30) $3.23 $8. 
49 
Total shares outstanding (thousands) 95,489 119,255 157,805 160,000 160,000 160,000 
160,000 160,000 160, 000 
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For modeling purposes, we have assumed the company 
deploys this excess cash into debt repayment. 
With the level of surplus cash, we have LDDS 
practically paying down all of its outstanding debt 
by 2000. We doubt this will happen, however. We 
would anticipate some acquisitions in this period, 
which would consume the cash, but have not attempted 
to factor this into our model. Given the 
company’s avoid stance of only doing accretive 
acquisitions, if the excess cash were used to do acquisitions, 
then earnings growth should exceed our 
expectations. 
Balance Sheet Gains 
The WilTel acquisition exacerbates an already-weak 
tangible net worth situation. By adding $1.9 billion 
of goodwill ($600 million of hard assets), the acquisition 
intangibles rise to approximately $4 
billion, representing 62% of total assets. And tangible 
net worth per share dips once more into the 
negative range at $11.00 by year-end 1995. As 
Table 6 shows, we forecast that shareholders’ 
equity would be $2.2 billion by year-end 1995. Debt 
to total capitalization (not subtracting intangibles) 
would be approximately 59% by the end of the year. 
Are we concerned about the negative net worth? Not 
really. The company is producing significant excess 
cash. The negative net worth is a reflection of historical 
events and bare no impact on future 
performance. 
Longer-Term Issues 
Long-Term Outlook in an RBOC Infested Long Distance 
Business 
LDDS has a decidedly different view of the future 
than its larger competitors. While the big guys rue 
the day the Bells enter long distance, LDDS appears 
to be rolling out the red carpet. But this enthusiasm 
is not based on the assumption that a Bell will buy 
out LDDS and make everybody rich (although this 
possibility does exist). Rather, the enthusiasm is 
based on LDDS’ desire to sell services to the Bells 
that will facilitate their entry into long distance by 
the end of the decade. Most observers don’t think of 
the Bells as needing much help in getting into long 
distance, but they clearly will. This can be an attractive 
opportunity for a company such as LDDS. 
The Bells clearly don’t possess all the necessary 
components for entry into long distance today, and 
even though there is time for them to prepare to enter 
the business, they are likely to source outside 
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vendors for many services. These could include enhanced 
800 capabilities, transmission facilities in region 
and out-of-region, enhanced calling cards, 
prepaid calling cards, international transmission, 
nationwide origination, and billing systems. We 
don’t have an estimate for the revenue potential of 
providing all of these services, but LDDS suggests 
it could be as large as the company’s existing 
business. 
Possible Strategic Investors 
In addition to the rumors of a Bell company buyout 
of LDDS, there have been consistent rumors of 
EDS or IBM buying the company. These rumors 
make no sense to us, and we doubt they will occur. 
If EDS really wanted to own and to operate a network, 
it should have outbid LDDS for WilTel. 
Having said this, however, we do think a strategic 
stake by either of these two companies, or perhaps a 
foreign telco, would make sense. By taking a strategic 
position in LDDS, an investor would be able 
to influence decisions and strategic planning that 
might help its own strategies. This could easily be 
seen as a positive for either of the technology companies 
mentioned here. In terms of a foreign buyer, 
the obvious choices are all in bed with other partners 
already. A not-so-obvious choice, however, 
might be Bell Canada. The company is somewhat 
involved with MCI, but not intimately linked yet. If 
that linkage fails to develop over time, it would 
probably make sense for this company to take a 
position in a U.S. carrier. Strategically, Bell Canada 
needs to offset the presence of the U.S. carriers in 
its markets (unless it gets completely in bed with 
MCI). LDDS would give the company full access to 
the U.S. market, the ability to offer fully integrated 
cross-boarder services, and the potential for crossing 
over into Mexico. Thus, while we aren’t 
predicting anything here, nor do we want to stimulate 
rumors, we do think strategic stakes in LDDS 
by a variety of players would make sense. 
If a Strategic Stake Developed, Would it Help the 
Stock?—The last two examples of this (BT investing 
in MCI, and the plan for the German and French 
investment in Sprint) certainly would suggest not. A 
strategic stake adds value to a stock if the price paid 
is high enough and if the proceeds can be redeployed 
profitably. Just as LDDS does not seem 
LDDS Communications, Inc. 
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inclined to do an acquisition that is non-accretive, we 
suspect it would not take a strategic investment unless 
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it was also accretive. (It helps to have the CEO 




as of April 13, 1995 
Company Year-to-Date 1994 1993 
ALC 22.9% 7.3% 107.1% 
AT&T 2.0 (4.3) 2.9% 
LCI (3.3) 44.6 —% 
LDDS 32.5 (19.4) 61.3% 
MCI 19.7 (35.0) 42.6% 
Sprint 16.3 (20.5) 36.3% 
As indicated earlier, we view LDDS as a market 
performer and rate it a Hold. This rating bears no 
negative connotation relative to our expectation for 
growth and profitability for the company. Rather, it 
reflects the fact that the company is very effective in 
getting its story out into the market, and therefore, 
we believe that most of the upside in the stock has 
been realized over the past three months already, 
given its strong performance. 
As Table 7 shows, LDDS has significantly outperformed 
every comparable long distance stock in 
1995 so far. In 1994, its performance lagged the 
smaller long distance names because of the uncertainty 
associated with its plate full of mergers. 
However, in 1993, its performance was quite 
strong. 
Table 1, which compares valuation measures across 
all the relevant long distance names, does not necessarily 
illustrate clearly the point that LDDS appears 
fully valued relative to its peers. Because operating 
income growth will be substantially lower than 
earnings per share growth, the valuation comparisons 
are a little misleading. 
In terms of considering the valuation, it is important 
to keep in mind that 8 percentage points of the 
earnings growth rate is generated from the de-leveraging 
of the company. In reality, this is unlikely to 
occur to such a dramatic degree. The company is 
likely to reinvest much of the money in new acquisitions. 
Thus, it is not likely that the company will 
be viewed by investors as a true 23% grower. 
Rather, its operating income growth of 14% 
will be considered a better reflection of economic 
performance. 
In viewing the valuation on LDDS, one needs to 
compare it with other regional long distance companies, 
as opposed to direct comparisons with the 
larger carriers. The disconnect between the valuations 
of the larger carriers and the smaller carriers is 
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evident in Table 1. Clearly the market is discounting 
the higher, more secure growth of the smaller players. 
The average P/E of 19.7 for LCI, ALC and 
LDDS is a clear indication of the differentiated expectations 
held by the market. While the historical 
P/E range for LDDS has been higher than the present 
level, this is not a good indication for a target 
range today. First of all, historical growth was even 
higher than it is today. Second, the market P/E was 
higher. And, third long distance multiples, in general, 
were at much loftier levels. 
The comparison of P/E to growth rate is actually 
lower for these carriers than is the case for any of 
the three big carriers. This P/E to growth rate comparison 
for the three faster-growing regionals is 
within the range of reason. High-growth-rate companies 
typically are not able to maintain P/Es that 
exceed their growth rates as opposed to low-growth rate 
companies, at least in the telecom industry, 
where it seems to occur frequently. 
LDDS’ operating cash flow multiple is slightly 
above the group average, and more than 50% higher 
than MCI’s and Sprint's. Why such a high level? 
First of all, we would hasten to note that P/Es are 
far more influential to stock prices than OCF multiples. 
But, clearly, there is great confidence that 
LDDS’ growth rate can be high and sustainable. 
The adjusted market cap to revenues is quite high 
for LDDS because of strong margins, but also because 
of high debt levels, which boost adjusted 
market capitalization. With a 1.9 ratio of adjusted 
market cap to revenues, LDDS stands at nearly 
twice the levels of AT&T, MCI, and Sprint, and is 
slightly higher than ALC, LCI and ACC. 
LDDS Communications, Inc. 
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While LDDS’ valuation is at the high end of the 
group range in most measures, it shouldn’t cause 
nosebleeds. Management is giving very clear signals 
as to its expected growth rate. This growth appears 
quite achievable, and the company has a good track 
record for delivering on what it promises. Thus, the 
high valuation is due to the visibility and low risk. 
This leaves little room for misinterpretation and 
distrust. Thus, the high price is reasonable and supportable. 
But, in our view, it does not leave much 
room on the table for near-term upside. 
N.B.: CS First Boston Corporation has, within the last three years, served 
as a manager or co-manager of a public offering of securities for AT&T, IBM 
and Williams Companies, and makes a primary market in issues of LDDS 
Communications, MCI Communications, and Xerox. April 13, 1995, closing 
prices: 
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ACC (ACCC): 161/8 MCI Communications 
ALC (ALC): 381/4 (MCI): 22 
AT&T (T): 513/8 Sprint (FON): 321/8 
IBM (IBM): 863/8 Williams Companies (WMB): 311/2 
LCI (LCI): 257/8 Xerox (XRX): 1151/4 
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This memorandum is for informative purposes only. Under no circumstances is it to be used or considered as an offer to 
sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, 
any security. While the information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, we do not 
represent that it is accurate or complete 
and it should not be relied upon as such. We may from time to time have long or short positions in and buy and sell 
securities referred to herein. This firm may 
from time to time perform investment banking or other services for, or solicit investment banking or other business from, 
any company mentioned in this report. 
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FIGURE 2: Independent and dependent variables’ distributions  
 
Distributions 
Excess Returns (-1   0) 




     
100.0% maximum 0.1887 
99.5%  0.1804 
97.5%  0.0990 
90.0%  0.0512 
75.0% quartile 0.0246 
50.0% median 0.0020 
25.0% quartile -0.0193 
10.0%  -0.0434 
2.5%  -0.0880 
0.5%  -0.2304 
0.0% minimum -0.2503 
Moments 
   
Mean 0.0030266 
Std Dev 0.0463773 
Std Err Mean 0.002945 
upper 95% Mean 0.0088271 
lower 95% Mean -0.002774 
N 248 
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Excess Returns (-1   1) 




     
100.0% maximum 0.1998 
99.5%  0.1936 
97.5%  0.1120 
90.0%  0.0639 
75.0% quartile 0.0356 
50.0% median 0.0074 
25.0% quartile -0.0211 
10.0%  -0.0582 
2.5%  -0.1101 
0.5%  -0.2430 
0.0% minimum -0.2560 
Moments 
   
Mean 0.0052806 
Std Dev 0.0534825 
Std Err Mean 0.0033961 
upper 95% Mean 0.0119697 










     
100.0% maximum 0.56350 
99.5%  0.56350 
97.5%  0.53161 
90.0%  0.51439 
75.0% quartile 0.50760 
50.0% median 0.50030 
25.0% quartile 0.49450 
10.0%  0.48261 
2.5%  0.45960 
0.5%  0.45960 
0.0% minimum 0.45960 
Moments 
   
Mean 0.4999888 
Std Dev 0.0155849 
Std Err Mean 0.0009665 
upper 95% Mean 0.5018921 








     
100.0% maximum 0.5335 
99.5%  0.5305 
97.5%  0.4961 
90.0%  0.4598 
75.0% quartile 0.4213 
50.0% median 0.3518 
25.0% quartile 0.1748 
10.0%  0.0685 
2.5%  -0.0184 
0.5%  -0.0334 
0.0% minimum -0.0374 
Moments 
   
Mean 0.300912 
Std Dev 0.1505543 
Std Err Mean 0.009337 
upper 95% Mean 0.3192981 









     
100.0% maximum 0.55480 
99.5%  0.54526 
97.5%  0.51725 
90.0%  0.50780 
75.0% quartile 0.49680 
50.0% median 0.48530 
25.0% quartile 0.47550 
10.0%  0.44920 
2.5%  0.34720 
0.5%  0.06536 
0.0% minimum 0.04460 
Moments 
   
Mean 0.4759655 
Std Dev 0.0509661 
Std Err Mean 0.0031669 
upper 95% Mean 0.4822018 









     
100.0% maximum 1.000 
99.5%  0.957 
97.5%  0.375 
90.0%  0.204 
75.0% quartile 0.130 
50.0% median 0.094 
25.0% quartile 0.026 
10.0%  -0.038 
2.5%  -0.194 
0.5%  -0.485 
0.0% minimum -0.493 
Moments 
   
Mean 0.0830126 
Std Dev 0.1409661 
Std Err Mean 0.0092549 
upper 95% Mean 0.1012473 









     
100.0% maximum 0.5475 
99.5%  0.5475 
97.5%  0.3404 
90.0%  0.1336 
75.0% quartile 0.0640 
50.0% median 0.0000 
25.0% quartile -0.0103 
10.0%  -0.0651 
2.5%  -0.2595 
0.5%  -0.6510 
0.0% minimum -0.6510 
Moments 
   
Mean 0.0199799 
Std Dev 0.1298458 
Std Err Mean 0.0086182 
upper 95% Mean 0.0369621 




Firm Size Assets 




     
100.0% maximum 80712 
99.5%  79098 
97.5%  72218 
90.0%  20620 
75.0% quartile 4840 
50.0% median 1294 
25.0% quartile 320 
10.0%  119 
2.5%  37 
0.5%  24 
0.0% minimum 22 
Moments 
   
Mean 6288.7204 
Std Dev 12972.796 
Std Err Mean 842.67368 
upper 95% Mean 7948.8439 
lower 95% Mean 4628.5969 
N 237 
 






     
100.0% maximum 22026 
99.5%  21377 
97.5%  18785 
90.0%  10132 
75.0% quartile 2480 
50.0% median 703 
25.0% quartile 204 
10.0%  82 
2.5%  18 
0.5%  -0.026 
0.0% minimum -0.026 
Moments 
   
Mean 2797.6268 
Std Dev 4488.5922 
Std Err Mean 290.34289 
upper 95% Mean 3369.597 




D Securities Issuance 




     
100.0% maximum 29976 
99.5%  29480 
97.5%  10539 
90.0%  5947 
75.0% quartile 2727 
50.0% median 372 
25.0% quartile -247 
10.0%  -888 
2.5%  -2546 
0.5%  -2814 
0.0% minimum -2818 
Moments 
   
Mean 1708.2381 
Std Dev 3899.0697 
Std Err Mean 269.06137 
upper 95% Mean 2238.6602 




Forecast freq. Revision 




     
100.0% maximum 7.0000 
99.5%  7.0000 
97.5%  6.7250 
90.0%  5.0000 
75.0% quartile 4.0000 
50.0% median 3.0000 
25.0% quartile 2.0000 
10.0%  1.0000 
2.5%  1.0000 
0.5%  1.0000 
0.0% minimum 1.0000 
Moments 
   
Mean 3.1153846 
Std Dev 1.4339981 
Std Err Mean 0.12577 
upper 95% Mean 3.3642236 









     
100.0% maximum 46.000 
99.5%  46.000 
97.5%  31.000 
90.0%  31.000 
75.0% quartile 27.000 
50.0% median 19.000 
25.0% quartile 16.000 
10.0%  8.000 
2.5%  3.000 
0.5%  3.000 
0.0% minimum 3.000 
Moments 
   
Mean 20.969231 
Std Dev 8.6776363 
Std Err Mean 0.761079 
upper 95% Mean 22.475044 
lower 95% Mean 19.463417 
N 130 
 
# of 2 digit SICs 




     
100.0% maximum 7.0000 
99.5%  7.0000 
97.5%  6.0000 
90.0%  6.0000 
75.0% quartile 6.0000 
50.0% median 4.0000 
25.0% quartile 3.0000 
10.0%  2.0000 
2.5%  2.0000 
0.5%  2.0000 
0.0% minimum 2.0000 
Moments 
   
Mean 4.1538462 
Std Dev 1.4965673 
Std Err Mean 0.1312576 
upper 95% Mean 4.4135426 









     
100.0% maximum 12.000 
99.5%  12.000 
97.5%  12.000 
90.0%  12.000 
75.0% quartile 12.000 
50.0% median 9.000 
25.0% quartile 3.000 
10.0%  2.000 
2.5%  1.000 
0.5%  1.000 
0.0% minimum 1.000 
Moments 
   
Mean 7.2230769 
Std Dev 4.1898093 
Std Err Mean 0.3674706 
upper 95% Mean 7.9501265 









     
100.0% maximum 10.000 
99.5%  10.000 
97.5%  10.000 
90.0%  8.000 
75.0% quartile 5.000 
50.0% median 3.000 
25.0% quartile 2.000 
10.0%  1.000 
2.5%  1.000 
0.5%  1.000 
0.0% minimum 1.000 
Moments 
   
Mean 3.4692308 
Std Dev 2.5584287 
Std Err Mean 0.224389 
upper 95% Mean 3.91319 
lower 95% Mean 3.0252716 
N 130 
 





     
100.0% maximum 1.000 
99.5%  1.000 
97.5%  0.930 
90.0%  0.294 
75.0% quartile -0.147 
50.0% median -0.418 
25.0% quartile -0.722 
10.0%  -0.893 
2.5%  -1.000 
0.5%  -1.000 
0.0% minimum -1.000 
Moments 
   
Mean -0.356517 
Std Dev 0.4720007 
Std Err Mean 0.0481734 
upper 95% Mean -0.260881 





TABLE 1: Summary of hypotheses and research questions 
 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable
/ RQ
Market reaction to analysts' words
Changes in Excess Returns?
H1 Optimism Posit ive and higher for more optimistic statements
H2 Changes in firms' securities (equity and debt) Positive and higher for firms repurchasing securities
H3 Optimism Positive and higher for smaller firms
H4 Degree of optimism Negative and higher for pessimistic versus positive and lower for optimistic statements
H5 Certainty Positive and higher for statements with more certainty
RQ1 Activity in optimistic statements Explore changes in Excess Returns on statements with high optimism
RQ2 Act ivity Explore changes in Excess Returns on statements
Analyst word choices based on their relationships with investment banking
Word choice by analysts
H6 Degree to which f irms issue securities More optimism
H7 Degree to which f irms issue securities More certainty
RQ3 Degree to which f irms issue securities Effect on words denoting activity in optimistic statements
RQ4 Degree to which f irms issue securities Effect on words denoting activity in statements with high certainty
H8 Timing of securities issuance More optimism closer to the issue dates
Analysts' characteristics: The number of firms and industries covered, experience, company size, f orecast frequency, and prior forecast accuracy
Positive analysts' characteristics: Fewer f irms and industries covered, more experience, bigger company sizes, higher forecast frequencies, and higher accuracies for prior f orecasts
Market reactions to analysts' characteristics based on the words used by the analysts
Analysts' characteristics Changes in Excess Returns?
H9 More positive Positive and higher for statements with higher optimism
H10 More positive Positive and higher for statements with words denoting more certainty
RQ5 More positive Effect on words denoting activity
Analysts' word choices based on their characteristics and investment banking relationships
Analysts' characteristics Word choice by analysts
H11 More positive More optimism for firms issuing securities
H12 More positive More certainty f or firms issuing securities
H13 More positive More optimism closer to the issue dates
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TABLE 2: Analyst reports – statement characteristics, finance variables, and 
analyst characteristics 
 
No_ Optimis m s core Certainty s core Activity s core Exce s s  Returns  (-1   0) Exc es s  Re turns  (-1   1) D Equity D De bt
1 0.5143 0.354 0.5001 -0.0006 -0.0062 0.090570337 0.087110541
2 0.5003 0.2922 0.5156 0.1036 0.0627 0.503797174 -0.047797573
3 0.5003 0.2922 0.5156 -0.0878 -0.0598 -0.446518053 -0.139956904
4 0.5003 0.2922 0.5156 -0.0392 -0.0375 0.061933914 0
5 0.5003 0.2922 0.5156 -0.023 0.0792 0.131002246 0.170850951
6 0.5003 0.2922 0.5156 -0.1691 -0.2029 0.022333588 -0.030390875
7 0.5003 0.2922 0.5156 -0.1363 -0.1383 0.480276164 0.007083808
8 0.49 0.1748 0.4652 0.0242 0.0143 0.091056985 0.088932764
9 0.49 0.1748 0.4652 -0.0047 -0.0019 0.007430447 0.019800593
10 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472 -0.187259821 -0.046247865
11 0.49 0.1748 0.4652 -0.0077 -0.0014 0.089190686 0.002507539
12 0.49 0.1748 0.4652 0.011 -0.0148 0.132330309 -0.021778584
13 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472 0.12 0.1265 0.094298597 0.069712056
14 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472 0.044 0.0577 0.144730551 -0.001262296
15 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472 0.1547 0.1998 0.051188964 0.015489805
16 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472 -0.0333 -0.0007 0.087002115 0.039884116
17 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472 0.0165 0.0638 0.058621499 -0.010282228
18 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472 -0.0311 0.0174 0.110578735 0.12705249
19 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472
20 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472 -0.0278 0.008 0.262441775 0.101771267
21 0.4596 0.3518 0.3472
22 0.5399 0.358 0.501 -0.0098 0.041 0.203782293 0.213493651
23 0.5028 0.3992 0.523 0.0419 0.0372 0.133688707 0.003945864
24 0.5042 0.3839 0.5205 -0.0164 0.0468 0.063681893 0.037051944
25 0.512 0.4199 0.5028 -0.0465 -0.0604 0.534020922 0.090816308
26 0.5146 0.3883 0.4999 -0.0119 -0.0111 0.123062386 0
27 0.5067 0.4041 0.5152 0.0359 0.0042 0.148328957 -0.000831607
28 0.516 0.4189 0.5085 0.0337 0.0562 0.352784246 -0.172593882
29 0.4689 0.4328 0.4886 -0.0177 0.0058
30 0.5276 0.387 0.509 0.0175 0.0245 0.112804074 -0.033909209
31 0.5012 0.3826 0.4837 0.0996 0.0826 0.203444073 0.231452416
32 0.5191 0.3811 0.5078 0.0682 0.0808 0.1969039 -0.015348538
33 0.5078 0.3449 0.5208 0.0048 0.0124 0.216787653 0.014030747
34 0.5022 0.3723 0.5024 0.027 0.0183 0.007430447 0.019800593
35 0.5055 0.3733 0.5113 0.024 0.047
36 0.5062 0.4219 0.506 0.0031 -0.036 0.272840646 -0.001441783
37 0.5267 0.3677 0.506 -0.0107 -0.0054 0.061062134 -0.067189367
38 0.5053 0.3947 0.4784 0.0331 0.051 0.184031319 -0.017403881
39 0.516 0.3879 0.4695 0.0508 0.0462 0.139458185 -0.003921439
40 0.4966 0.3697 0.4933 0.0303 0.0384 0.069986715 0.106135593
41 0.4966 0.3599 0.5028 -0.03 -0.0582 0.091056985 0.088932764
42 0.5058 0.4096 0.498 -0.0434 -0.0239 -0.037560208 0
43 0.5309 0.3717 0.4878 -0.0323 -0.1003 0.132330309 -0.021778584
44 0.5252 0.3905 0.4492 -0.0005 0.0005 0.276259296 -0.238599691
45 0.51 0.3658 0.0109 0.0166 0.089190686 0.002507539
46 0.5335 0.4047 0.4929 0.0459 0.0395 0.1560777 0
47 0.4948 0.1718 0.488 0.0151 0.0181
48 0.5091 0.4355 0.4765 -0.0043 -0.018 -0.038051455 -0.247597552
49 0.4963 0.1029 0.4839 -0.0046 -0.0092 0.045764264 0.015110644
50 0.501 0.4216 0.501 0.0171 0.0181 -0.08288853 -0.019705809
51 0.4995 0.2777 0.5223 0.0204 0.0253 0.033165401 0.085479789
52 0.5002 0.0311 0.4934 -0.0288 -0.0445 0.191154285 -0.14910619
53 0.4978 0.1457 0.4798 0.0047 0.0064 0.042905824 -0.000873059
54 0.5048 0.4419 0.4857 -0.0044 0.0096 -0.071055961 -0.005491568
55 0.493 0.1262 0.4868 0.0043 0.0013
56 0.4958 0.1012 0.4837 0.0067 0.0045 -0.087113556 -0.007045404
57 0.5172 0.4317 0.4625 -0.0088 -0.0029 -0.176954606 -0.014176092
58 0.4976 0.1432 0.4778 -0.0096 -0.0056 -0.118529712 0.021394202
59 0.5065 0.5196 0.4934 -0.0185 -0.0286
60 0.4992 0.4843 0.5011 -0.0265 -0.0224 0.118267798 -0.012706161
61 0.5121 0.4713 0.5017 0.023 0.0262 -0.038051455 -0.247597552
62 0.5121 0.4713 0.5017 0.0247 0.017 0.033165401 0.085479789
63 0.5121 0.4713 0.5017 0.021 0.0367 0.191154285 -0.14910619
64 0.5121 0.4713 0.5017 0.0116 0.002
65 0.5121 0.4713 0.5017 0.0392 0.066
 161
TABLE 2 continued: Analyst reports – statement characteristics, finance variables, 
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66 0.5068 0.4364 0.4653 -0.0157 -0.0066 0.122868867 -0.000115587
67 0.5149 0.3985 0.5039 -0.0034 0.0077 0.118267798 -0.012706161
68 0.4991 0.2609 0.4642 0.0201 0.0021 0.100132885 0.004168652
69 0.4953 0.4076 0.4938 -0.0055 -0.1025 0.108879123 -0.002226863
70 0.4866 0.4814 0.5007 0.0143 0.0237 0.130507529 0.017992677
71 0.5076 0.4949 0.4834 0.0116 0.0197 0.14861819 0.017641716
72 0.4993 0.4948 0.4957 -0.0243 0.0082 0.124239004 -0.086171462
73 0.5046 0.5035 0.4963 0.015 0.0721 0.118882102 0.180619062
74 0.4966 0.4615 0.4931 0.001 0.0083 0.063681893 0.037051944
75 0.4945 0.0683 0.4447 -0.028 -0.0244 -0.18146284 -0.287133219
76 0.4954 0.4212 0.485 -0.0331 0.0025 -0.18146284 -0.287133219
77 0.4931 0.0603 0.4727 -0.017 -0.0382 0.10968164 0
78 0.5021 0.4566 0.4691 0.0013 -0.0333 0.020719866 0
79 0.4979 0.444 0.5019 0.0294 0.0301 0.10968164 0
80 0.5216 0.4244 0.4587 -0.0008 0.0037 0.122868867 0
81 0.5216 0.422 0.4626 -0.0038 0.0291 0.199324278 0
82 0.4929 0.3655 0.4929 -0.0435 -0.0449 -0.492630218 -0.023882527
83 0.502 0.1397 0.4435 -0.0207 -0.0336 -0.088051632 -0.001106938
84 0.5004 0.2828 0.4833 -0.018 -0.0216 -0.088051632 -0.001106938
85 0.5066 0.4433 0.4707 -0.0813 -0.0847 -0.037560208 0
86 0.4812 0.3546 0.4869 0.0413 0.0151 0.133688707 0.003945864
87 0.4684 0.2757 0.4447 0.0255 0.0683 0.116310394 0.001585965
88 0.5025 0.0134 0.4938 0.0044 -0.003
89 0.5127 0.2264 0.4828 0.0348 0.0499 0.124236825 -0.086171808
90 0.5127 0.2264 0.4828 0.0393 0.0345 0.118878734 0.180624955
91 0.5127 0.2591 0.4828 0.0786 0.0714 0.063681893 0.037051944
92 0.5127 0.2264 0.4828 0.0179 0.0476 0.123079022 0
93 0.5127 0.2685 0.4638 -0.0081 0.0547 0.14861558 0.017645048
94 0.5127 0.2264 0.4828 0.0275 0.0451 0.130507529 0.017992677
95 0.5127 0.2591 0.4828 0.093 0.1036 0.087002115 0.039884116
96 0.5127 0.2551 0.4631 0.0313 0.0019 0.118267798 -0.012706161
97 0.4835 0.5236 0.5031 0.0896 0.1039 -0.038051455 -0.247597552
98 0.5635 0.4213 0.0446 0.024 0.0415 0.130507529 0.017992677
99 0.4744 0.4598 0.483 -0.088 -0.0713 0.124236825 -0.086171808
100 0.4744 0.4598 0.483 -0.0606 -0.0818 0.118878734 0.180624955
101 0.4744 0.4598 0.483 0.0069 0.0075 0.063681893 0.037051944
102 0.4746 0.4625 0.483 -0.0688 -0.116 0.14861558 0.017645048
103 0.4744 0.4595 0.483 -0.0439 -0.0196 0.130507529 0.017992677
104 0.4745 0.4594 0.4852 -0.0108 0.0073 0.087002115 0.039884116
105 0.4745 0.4608 0.483 -0.0633 -0.0738 0.118267798 -0.012706161
106 0.4744 0.4598 0.483 -0.0609 -0.0953 0.233194575 -0.140915805
107 0.4999 0.4313 0.429 -0.0033 -0.0133 0.094298597 0.069712056
108 0.5006 0.4222 0.4999 0.0118 0.0153 0.063681893 0.037051944
109 0.51 0.4095 0.4855 0.0236 -0.0035 0.123079022 0
110 0.5018 0.4403 0.5083 0.0361 0.0316 0.130507529 0.017992677
111 0.5193 0.4437 0.4831 0.0279 0.0105 0.087002115 0.039884116
112 0.4989 0.4831 0.5029 0.0417 -0.0046 0.118267798 -0.012706161
113 0.5049 0.4566 0.4786 0.0464 0.036 0.110578735 0.12705249
114 0.4943 0.4053 0.4769 -0.0112 0.0865 0.1186251 0.113242739
115 0.4977 0.123 0.4738 0.0045 0.0634 0.203782293 0.213493651
116 0.4984 0.1113 0.4606 0.0494 0.1387 0.094298597 0.069712056
117 0.5016 0.2326 0.4239 0.063 0.0607 -0.014106308 0.208035436
118 0.4977 0.0838 0.463 -0.0101 -0.0076 0.118878734 0.180624955
119 0.4993 0.0878 0.4774 0.0367 0.0456 0.130507529 0.017992677
120 0.4988 0.2308 0.486 -0.0195 -0.0243 0.087002115 0.039884116
121 0.5011 0.1723 0.4685 0.0035 -0.0096 0.058621499 -0.010282228
122 0.4964 0.0898 0.4561 0.0388 0.039 0.100132885 0.004168652
123 0.5037 0.2301 0.4299 0.0738 0.0671
124 0.4979 0.1345 0.4495 0.0615 0.0899 0.110578735 0.12705249
125 0.4963 -0.0209 0.4674 0.0217 0.0043 0.118267798 -0.012706161
126 0.4908 0.0946 0.4901 -0.027 -0.0389 0.118878734 0.180624955
127 0.4978 0.0889 0.4894 0.0219 0.0506
128 0.4964 0.1143 0.4497 -0.006 -0.0095 0.118267798 -0.012706161
129 0.4924 0.4284 0.4862 0.0287 -0.0007 0.118267798 -0.012706161
130 0.4976 0.1385 0.4479 0.0832 0.1143 0.118878734 0.180624955
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130 0.4976 0.1385 0.4479 0.0832 0.1143 0.118878734 0.180624955
131 0.4934 0.1122 0.4896 0.0546 0.0413 0.058621499 -0.010282228
132 0.486 0.3178 0.5058 -0.0119 -0.0562 0.262441775 0.101771267
133 0.5104 0.4061 0.4656 -0.0023 0.0103 0.13385345 -0.000132579
134 0.487 0.3369 0.491
135 0.4895 0.3865 0.4879 0.0968 0.0995
136 0.4833 0.4184 0.4914 -0.0268 -0.0708 -0.194098326 -0.007486575
137 0.4971 0.3008 0.5078
138 0.5132 0.4982 0.4977 -0.132 -0.1051
139 0.5122 0.4806 0.4736 0.066429676 0.5475379
140 0.4974 0.0718 0.4801 0.0244 0.0263 0.108879123 -0.002226863
141 0.4917 0.2871 0.4546 0.0209 0.0625 0.021952601
142 0.4893 0.4278 0.5048
143 0.5021 0.3683 0.4985 -0.0494 -0.0822 0.122868867 0
144 0.4826 0.351 0.4896 0.0244 0.0333 0.071473354 0.021513659
145 0.5042 0.4325 0.4997 0.0203 0.0196 -0.18146284 -0.287133219
146 0.4827 0.4027 0.4965 0.1887 0.1746 0.210828465 0.011004062
147 0.52 0.4255 0.4908 -0.0612 -0.0792 -0.194098326 -0.007486575
148 0.5067 0.1683 0.4794 0.0006 0.0135 0.122868867 0
149 0.497 0.4551 0.5041 0.0353 0.0526 0.021952601
150 0.4889 0.3177 0.4907 0.0457 0.0652 0.070432848 0.074591183
151 0.5123 0.3166 0.4647 0.0263 -0.0113 0.071473354 0.021513659
152 0.5067 0.2859 0.4734 -0.0143 0.011 0.007619567 -0.040693603
153 0.5203 0.4209 0.4732 0.0005 0.0083 -0.038051455 -0.247597552
154 0.4937 0.0064 0.478 0.0101 0.0085 0.095576682 -0.042232785
155 0.4946 0.4639 0.4886 0.0118 0.0135 -0.055073272 0.018114976
156 0.5198 0.4075 0.4953 0.0057 0.0103 0.203782293 0.213493651
157 0.5034 0.0767 0.4896 -0.0103 -0.0426 0.203782293 0.213493651
158 0.4954 0.1762 0.5154 -0.022580986 0.10989835
159 0.509 0.362 0.4897 -0.0272 -0.0439 -0.207953588 0.159972775
160 0.4866 0.3709 0.4825 -0.001 -0.0044 0.10968164 0
161 0.5052 0.0902 0.4447 0.0682 0.017 0.070432848 0.074591183
162 0.5004 0.451 0.5145 -0.0374 -0.0149 -0.038051455 -0.247597552
163 0.4984 0.013 0.48 -0.0026 0.0023
164 0.4975 0.0061 0.4847 0.008 0.0119
165 0.4975 0.0036 0.4858 -0.0237 -0.0007 0.033165401 0.085479789
166 0.4993 0.1268 0.4884 -0.0169 -0.0218 0.045124336 0.028392882
167 0.5035 0.3915 0.4968 0.0088 0.0207 0.107186297 -0.000168973
168 0.4932 0.0579 0.4826 -0.0146 -0.0218
169 0.4832 0.3482 0.512 -0.0153 -0.0102 0.178990799 -0.003366753
170 0.4826 0.2823 0.5548 0.0046 0.0082 0.070432848 0.074591183
171 0.4912 0.2848 0.4774 0.0054 0.0187 0.045088044 0
172 0.5033 0.3299 0.478 0.0232 0.0589 0.096106494 -0.026815943
173 0.5024 0.3758 0.5106 0.053838846 0.309511114
174 0.5054 0.3391 0.4948 0.053838846 0.309511114
175 0.5126 0.4385 0.4965 0.0262 0.0421 0.056660036 -0.03270982
176 0.5029 0.3588 0.4953 -0.0202 -0.0194 -0.015248037 0.412519009
177 0.5069 0.364 0.4631 -0.0111 -0.0397
178 0.5115 0.4601 0.5025 -0.0275 -0.0273 0.033165401 0.085479789
179 0.5239 0.3244 0.4898 -0.0454 -0.0532 1.000412205 0.108294853
180 0.4715 0.3524 0.2916 0.0591 0.0142 0.118267798 -0.012706161
181 0.4944 0.0689 0.487 0.0178 0.0227 0.130507529 0.017992677
182 0.5052 0.115 0.4765 -0.0211 0.0157 0.002934992 -0.00718416
183 0.4999 0.3924 0.4929 0.0232 0.0135 0.007455317 0
184 0.5125 0.3559 0.4362 0.0042 0.0386 0.262441775 0.101771267
185 0.4993 0.0759 0.4753 -0.0069 -0.0228 -0.02534939 0.014867678
186 0.5051 0.0995 0.4902 -0.0149 -0.0196 0.225822879 0.058205537
187 0.5045 0.096 0.4901 0.061 0.0603 0.049964832 -0.001361563
188 0.4999 0.0459 0.4885 -0.0056 -0.0312 0.130348678 -0.001494234
189 0.501 0.0885 0.4823 0.0558 0.0556 0.130348678 -0.001494234
190 0.4965 0.1165 0.4786 -0.01 -0.0161 0.094298597 0.069712056
191 0.5032 0.1426 0.4871 -0.0228 0.051 0.225822879 0.058205537
192 0.5107 0.4089 0.5014 0.0055 0.0175 0.130507529 0.017992677
193 0.5144 0.3947 0.4316 0.0174 0.0677 0.262441775 0.101771267
194 0.4982 0.0729 0.4905 0.0331 0.0156 0.031120942 -0.001022348
195 0.5027 0.401 0.4754 -0.0283 -0.0364 0.094298597 0.069712056
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195 0.5027 0.401 0.4754 -0.0283 -0.0364 0.094298597 0.069712056
196 0.4974 0.0838 0.4868 -0.0516 -0.0389 0.262441775 0.101771267
197 0.4944 0.0079 0.4819 -0.0102 0.0015 0.058621499 -0.010282228
198 0.5076 0.4418 0.4994 -0.022 -0.0327 0.130348678 -0.001494234
199 0.4984 -0.0184 0.4773 0.0198 0.0199 0.069001927 -0.007707943
200 0.5095 0.3148 0.4837 -0.0163 0.0038 0.146687956 0.044879817
201 0.4966 -0.0191 0.479 0.017 0.0266 0.041103593 0.133633209
202 0.4944 -0.0094 0.4814 0.0459 0.0282 0.003907477 0.444397688
203 0.4941 -0.0374 0.4745 -0.0275 -0.0663
204 0.5039 0.3501 0.476 -0.0044 -0.001 0.032624834 -0.003848558
205 0.4967 -0.0231 0.478 -0.0041 -0.0135 0.112562051 -0.00262434
206 0.4946 -0.009 0.4771 -0.02 -0.0147 0.203431284 -0.0817178
207 0.4953 -0.0185 0.4781 -0.0415 -0.0108 0.094298597 0.069712056
208 0.4945 -0.0068 0.4798 0.0058 0.0109 -0.143251336 -0.06458052
209 0.5083 0.3143 0.508 -0.0404 -0.0686 0.104121688 0
210 0.5025 0.336 0.4848 -0.0368 -0.0195 0.163179238 -0.025823195
211 0.5018 0.3376 0.4876 0.0165 0.0259 0.032624834 -0.003848558
212 0.5126 0.394 0.5018 -0.0226 -0.019 0.069001927 -0.007707943
213 0.5001 0.398 0.5159 -0.0026 -0.0009 -0.055073272 0.018114976
214 0.4971 0.4089 0.4863 -0.021 0.0211 0.003907477 0.444397688
215 0.4977 -0.0242 0.4797 0.023 0.0459 0.023112004
216 0.5088 0.4066 0.4927 -0.0557 -0.0565 0.095576682 -0.042232785
217 0.4938 -0.0002 0.4797 0.0084 0.0095 -0.055073272 0.018114976
218 0.507 0.4548 0.4853 -0.016 -0.0179 0.053489566 0.007112767
219 0.4987 0.4501 0.4866 -0.0331 -0.0251 -0.007171867 0.05585751
220 0.4876 0.4541 0.4792 -0.0861 -0.0719 0.041103593 0.133633209
221 0.4813 0.4284 0.4844 0.0596 0.0375 0.203431284 -0.0817178
222 0.5324 0.4453 0.483 -0.0015 -0.0318 -0.143251336 -0.06458052
223 0.5144 0.3382 0.501 0.0278 0.0272 0.175591857 0.112902657
224 0.5047 0.3612 0.4649 -0.0229 -0.0312 -0.018140339 -0.02899758
225 0.4992 0.4433 0.4977 0.096 0.1029 0.056464161 0.072773821
226 0.5093 0.3232 0.5103 0.0487 0.0452 -0.032931451 0.096893282
227 0.5103 0.236 0.4755 -0.0147 0.009 0.122868867 -0.000115587
228 0.5055 0.4276 0.4845 0.017 -0.0097 0.10968164 0
229 0.5028 0.0953 0.4885 -0.0199 -0.0426 0.10968164 0
230 0.5013 0.4484 0.4797 -0.0004 0.0056 0.068477792 0.0639931
231 0.4649 0.4975 0.1138 -0.0139 -0.074 -0.019590205 0.09854073
232 0.5082 0.292 0.4899 0.0889 0.1217 0.031120942 -0.001022348
233 0.5122 0.3928 0.5018 -0.2503 -0.256 0.023915363 -0.008426845
234 0.5008 0.5335 0.2621 -0.1265 -0.1272
235 0.4994 0.0665 0.4872 0.0251 0.0308 0.024244846 0.032417266
236 0.5056 0.3063 0.4887 -0.0032 -0.004 -0.011747917 0.010068567
237 0.5084 0.0685 0.4755 -0.001 -0.0033
238 0.4981 0.1101 0.4928 0.0302 0.0407 0.053341118 0
239 0.5037 0.4681 0.4673 0.017 0.0304 0.096106494 -0.026815943
240 0.4858 0.3617 0.49 0.0423 0.0219
241 0.4901 0.4752 0.4816 0.0172 0.0565
242 0.5247 0.3464 0.4488 0.0028 0.0257 -0.298947739 0.056527634
243 0.5011 0.3855 0.4953 -0.0069 0.007 0.024244846 0.032417266
244 0.4967 0.3062 0.4857 -0.0252 -0.0295 -0.011747917 0.010068567
245 0.5129 0.3981 0.4843 -0.005 -0.0057
246 0.4954 0.4215 0.4875 0.0213 0.0174 0.192069183 0.011397416
247 0.4952 0.2027 0.4889 0.0304 0.0084 0.031120942 -0.001022348
248 0.5012 0.0982 0.4879 -0.0131 -0.0309 0.210828465 0.011004062
249 0.4849 0.4135 0.4917 -0.0493 -0.1116 0.021952601
250 0.4838 0.271 0.5105 -0.0679 -0.0584 -0.026100352 0
251 0.4834 0.4092 0.5186 -0.0339 -0.0118 0.059074427 0.018224374
252 0.4877 0.0471 0.4696 0.0072 -0.0257 0.145472842
253 0.503 0.2032 0.503 0.0809 0.0872 0.00227188 -0.010802591
254 0.4966 0.0455 0.4655 0.1086 0.0923 0.00227188 -0.010802591
255 0.5032 0.312 0.4949 -0.072 -0.0455 0.73475557 -0.651020951
256 0.4986 0.2905 0.4823 0.0092 0.0023
257 0.4998 0.2986 0.483 0.0052 0.0012 0.107186297 -0.000168973
258 0.4982 0.1417 0.4968 -0.0162 -0.0401 0.107186297 -0.000168973
259 0.5635 0.346312214 0.48273615 0.097962094 0.5475379
260 0.5635 0.346312214 0.48273615 0.097962094 -0.65102095
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No_ Firm S ize  As s e ts Firm Size  Equity D Sec IBES Frcs t freq Larges t . Cos #2 digit Gen Firm Lagg ed
Is s Rec_ Co de Rev decile?  fo llo wed SICs Exp Exp frcs t acc .
1 1294.585 362.0395 -545 2
2 150.5725 35.715 1
3 513.9725 220.6265 1361 3
4 201.3275 203.625 158 3
5 605.44 438.015 222 1
6 816.528 289.1535 -477 2
7 66.772 55.671 -462 2
8 1648.605 644.486 -584 3 2 1 27 6 3 2 -0.147025172
9 813.41 366.026 -226 3 4 1 27 6 3 3 0.294117647
10 37.472 18.3145 -190
11 1011.35 431.419 4381 3 4 1 27 6 3 3 -0.62686567
12 275.5 183.7335 303 1 1 27 6 3 3 -0.333333333
13 3088.275 2061.005 -2572 1
14 784.285 429.46 1672 1
15 247.905 212.03 100 1
16 562.63 383.195 52 1
17 23438.5 11421.5 -232 1
18 9287.5 4096 -1866 1
19
20 3263.2 2199.1 2421 1
21
22 844.99 600.135 -749 1 3 1 27 6 3 2 -0.44
23 3301.685 2076.965 131 1 3 1 27 6 3 3 -0.722222222
24 165.2275 133.4545 2 3 1 27 6 3 3 0
25 241.5205 103.0535 264 1 1 1 27 6 3 2 0.625
26 293.144 253.86 2653 2 3 1 27 6 3 3 -1
27 194.8035 165.5225 565 1 2 1 27 6 3 3 -1
28 22.1155 12.2005 243 1 4 1 27 6 3 2
29 3 3 1 27 6 3 2 0
30 629.534 470.609 -106 3 7 1 27 6 3 2 -1
31 220.2915 140.568 -1794 2 5 1 27 6 3 3 1
32 826.007 502.524 97 2 5 1 27 6 3 2 -0.180327869
33 412.2375 323.209 -1908 2 3 1 27 6 3 3 -0.193548387
34 813.41 366.026 -281 3 4 1 27 6 3 3 0.294117647
35 2 3 1 27 6 3 3 -0.111111111
36 613.8235 446.098 -269 2 4 1 27 6 3 2 -0.533333333
37 1322.62 723.3025 6364 3 6 1 27 6 3 2 0.27172641
38 439.7295 326.589 -91 2 5 1 27 6 3 3 -0.708029197
39 1060.325 800.9305 -2479 1 6 1 27 6 3 3 -0.871428571
40 4463.79 1572.55 546 2 3 1 27 6 3 3 -0.868917577
41 1648.605 644.486 3 2 1 27 6 3 2 -0.147025172
42 92.4915 80.6275 -220 1 1 27 6 3 2
43 275.5 183.7335 309 1 1 27 6 3 3 -0.333333333
44 71.27 31.702 1684 3 1 1 27 6 3 2 -0.251407129
45 1011.35 431.419 4326 3 4 1 27 6 3 3 -0.626865672
46 377.248 302.072 711 2 1 27 6 3 3 -1
47 3
48 72218 18784.5 -14 1
49 381.6515 177.3465 -83 3
50 32224 12537 2
51 21139.5 10131.5 -532 1
52 16074.45 6601.1 -594 3
53 5216.145 2023.101 -240 2
54 22725.75 6545.4 -257 2
55 3
56 26939.55 6569.25 1745 2
57 16224.5 2481.5 2
58 37720.5 7103.5 -756 2
59 1
60 2786.05 1663 4247 1
61 72218 18784.5 -5 2 2 0 18 2 9 9 0.100478469
62 21139.5 10131.5 -482 2 2 0 18 2 9 9 0.929824561






TABLE 2 continued: Analyst reports – statement characteristics, finance variables, and analyst 
characteristics 
No_ Firm S ize  As s e ts Firm Size  Equity D Sec IBES Frcs t freq Larges t . Cos #2 digit Gen Firm Lagg ed
Is s Rec_ Co de Rev decile?  fo llo wed SICs Exp Exp frcs t acc .
66 8651.5 6640.5 3241 2 4 1 16 4 9 5 -0.537486096
67 2786.05 1663 4170 1
68 129.0585 102.5635 607 1
69 75.8915 49.1485 153 2 3 0 19 3 12 1
70 20619.5 15006 8535 1
71 921.509 536.9825 3737 1
72 746.883 312.717 2553 1
73 1187.765 703.3845 -71 1
74 165.2275 133.4545 3
75 37.352 -0.026 3
76 37.352 -0.026 3
77 9172 5379 -2003 1 4 1 16 4 9 5 -0.463806971
78 948.51 738.1395 3083 2 2 1 16 4 9 5 -0.166666667
79 9172 5379 -2030 1 4 1 16 4 9 5 -0.463806971
80 8651.5 6640.5 3218 1 4 1 16 4 9 5 -0.537486096
81 180.9915 147.215 1142 1 5 1 16 4 9 1
82 54.14 10.765 3 3 1 16 4 9 2 -0.114754098
83 319.801 199.148 2070 2 7 1 16 4 9 4 0.038888889
84 319.801 199.148 2071 2 7 1 16 4 9 4 0.038888889
85 92.4915 80.6275 53 1 1 27 6 3 2
86 3301.685 2076.965 -139 1 3 1 27 6 3 3 -0.722222222
87 263.562 198.1685 -133 2 1 27 6 3 1
88 3
89 746.88 312.72 2672 1
90 1187.765 703.385 48 1
91 165.2275 133.4545 1
92 293.145 253.86 2848 1 2 1 3 2 1 1
93 921.505 536.985 3856 1
94 20619.5 15006 8654 1
95 562.63 383.195 248 1 3 1 3 2 1 1
96 2786.05 1663 4366 1
97 72218 18784.5 197 3
98 20619.5 15006 8591 1
99 746.88 312.72 2742 1
100 1187.765 703.385 118 1
101 165.2275 133.4545 3
102 921.505 536.985 3926 1
103 20619.5 15006 8724 1
104 562.63 383.195 318 1 3 1 3 2 1 1
105 2786.05 1663 4436 1
106 37.235 22.8465
107 3088.275 2061.005 -2737 3
108 165.2275 133.4545 1
109 293.145 253.86 2786 1
110 20619.5 15006 8592 1
111 562.63 383.195 186 1 3 1 3 2 1 1
112 2786.05 1663 4304 1
113 9287.5 4096 20961 3
114 93.825 50.495 2608 3
115 844.99 600.135 -697 1
116 3088.275 2061.005 -2818 3
117 1027.2 416.435 380 2
118 1187.765 703.385 -95 1
119 20619.5 15006 8511 1
120 562.63 383.195 105 2
121 23438.5 11421.5 -179 2
122 129.0585 102.5635 660 1
123 2
124 9287.5 4096 19054 1
125 2786.05 1663 4348 3
126 1187.765 703.385 -131 1
127 1
128 2786.05 1663 4516 3
129 2786.05 1663 4202 3
130 1187.765 703.385 134 1
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TABLE 2 continued: Analyst reports – statement characteristics, finance variables, 
and analyst characteristics 
 
No_ Firm S ize  As s e ts Firm Size  Equity D Sec IBES Frcs t freq Larges t . Cos #2 digit Gen Firm Lagg ed
Is s Rec_ Co de Rev decile?  fo llo wed SICs Exp Exp frcs t acc .
129 2786.05 1663 4202 3
130 1187.765 703.385 134 1
131 23438.5 11421.5 -125 1
132 3263.2 2199.1 6091 1
133 392.22 141.365 152 2 2 0 19 3 12 1
134
135 3 4 0 19 3 12 3
136 95.905 67.275 181
137
138 2
139 313.655 135.065 27
140 75.8915 49.1485 377 2 3 0 19 3 12 1
141 759.09 418.23 1525 2 3 0 19 3 12 5 -0.179487179
142 2188.28 1434.38 6870
143 8651.5 6640.5 3528 2 5 0 19 3 12 9 -0.816462736
144 111.65 68.075 90 2 3 0 19 3 12 1
145 37.352 -0.026 3
146 427.115 204.975 650 2 3 0 19 3 12 3 -0.11627907
147 95.905 67.275 168
148 8651.5 6640.5 3270 2 5 0 19 3 12 9 -0.816462736
149 759.09 418.23 1298 2 3 0 19 3 12 5 -0.179487179
150 3990.78 2120.08 -497 2 5 0 19 3 12 7 0.092288243
151 111.65 68.075 35 2 3 0 19 3 12 1
152 238.465 118.445 -512 2
153 72218 18784.5 38 1
154 151.47 118.885 2 3 0 17 3 11 4 -1
155 2456.255 1767.765 -1098 3 2 1 19 4 7 6 -0.753909465
156 844.99 600.135 -736 2 3 0 31 5 12 3 -0.44
157 844.99 600.135 -399 1 3 0 31 5 12 3 -0.44
158 2843.1 1150.278 -248 2 0 46 5 2 1
159 154.27 81.715 1514 1 0 46 5 2 1
160 9172 5379 -2009 2 4 0 7 3 1 1
161 3990.78 2120.08 -428 1
162 72218 18784.5 -33 1
163 2
164 3
165 21139.5 10131.5 -247 2
166 3520.495 2205.985 10608 2 2 0 8 3 3 2 -0.76
167 2118.685 1701.555 3537 3 3 0 10 3 3 3 -0.396825397
168 57.13 36.59 2 4 0 12 3 2 1
169 121.185 95.255 1126 3 5 1 18 4 12 2 -0.625
170 3990.78 2120.08 -425 2 3 1 16 3 8 3 -0.382498304
171 215.8 103.355 2722 3
172 2599.2 1867.75 -708 2 5 0 8 2 2 2 -0.244256348
173 1847.365 999.07 1933 5 0 18 2 9 9 -0.216326531
174 1847.365 999.07 1942 5 0 18 2 9 9 -0.216326531
175 13699.25 10802.645 1166 2 4 0 18 2 9 4 0.789156627
176 243.31 137.976
177 1867.13 830.331 1238 2 3 0 18 2 9 1
178 21139.5 10131.5 -422 2 2 0 18 2 9 9 0.929824561
179 13248.275 7573.63 -424
180 2786.05 1663 4235 3 4 0 31 5 12 1
181 20619.5 15006 8586 1 4 0 31 5 12 7 -0.880184332
182 228.28 165.47 246 1 5 0 31 5 12 2 0
183 921.49 463.66 597 3 4 0 31 5 12 8 -0.517073171
184 3263.2 2199.1 6016 3
185 80712 22025.5 -161 2 4 0 31 5 12 5 0.672535211
186 4300.45 2003.93 1 2 0 31 5 12 10 -0.492957746
187 1549.69 926.54 427 2 2 0 31 5 12 1
188 1398.71 685.53 470 3 2 0 31 5 12 1
189 1398.71 685.53 526 3 2 0 31 5 12 1
190 3088.275 2061.005 -2686 3 4 0 31 5 12 7 -0.81858382
191 4300.45 2003.93 1 2 0 31 5 12 10 -0.492957746
192 20619.5 15006 8472 1 4 0 31 5 12 7 -0.880184332
193 3263.2 2199.1 6021 3
194 10011.265 3567.245 722 3 1 0 31 5 12 1
195 3088.275 2061.005 -2682 3 4 0 31 5 12 7 -0.81858382
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TABLE 2 continued: Analyst reports – statement characteristics, finance variables, 
and analyst characteristics 
 
No_ Firm S ize  As s e ts Firm Size  Equity D Sec IBES Frcs t freq Larges t . Cos #2 digit Gen Firm Lagg ed
Is s Rec_ Co de Rev decile?  fo llo wed SICs Exp Exp frcs t acc .
194 10011.265 3567.245 722 3 1 0 31 5 12 1
195 3088.275 2061.005 -2682 3 4 0 31 5 12 7 -0.81858382
196 3263.2 2199.1 6221 3
197 23438.5 11421.5 -218 3 4 0 31 5 12 6 -0.292006525
198 1398.71 685.53 475 3 2 0 31 5 12 1
199 18941.5 9940.5 188 3 4 0 17 3 11 2 -0.506849315
200 1158.65 769.67 5326 3 4 0 17 3 11 3 -0.775128069
201 257.885 131.38 1629 3
202 365.965 119.955 306 2
203 394.96 281.85 3 4 0 17 3 11 8 0.106382979
204 255.94 200.21 1309 3 2 0 17 3 11 4 -0.370967742
205 158.135 127.425 4716 3 3 0 29 6 12 1
206 1390.15 897.45 -334 3 2 0 17 3 11 3 -0.161764706
207 3088.275 2061.005 -1521 3
208 8516.5 3104 -456 2 2 0 17 3 11 4 -0.567567568
209 101.9 83.15 3 2 0 29 6 12 1
210 30.825 22.655 1461 3 3 0 29 6 12 1
211 255.94 200.21 1209 3 2 0 17 3 11 4 -0.370967742
212 18941.5 9940.5 366 3 4 0 17 3 11 2 -0.506849315
213 2456.255 1767.765 -1270 2 6 0 29 6 12 5 -0.298122066
214 365.965 119.955 460 2
215 1293.7 846.83 -903 1 4 0 17 3 11 2 0.44
216 151.47 118.885 1 3 0 17 3 11 4 -1
217 2456.255 1767.765 -1186 2 6 0 29 6 12 5 -0.298122066
218 1129.94 692.05 16090 1 1 1 20 7 8 8 -0.533333333
219 2576.735 905.6 29976 1 2 1 19 4 7 2 -0.27761194
220 257.885 131.38 1352 2
221 1390.15 897.45 -370 4 2 1 19 4 7 6 -0.720588235
222 8516.5 3104 -673 2 1 1 19 4 7 6 -0.567567568
223 7085.75 4406.35 475 1
224 28930 12344.1
225 3470.52 1184.86 -314 1
226 815.33 328.18 1367 2
227 8651.5 6640.5 3562 2
228 9172 5379 -1694 3 2 0 4 2 11 10 -0.892761394
229 9172 5379 -1730 3 2 0 4 2 11 10 -0.892761394
230 5797.5 2479.5 553 2 1 0 4 2 11 9 -0.893665734
231 100.05 51.92 358 2
232 10011.265 3567.245 855 1
233 623.365 498.935 3675 3
234 3
235 11012.65 4858.3 10337 2 1 0 8 3 3 2 -1
236 13278.95 3427.45 868 2 1 0 8 3 3 2 -0.62962963
237 2 2 0 8 3 3 2 -0.882352941
238 710.765 221.175 4339 3 1 0 7 3 4 2 -0.265306122
239 2599.2 1867.75 -744 2
240 2
241 433.811 390.115 1
242 1589.435 718.635 1626 3
243 11012.65 4858.3 10357 1 3 0 12 3 2 2 -0.368421053
244 13278.95 3427.45 843 1 0 12 3 2 1
245 57.132 36.585 2 4 0 12 3 2 1
246 937.23 734.685 2232 2 0 12 3 2 2 -0.863215488
247 10011.265 3567.245 888 2
248 427.115 204.975 631 4 1 24 3 7 3 -0.11627907
249 759.09 418.23 1344 3 5 1 24 3 7 3 -0.58974359
250 2233.15 1802.96 2996 2 5 1 24 3 7 2 0.591836735
251 1800.83 1098.38 3
252 556.475 441.68 2118 1
253 3672.73 2187.045 -1466 1
254 3672.73 2187.045 -1330 1
255 300.7 103.255 -422 1 0 8 2 2 1
256 433.81 390.12 3 2 0 8 2 2 2 -0.214285714
257 2118.685 1701.555 3934 3 2 0 8 2 2 1








Mean(Certa inty score) 0.300912017
Mean(Activity score) 0.47596553
Mean(Excess  Returns  (-1   0)) 0.003026613
Mean(Excess  Returns  (-1   1)) 0.005280645
Mean(D Equity) 0.083012564
Mean(D Debt) 0.019979857
Mean(Firm S ize  Asse ts ) 6288.720411
Mean(Firm S ize  Equity) 2797.626815
Mean(D Securities  Is suance) 1708.238095
Mean(IBES Rec. Code) 1.965217391
Mean(Forecas t freq. Revis ion) 3.115384615
Mean(Larges t decile?) 0.423076923
Mean(# cos  followed) 20.96923077
Mean(# of 2 digit S ICs) 4.153846154
Mean(Gen. Experience) 7.223076923
Mean(Firm experience) 3.469230769
Mean(Lagged forecas t accuracy) -0.356517195
Std Dev(Optimism score) 0.015584947
Std Dev(Certa inty score) 0.150554279
Std Dev(Activity score) 0.050966087
Std Dev(Excess  Returns  (-1   0)) 0.04637731
Std Dev(Excess  Returns  (-1   1)) 0.053482521
Std Dev(D Equity) 0.140966131
Std Dev(D Debt) 0.129845822
Std Dev(Firm Size  Asse ts ) 12972.79645
Std Dev(Firm Size  Equity) 4488.592226
Std Dev(D Securities  Is suance) 3899.069725
Std Dev(IBES Rec. Code) 0.82462573
Std Dev(Forecas t freq. Revis ion) 1.433998126
Std Dev(Larges t decile?) 0.495958623
Std Dev(# cos  followed) 8.677636285
Std Dev(# of 2 digit SICs) 1.49656733
Std Dev(Gen. Experience) 4.189809314
Std Dev(Firm experience) 2.558428725
Std Dev(Lagged forecas t accuracy) 0.472000706
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Ro w Opt Sco re Cert Sco re Act Sc ore Exc Ret (-1   0) Exc  Ret (-1   1) D Equity D Debt Firm As s ets Firm Equity
Optimis m s c ore 1.00 0.36 0.00 -0.16 -0.07 0.14 -0.04 0.05 0.05
Certainty s co re 0.36 1.00 0.30 0.17 0.13 0.19 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12
Activity s co re 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.01
Exces s  Returns  (-1   0) -0.16 0.17 0.08 1.00 0.90 0.16 0.02 -0.05 -0.09
Exces s  Returns  (-1   1) -0.07 0.13 0.09 0.90 1.00 0.12 0.02 -0.07 -0.08
D Equity 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.12 1.00 0.19 -0.25 -0.20
D Debt -0.04 -0.02 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.19 1.00 -0.26 -0.20
Firm Size As s ets 0.05 -0.11 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.25 -0.26 1.00 0.90
Firm Size Equity 0.05 -0.12 0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.20 -0.20 0.90 1.00
D Securitie s  Is s uance -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.22 -0.14 -0.13 -0.02 -0.03 0.03
IBES Re c. Co de -0.16 -0.12 -0.14 0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.26 -0.07 -0.13
Fo re cas t fre q. Revis io n -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.10 0.04 -0.09 -0.02
Larg es t decile ? 0.08 0.32 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.20 -0.03 -0.35 -0.42
# co s  followed 0.10 -0.02 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.18 -0.01 -0.03
# of 2 dig it SICs 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.29 0.16 -0.27 -0.34
Gen. Experience -0.21 -0.23 -0.11 -0.15 -0.17 -0.23 0.03 0.27 0.38
Firm e xpe rience -0.02 0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.19 -0.21 -0.08 0.34 0.45
Lagg ed forecas t accurac y 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.11 0.24 0.16
Row D Sec  Is s IBES Code Frcs t freq_ Rev Larges t dec ile? . cos  fo llowed
Optimis m s core -0.01 -0.16 -0.01 0.08 0.10
Certainty s core 0.06 -0.12 -0.12 0.32 -0.02
Activity s core -0.04 -0.14 -0.01 0.04 0.08
Exces s  Returns  (-1   0) -0.22 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04
Exces s  Returns  (-1   1) -0.14 0.00 0.08 -0.05 0.03
D Equity -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 0.20 0.22
D Debt -0.02 -0.26 0.04 -0.03 0.18
Firm Size  As s ets -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.35 -0.01
Firm Size  Equity 0.03 -0.13 -0.02 -0.42 -0.03
D Securities  Is s uance 1.00 -0.26 -0.18 0.03 -0.17
IBES Rec . Code -0.26 1.00 -0.02 -0.16 -0.14
Forecas t freq. Revis ion -0.18 -0.02 1.00 0.12 0.36
Larges t dec ile? 0.03 -0.16 0.12 1.00 0.26
# cos  fo llowed -0.17 -0.14 0.36 0.26 1.00
# o f 2 dig it SICs -0.04 -0.19 0.25 0.58 0.79
Gen. Experience -0.10 0.09 0.12 -0.57 -0.01
Firm experience -0.11 0.05 -0.12 -0.36 -0.16
Lagged forecas t accuracy -0.11 -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.12
Row . of 2 dig it SICs Gen_ Experienc e Firm experience Lag  frcs t acc
Optimis m s core 0.16 -0.21 -0.02 0.01
Certainty s core 0.05 -0.23 0.12 0.06
Activity s core 0.00 -0.11 -0.09 0.04
Exces s  Returns  (-1   0) 0.07 -0.15 -0.08 0.02
Exces s  Returns  (-1   1) 0.03 -0.17 -0.19 0.04
D Equity 0.29 -0.23 -0.21 -0.07
D Debt 0.16 0.03 -0.08 0.11
Firm Size  As s ets -0.27 0.27 0.34 0.24
Firm Size  Equity -0.34 0.38 0.45 0.16
D Se curities  Is s uance -0.04 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11
IBES  Rec. Code -0.19 0.09 0.05 -0.01
Forecas t freq. Revis ion 0.25 0.12 -0.12 0.10
Larges t decile? 0.58 -0.57 -0.36 0.02
# cos  fo llowed 0.79 -0.01 -0.16 0.12
# o f 2 dig it SICs 1.00 -0.39 -0.33 -0.09
Gen. Experience -0.39 1.00 0.57 -0.03
Firm experienc e -0.33 0.57 1.00 -0.07
Lagged forecas t accuracy -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 1.00
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TABLE 5: Power 
 
Alpha = 0.1    Delta = 10% of the coefficent estimate
N = 219
Regression Equation Ia Ib
Sigma 0.0529 0.0530
Independent Variable (below) Power Power
Optimism Score 0.7211 0.7891
Certainty Score 0.1750 0.1746
Activity Score 0.9996 0.9996
D Equity 0.1295 0.1294
D Debt 0.4785 0.4770
Firm Size Equity 0.1000 0.1000
Optimism Score * Firm Size Equity 0.1000 0.1000
Optimism Score * Activity Score 0.6084
Regression Equation IIa/f IIb IIe
Dependent Variable ----> Optimism Score Certainty Score Activity Score
N 203 203 202
Sigma 0.0151 0.1472 0.0534
Independent Variable (below) Power Power Power
D Equity 0.2749 0.1318 0.1171
D Debt 0.1519 0.2831 0.1736
D Securities Issuance 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000
N = 202
Regression Equation IIc IId
Sigma 0.0151 0.0519
Variable Power Power
D Equity 0.2749 0.1009
D Debt 0.1519 0.2751
D Securities Issuance 0.1000 0.1000
Optimism Score 1.0000 1.0000
Optimism Score * D Equity 1.0000 1.0000   
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TABLE 5 continued: Power 
 
 
Alpha = 0.1    Delta = 10% of the coefficent estimate
     N = 106    D Equity    Regression Equation IVa
Analyst Characteristic Forecast frequency Largest decile #  firms followed #  industries
Sigma 0.0114 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013
Independent Variable (below) Power Power Power Power
IBES Rec. Code [1] 1.0000 0.1515 0.1440 0.1427
IBES Rec. Code [2] 0.1197 0.1266 0.1198 0.9893
IBES Rec. Code [3] 0.1104 0.1184 0.1111 0.1097
D Equity 0.5930 0.3517 0.4538 0.2063
Analyst Characteristic 0.1000 0.1031 0.1000 0.1948
D Equity * Analyst Characteristic 0.1715 0.2335 0.1085 0.1010
Analyst Characteristic General experience Firm Experience Lagged Forecast
Sigma 0.0113 0.0112 0.0014
Independent Variable (below) Power Power Power
IBES Rec. Code [1] 0.1484 0.1544 0.1320
IBES Rec. Code [2] 0.1217 0.1103 0.1222
IBES Rec. Code [3] 0.1144 0.1082 0.1143
D Equity 0.3885 0.2945 0.4922
Analyst Characteristic 0.1002 0.1002 0.1000
D Equity * Analyst Characteristic 0.1170 0.2945 0.1206
     N = 102    D Debty    Regression Equation IVa
Analyst Characteristic Forecast frequency Largest decile #  firms followed #  industries
Sigma 0.0116 0.0014 0.0016 0.0015
Independent Variable (below) Power Power Power Power
IBES Rec. Code [1] 0.1634 0.1660 0.1701 0.1606
IBES Rec. Code [2] 0.1168 0.1279 0.1199 0.1200
IBES Rec. Code [3] 0.1082 0.1161 0.1701 0.1065
D Debt 0.4630 0.4066 0.8714 0.6062
Analyst Characteristic 0.1000 0.1029 0.1000 0.1016
D Debt * Analyst Characteristic 0.1028 0.7387 0.1123 0.1025
Analyst Characteristic General experience Firm Experience Lagged Forecast
Sigma 0.0114 0.0116 0.0014
Independent Variable (below) Power Power Power
IBES Rec. Code [1] 0.1556 0.1650 0.1391
IBES Rec. Code [2] 0.1191 0.1175 0.1154
IBES Rec. Code [3] 0.1107 0.1097 0.1092
D Debt 0.2542 0.4639 0.3198
Analyst Characteristic 0.1003 0.1001 0.1001
D Debt * Analyst Characteristic 0.1535 0.1067 0.1001
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TABLE 6: Hypotheses and Research Questions results 
 
Hyp.  Elements       Support/Relationship?    p value      Alpha  
H1 
a. Hi Opt.   Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Equity No  
b. Hi Opt.   Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Equity No     
c. Low Opt.   Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Equity No 
d. Low Opt.   Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Equity No     
e. Hi Opt.   Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Assets No    
f. Hi Opt.   Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Assets No    
g. Low Opt.   Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Assets No     
h. Low Opt.   Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Assets. No  
 
H2 
a. DEquity      No  
b. DDebt      No  
 
H3 
a. Exc Returns –1 1     Firm Size Equity No  
b. Exc Returns –1 0     Firm Size Equity No 
c. Exc Returns –1 0     Firm Size Assets No  
d. Exc Returns –1 0     Firm Size Assets No  
High Opt. Score Group 
e. Exc Returns –1 1     Firm Size Equity No  
f. Exc Returns –1 0     Firm Size Equity No 
g. Exc Returns –1 1     Firm Size Assets No     
h. Exc Returns –1 0     Firm Size Assets No  
i. Exc Returns –1 1      Large Firm Size Equity Yes  0.0435  0.05  
j. Exc Returns –1 0      Large Firm Size Equity No 
k. Exc Returns –1 1    Small Firm Size Equity No  
l. Exc Returns –1 0    Small Firm Size Equity No  
m. Exc Returns –1 1    Large Firm Size Assets Yes  0.0315  0.05  
n. Exc Returns –1 0     Large Firm Size Assets No 
o. Exc Returns –1 1    Small Firm Size Assets No  
p. Exc Returns –1 0    Small Firm Size Assets No  
 
H4       No 
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TABLE 6 continued: Hypotheses and Research Questions results 
 
Hyp.  Elements   Support/Relationship?  p value Alpha  
H5 
a. Hi Cert.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Equity No  
b. Hi Cert.  Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Equity No     
c. Low Cert.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Equity No 
d. Low Cert.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Equity No     
e. Hi Cert.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Assets No      
f. Hi Cert.  Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Assets No    
g. Low Cert.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Assets No      
h. Low Cert.  Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Assets. No  
 
RQ1 
a. Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Equity  No  
b. Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Equity  No     
c. Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Assets  No 
d. Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Assets  No     
 
RQ2 
a. Hi Act.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Equity No  
b. Hi Act.  Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Equity No     
c. Hi Act.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Assets No 
d. Hi Act.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Assets No     
e. Low Act.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Equity   Rel’ship-exp. dir’n. 0.0437  0.05  
f. Low Act.  Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Equity   Rel’ship-exp. dir’n. 0.0362  0.05  
g. Low Act.  Exc Ret. –1 1    Firm Size Assets   Rel’ship-exp. dir’n. 0.0880  0.1  
h. Low Act.  Exc Ret. –1 0    Firm Size Assets.  Rel’ship-exp. dir’n. 0.0681  0.1 
 
H6 
a. D Equity      No  
b. DDebt      No     
High Opt. Score Group 
c. DEquity      No 
d. DDebt      No     
Low Opt. Score Group 
e. DEquity      No 
f. DDebt      No     
 
H7 
a. D Equity      No  
b. DDebt      No     
High Cert. Score Group 
c. DEquity      No 
d. DDebt      No     
Low Cert. Score Group 
e. DEquity      No 
f. DDebt      No     
 









Hyp.  Elements   Support/Relationship? p value Alpha  
RQ3 
a. D Equity  Relationship-opposite to predicted direction 0.0656  0.1  
b. DDebt             Relationship-opposite to predicted direction   0.08  0.1 
    
RQ4 
a. D Equity      No  
b. DDebt      No 
High Act. Score Group 
c. DEquity      No 
d. DDebt      No     
Low Act. Score Group 
e. DEquity      No 
f. DDebt      No     
 













Hyp.  Elements      Support/Relationship? p value Alpha  
H9 
a. Exc Returns –1 0   Forecast Freq. Lo Opt. No  
b. Exc Returns –1 0   Forecast Freq. Hi Opt. Yes  0.0684  0.1 
c. Exc Returns –1 1   Forecast Freq. Lo Opt. No 
d. Exc Returns –1 1   Forecast Freq. Hi Opt. Yes  0.03  0.05  
e. Exc Returns –1 0   Decile?  Lo Opt. Yes  0.08  0.1  
f. Exc Returns –1 0   Decile?  Hi Opt. No    
g. Exc Returns –1 1   Decile?  Lo Opt. Yes  0.02  0.05  
h. Exc Returns –1 1   Decile?  Hi Opt. No  
i. Exc Returns –1 0   #firms followed Lo Opt. No  
j. Exc Returns –1 0   #firms followed Hi Opt. No  
k. Exc Returns –1 1   #firms followed Lo Opt. No  
l. Exc Returns –1 1   #firms followed Hi Opt. No 
m. Exc Returns –1 0   #2 digit SICs Lo Opt. No  
n. Exc Returns –1 0   #2 digit SICs Hi Opt. No  
o. Exc Returns –1 1   #2 digit SICs Lo Opt. No  
p. Exc Returns –1 1   #2 digit SICs Hi Opt. No 
q. Exc Returns –1 0   Gen. Exp. Lo Opt. Yes  0.0498  0.05  
r. Exc Returns –1 0   Gen. Exp. Hi Opt. No  
s. Exc Returns –1 1   Gen. Exp. Lo Opt. No  
t. Exc Returns –1 1   Gen. Exp. Hi Opt. No 
u. Exc Returns –1 0   Firm Exp. Lo Opt. No  
v. Exc Returns –1 0   Firm Exp. Hi Opt. No  
w. Exc Returns –1 1   Firm Exp. Lo Opt. No  
x. Exc Returns –1 1   Firm Exp. Hi Opt. No 
y. Exc Returns –1 0   Lagged frcst Lo Opt. No  
z. Exc Returns –1 0   Lagged frcst Hi Opt. No  
aa. Exc Returns –1 1   Lagged frcst Lo Opt. No  










Hyp.  Elements     Support/Relationship?         p value  Alpha  
H10 
a. Exc Returns –1 0   Forecast Freq. Lo Cert. Yes  0.03  0.05  
b. Exc Returns –1 0   Forecast Freq. Hi Cert. Yes  0.06  0.1 
c. Exc Returns –1 1   Forecast Freq. Lo Cert. No 
d. Exc Returns –1 1   Forecast Freq. Hi Cert. Yes  0.03  0.05  
e. Exc Returns –1 0   Decile?  Lo Cert. No      
f. Exc Returns –1 0   Decile?  Hi Cert. No    
g. Exc Returns –1 1   Decile?  Lo Cert. No      
h. Exc Returns –1 1   Decile?  Hi Cert. No  
i. Exc Returns –1 0   #firms followed Lo Cert. No  
j. Exc Returns –1 0   #firms followed Hi Cert. No  
k. Exc Returns –1 1   #firms followed Lo Cert. No  
l. Exc Returns –1 1   #firms followed Hi Cert. No 
m. Exc Returns –1 0   #2 digit SICs Lo Cert. No  
n. Exc Returns –1 0   #2 digit SICs Hi Cert. No  
o. Exc Returns –1 1   #2 digit SICs Lo Cert. No  
p. Exc Returns –1 1   #2 digit SICs Hi Cert. No 
q. Exc Returns –1 0   Gen. Exp. Lo Cert. No      
r. Exc Returns –1 0   Gen. Exp. Hi Cert. No  
s. Exc Returns –1 1   Gen. Exp. Lo Cert. No  
t. Exc Returns –1 1   Gen. Exp. Hi Cert. No 
u. Exc Returns –1 0   Firm Exp. Lo Cert. Yes  0.0046  0.005  
v. Exc Returns –1 0   Firm Exp. Hi Cert. No  
w. Exc Returns –1 1   Firm Exp. Lo Cert. No  
x. Exc Returns –1 1   Firm Exp. Hi Cert. No 
y. Exc Returns –1 0   Lagged frcst Lo Cert. No  
z. Exc Returns –1 0   Lagged frcst Hi Cert. No  
aa. Exc Returns –1 1   Lagged frcst Lo Cert. No  











Hyp.  Elements   Support/Relationship? p value Alpha  
RQ5 
a. Exc Returns –1 0   Forecast Freq. Lo Act. No     
b. Exc Returns –1 0   Forecast Freq. Hi Act. No     
c. Exc Returns –1 1   Forecast Freq. Lo Act. No 
d. Exc Returns –1 1   Forecast Freq. Hi Act. No     
e. Exc Returns –1 0   Decile?  Lo Act. No      
f. Exc Returns –1 0   Decile?  Hi Act. No    
g. Exc Returns –1 1   Decile?  Lo Act. No      
h. Exc Returns –1 1   Decile?  Hi Act. No  
i. Exc Returns –1 0   #firms followed Lo Act. No  
j. Exc Returns –1 0   #firms followed Hi Act. No  
k. Exc Returns –1 1   #firms followed Lo Act. No  
l. Exc Returns –1 1   #firms followed Hi Act. No 
m. Exc Returns –1 0   #2 digit SICs Lo Act. No  
n. Exc Returns –1 0   #2 digit SICs Hi Act. No  
o. Exc Returns –1 1   #2 digit SICs Lo Act. No  
p. Exc Returns –1 1   #2 digit SICs Hi Act. No 
q. Exc Returns –1 0   Gen. Exp. Lo Act.  Rel’ship-exp. dir’n. 0.054  0.1 
r. Exc Returns –1 0   Gen. Exp. Hi Act. No  
s. Exc Returns –1 1   Gen. Exp. Lo Act. No  
t. Exc Returns –1 1   Gen. Exp. Hi Act. No 
u. Exc Returns –1 0   Firm Exp. Lo Act. No      
v. Exc Returns –1 0   Firm Exp. Hi Act. No  
w. Exc Returns –1 1   Firm Exp. Lo Act.  Rel’ship-exp. dir’n. 0.0508  0.05  
x. Exc Returns –1 1   Firm Exp. Hi Act. No 
y. Exc Returns –1 0   Lagged frcst Lo Act. No  
z. Exc Returns –1 0   Lagged frcst Hi Act. No  
aa. Exc Returns –1 1   Lagged frcst Lo Act. No  
ab. Exc Returns –1 1   Lagged frcst Hi Act. No 
 
Rel’ship-exp. dir’n.: Relationship – expected direction 
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TABLE 6 continued: Hypotheses and Research Questions results 
 
Hyp.            Elements       Support/Relationship?  p value  Alpha  
H11 
DEquity 
a. Forecast Freq.     No  
b. Decile?      No  
c. #cos followed     No  
d. #2 digit SICs  Relationship-opposite to predicted direction 0.0865  0.1  
e. Gen. Exp.      No      
f. Firm Exp.  Relationship-opposite to predicted direction 0.0280  0.05  
g. Lagged frcst      No  
DDebt 
a. Forecast Freq.     No  
b. Decile?      No  
c. #cos followed     No  
d. #2 digit SICs      No      
e. Gen. Exp.      No      
f. Firm Exp.      No      




a. Forecast Freq.     No  
b. Decile?      No  
c. #cos followed     No  
d. #2 digit SICs      No      
e. Gen. Exp.      No      
f. Firm Exp.  Relationship-opposite to predicted direction 0.0056  0.01  
g. Lagged frcst      No  
DDebt 
a. Forecast Freq.     No  
b. Decile?      No  
c. #cos followed     No  
d. #2 digit SICs      No      
e. Gen. Exp.      No      
f. Firm Exp.      No      
g. Lagged frcst      No  
 
H13 
DEquity,  DDebt 
a. Forecast Freq.     No  
b. Decile?      No  
c. #cos followed     No  
d. #2 digit SICs      No     
e. Gen. Exp.      No      
f. Firm Exp.      No      
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